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GUERRILLA WAR :: GAME TIME! ****************************** Send your links and comments to: politicalsoldier@lycos.com ___________________________ ******* ... Why Take Up Armed Struggle? ___________________________ ... or Why Play Guerrilla War ______________________ The art of Revolution: _________________ ------------------------------- ************ A (partially) ANARCHIST VIEW ------------------------------ -----------------******* ********** No SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE in recent world history has been effected through non-violent means. We live in a world of violent domination, where people are either compliant with corporate rule or done away with. As first-world consumers, we are all guilty of directly causing the subjugation of marginalized people the world over, the destruction of the global ecosphere and the deaths of those in political opposition to any government ours has relations with. Americans who claim to be believers in non-violence are fooling themselves. *********************** The legitimacy of armed uprising is an issue that each of us has to decide for ourselves. Pacifism is a sort of self-therapy to dismiss anything the pacifist doesn't wish to confront on a personal level. Don't argue the pacifist point of view with me, and don't censure me. Let the government do it's own dirty work. Now, on with the educational portion of this program... _______________________ _______________________ BUILD YOUR BASE OF SUPPORT... There are things that have to be done before taking up armed struggle. First, surround yourself with people you know well enough to trust with your life. The second is to prepare to leave everyone else you know behind and prepare for a lonely, painful existence of hardship and uncertainty. And drug, drink and sexual abstinence as well. Now you and a small band of friends are ready to begin. Before you pull off your first action, though there are a lot of preparations you will have to make. _________________________ Make sure you know as much as you can possibly find out about your base of operations: Who are your neighbors, do they suspect anything? Are they simpatico? Where are good hiding places? Good escape routes? Any fresh water springs or other sources of water in the area? Can you slip in and out of your basecamp ( or your various urban-rural safe-houses and barns) without being seen or looking suspicious? ______________________ _______ Do you know people outside your group who you can ask for help who will not ask questions and do anything (within reason) to help you? These people are going to be the ones who will let your wounded comrades hide out in their homes until they are better, who will help you acquire food and medicine, who will feed you and deliver messages to your above-ground supporters. You will not succeed in your efforts without at least a nominal base of support. Your supporters need not adhere to your political views. They will help you out because they like you as people and think that you are passionate, even heroic. Do not do anything to expose these people to violence from the police and military. They are not combatants. They have not joined your militia. Keep away from them during times of heightened activity from the police and military forces. ____________________ ___________ The guerrilla group - or preferably a higher level coordinating cadre (politico-military or intelligence) will also identify people or officials who can be coerced or intimidated into helping (money, protection, information on military plans) _____________________ ________ At this time, you should be propagandizing, letting the community know that there are people around who are willing to stop complying with the legal status quo. Through these efforts, you will better understand the community you are involved with. This is the time to confront attitudes - both yours and other's - and get a feel for who can be trusted and how far that trust can go. This is a time when you are vulnerable to arrest. ____________________ __________ Propaganda vehicles consist of flyers, graffiti, guerilla actions against billboards and any media at your disposal - print, radio, video -- anything that you can use to explain why you feel the way you do. _____________________ __________ It is not important to convert people to your side at this point - emphasis should be in setting the proper context for your consequent actions, so that when they begin, people will know what's happening and why. ___________________ ____________ When to begin your activities as a revolutionary fighting unit? Marxist strategy preaches that "the people" should be prepared before there can be a chance for a revolution to be successful. Yet history has shown that "the people" will start kicking ass long before any leadership has emerged. According to Che, the Cuban Revolution proved that an oppressed people sometimes only need a catalyst to prod them into action before they ignite into a mass movement -- to sweep aside the old regime. History has also shown that in the chaos between the fall of the old and the start of the new order, there is a danger of a cultish leader taking control of the revolutionary spirit in order to set himself up as the new dictator. ********************* ***** The times this has not happened, there has been international efforts made to crush the Revolution before it sets an example the rest of the world could follow. These are dangers that need to be considered during the development of the revolution. ******************* ********** Once your group is ready to begin activities, there are considerations: how do you keep the unit supplied with ammunition, what are your targets for attack, are you ready for a counter-strike by the enemy? There is a difference, psychologically, in pressing the attack and being attacked. In the former case, there is a feeling of control, you have met the enemy and are now going to kick his ass. When they come after you, however, there is a feeling of defeat from the outset. Coming under fire by your enemy is unnerving. Even when faced with far superior fire- and manpower, the guerrilla group can escape by stealth or directed assault and use their knowledge of the area to make their get-away. ---------------------------------- --------------------------- ------------------- Essential equipment Here are the things each guerrilla soldier must have: a weapon a sleeping bag or wool blanket a backpack good boots a hammock a tarp some heavy clothing an ammo belt _____________________ __________ A mosquito net would come in handy during the warm seasons, and the guerilla will do well to have some sort of dry food on him whenever possible. Other things that could help out would include a small flashlight, a cup and small pan, a knife of some sort, especially one similar to a Swiss army knife. Some extra cord, string or twine for repairing equipment and stringing up the hammock and tarp is always a good idea. ______________________ __________ The less stuff the soldier carries in the field, the more mobile the unit is. If your unit is operating in a safe, familiar area, you can stash things, like staple foods , medicines and extra ammunition and weapons in hidey-holes spread throughout your field of operations. ______________________ _______ There should be one or two people outside the unit who can act as go-betweens when the unit needs things like food and medicine. It is not important for the whole unit to know these people, nor for them to know much about the unit. You will hopefully have contact with organizations which support your actions. When the time comes to escalate your activities, these outside contacts will become sources for new recruits. ______________________ _________ Desirable Items of Gear and Weaponry ____________________________ 308 and 50 caliber sniper rifles with high powered scopes ________________________ Mortars ________________________ Incendiary and armor piercing ammo ________________________ Spotting scopes and telescopes _______________________ Range finders _______________________ blasting caps and det cord _______________________ familiarity with various timing devices and trip cord booby traps ------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ----------- The Anarchist Guerilla Group _____________________ ______ Decisions - including the choice of commanding officers - are often made by consensus, though this is not always possible. In battle, when unexpected complications arise (serious accidents occur or during severe weather) the officers take the initiative to remedy the situation - longer-term operations are consulted with by a larger group of soldiers. No Anarchist Guerrilla should put themselves in the position of sticking rigidly to non-hierarchal principles in battle situations. The Guerrilla should be able to trust her fellow militia members who have been chosen at large to act in the best interest of the unit. This is easier to do with people you've known a long time or have faced enemy fire with. ********************* ********* The typical Guerilla group is small, between five and a dozen people. Any more than that and the odds of being spotted by the enemy are greatly increased. Any less and there are extreme limits to what your group can attempt and expect to survive. There will usually emerge one or two people with organizational skills who will often serve as leaders due to their general competence. These people may not be the same people who are effective combat leaders. The differences should be respected, as well as acknowledged. These people should be deferred to during times of crisis or difficult decision making such as when chosen officers are missing or incapacitated. ********************* ******* When the conflict escalates, the group will hopefully grow and the experienced members will be thrust into leadership roles with the new arrivals, help them to make the adjustment to clandestine or camp life and teach them how to survive engagement with the enemy. It is worth noting that the successful small group leader will not always be as competent with a larger group. And the person unable to take the initiative with a small group of friends might find herself feeling responsible for the well-being of the new recruits. Let these naturally occurring roles manifest themselves, but always be wary of anyone who takes on too much responsibility. If that person were killed during an action, the group might find itself in deep shit. It is the responsibility of the entire militia to see that all the work is shared by everyone, so that there is always someone available to help out when someone else is lost due to injury or illness. ********************* ****** When the group has grown to ungainly size, it will need to split up. This then creates a new difficulty of keeping in contact and coordinating actions. Therefore, any activities must be planned well in advance - though not necessarily in great detail. This difficulty will be compounded greatly the more recruits there are. The time will come when the militia will have to expand its base of operations. This is like starting all over again, with new contacts to be made with the people in the area, new maps to be acquired, new terrain to be explored. This is a dangerous time for the group, and should be undertaken with a heightened sense of alertness. There should be time available to send men into new places without their field gear, just to pass through and scope things out. It is important for these people to stay out of difficulties with the police in the new places. ----------------------------- -------------------------- ------------------------- Insurrection! ________________________ ______ There are no hard-set rules for making your initial engagements with the enemy: ______________________ Never engage the enemy in an attack that you cannot win. Don't send your infantry to assault a well-fortified airfield or attack a barracks outside your territory - use suicidal bombers or standoff weapons (mortars or 50 caliber rifles). _________________________ Always strike fast, with every weapon at your disposal, inflict the maximum amount of damage that you can and withdraw just as quickly. ________________________ Have your escape planned beforehand. ___________________________ Select a rendezvous point where anyone separated during the fighting can catch up with the others. ___________________________ Make every round of ammunition count. You'll never suffer from an over-abundance of ammunition. ___________________________ Recover ammunition and weapons from fallen enemies. Indeed, many of your engagements will be solely for this purpose. _______________________ _________ Don't panic if things don't go well. Get out as quickly as possible and try to make the enemy regret any pursuit attempted. ______________________ _______ .......... ALWAYS fire from a well-concealed position. ___________________ _____ Not just behind a tree or rock, but laying on the ground behind a tree or rock. It is especially important to be on the ground behind a bush or in grass. If not, the enemy will likely see the discharge from your weapon and be able to aim at that. If you're on the ground, underneath some sort of foliage, the enemy may not even see your gun's blast. The smaller a target you present, the less likely you'll be hit. ____________________ _________ Make sure you're not trapped, in a place where any movement will expose you to enemy fire with no chance for cover. Though these may sound like obvious points, you will be surprised at what people will do in the heat of battle. Practice with paint guns before using real weapons. ______________________________ If you are being pursued by an enemy column, always kill the lead man (the Point man). This will unnerve the enemy and make the point position difficult to fill. This tactic will sometimes divide the enemy against one another, as some men may refuse to take a position that is going to result in their deaths. ___________________________ Your first actions will likely not put a great deal of fear into your enemies. You will have to do armed robberies in order to provision your group with enough food and supplies to get started. Keep some money in reserve in case the group is forced out of their base of operations. Do not rob the families of the people who are your supporters, or who should be your supporters. Rob the wealthy, the powerful and the local tyrants. You'll know who they are, the businesses they own and where they live, if you've made the proper preparations. ________________________________ When you've pulled off your first outright "military" action, this should be followed by a propaganda effort, or propaganda should be made during the action, so that all will know what's going on. From this point on, the Guerrilla is on enemy turf, until they have established complete control of some territory. Once this action is taken, the war is on and the guerrillas will be under constant harassment. _____________________________ -------------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------- Defensive positions ____________________________ You should have prepared several bunkers at different places throughout your base of operations. Here, you can store excess items rather than carry them around with you all the time. These should offer some shelter, not only from the cold and rain, but also from light artillery, such as grenades launched from guns and mortars. Thus, if the attackers are only a small unit you may have some time to evacuate and retrieve valuable equipment. __________________________ Anytime the unit is under fire and has to withdraw from an area, they should do so in an orderly manner. Several people should fall back and offer cover fire so that the others can pull out. These people will then take up firing positions so that the previously positioned guerrillas can then withdraw, too. The process is repeated until the enemy breaks off pursuit. During such a strategic retreat, an experienced fighting unit may sometimes find itself suddenly in the possession of an easily-defendable position. By regrouping there, they may be able to actually mount a counter-attack against the pursuing enemy. To do this, they must attack with great energy and only if they have enough ammunition to sustain the attack. If they can successfully force the enemy into retreat, there will be opportunities to gather ammunition left behind by fallen enemy soldiers. Of course, when faced with superior numbers and firepower, the best idea is to leave the area as quickly as possible. ___________________________ ------------------------------- --------------------------- ---------------------- ..........Taking Action : And Seeking Strategic Effect ___________________________ In Nicaragua (FSLN)-Sandinistas) & El Salvador (FMLN) rebels pulled off spectacular actions not only to display their capabilities, but also to humiliate their enemies. They would capture the banquet hall where a member of a ruling familiy was holding a wedding reception or loot and burn stores that belong to the rulers. The Tupac Amaru attempted such an action in Peru when they took over the Japanese Embassy. They had undertaken the effort as an act of desperation, without really expecting to win the encounter. They could have attempted to shoot their way out, thus giving their supporters and those in sympathy with them a chance to join in the fray. Had they engaged the army units surrounding them in a prolonged, running battle, they could have set the city aflame with revolutionary fever. _____________________________ By carrying out such outrageous actions, the guerrillas illustrate to the people that the powerful are vulnerable. This inspires admiration and respect, not only with the people in the barios, but often in the ranks of the military as well. There are incidents of high-ranking officers in the military, disgusted by the attitudes and behavior of the ruling elite, who would withdraw their troops into their barracks and withhold them from the fighting, then pledge themselves to the revolutionary government. Displays of bravery coupled with upright behavior can win over to the guerrilla's side those who have been apathetic or even opposed to their actions. Not all who serve the powerful enjoy their roles. ___________________________ The focus of the guerrilla groups initial activities will be to disrupt the lives of the enemy forces as much as possible and to cut off their supplies. With stealth and a few homemade weapons, the guerilla band can attack airfields, convoys and other means of supply the enemy will use. Mines that can be detonated by remote switches are effective. Shotguns can be converted into grenade launchers and explosive devices (black powder grenades, molotovs, etc.) can be fired with them. Improvised weapons are effective, not only due to their offensive capacities, but also as a psychological weapon against the opposing soldiers, who assume you have nothing in your arsenal other than a few rifles. ____________________________ Do not take prisoners unless they are valuable - wealthy or high ranking. If possible, escort surrendering troops to a border and tell them to get lost for the remainder of the war. Do not allow them to return to their bases. Since they will be fellow countryfolk, they may actually want to join your side! They must prove themselves under fire before you can trust them with weapons! Until then they can be treated as suspect new recruits. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .......... Urban Warfare Usually labeled as "terrorists", the urban guerilla differs from the traditional "fighting in the fields" guerrilla in their base of operations. The Urban guerrillas are under more intensive scrutiny than those in the woods and have to be careful not to arouse the suspicion of neighbors as well as the police. But, they can hide out just as easily, have more targets to choose from and can often stir up the locals to take part in their actions, even if they are only playing supporting roles. The Sendero Luminoso in Peru existed for years in the slums of Lima. ____________________________ The urban guerilla band will never have the security that the "outdoor" guerrillas have, nor will they usually have the number of people involved in their day-to-day activities, still they will be able to maintain social ties to the outside world. This is both good and bad. It's a security risk anytime someone outside the group becomes familiar with one or more of it's members. The good part is that the urban guerrillas can more accurately assess their situation and plan their actions accordingly. ************************ Urban guerrilla activity is probably the first step to take in a modern industrial state, though it is usually the last phase of the traditional revolution. Due to the amount of police informants, security forces and military available to combat the guerrillas, it is advisable not to stay in one area for very long. Once a few actions have taken place, the guerrilla group can split up and regroup later. This regrouping should be seen as a chance to gather together to plan the next operation and the group should have their combat supplies stored somewhere secure. When the group is dispersed for any amount of time, there is no certainty that all the members will rejoin the group. Some may be arrested, or injured or killed. There is always the danger of being followed or turned in by someone familiar with the guerrillas, maybe even one of its members. In any case, treat a re-grouping with extreme caution, assume the worst and do not wait around for very long for any stragglers. ************************* ------------------------------- --------------------------- ---------------------- .......Some final thoughts about ________________________ Insurrection ________________________ Once a person begins down this road, it is difficult to turn back. Even if one surrenders, there is no guarantee the government forces will accept the surrender, or that they won't have you killed in prison. __________________________ Self-discipline is key to security. Wandering away to have a fling with a babe, getting drunk at a tavern or trying to contact a missed person could result in getting oneself and the entire group killed. The ability to remain calm under duress is extraordinarily useful. If stopped by an agent of the state, try to determine what the matter is all about before whipping out a gun or grenade or taking cyanide. The agent in question could be asking around about something totally unrelated to your activities. __________________________ Try not to be fearful, but allow yourself to use your fear to your advantage. Fear brings about a heightened state of alertness which can be quite useful at certain times. __________________________ __________________________ Russia as Weird as the USA __________________________ The Russian authorities have so far ignored Basayev’s statements. They are most probably investigating the incident that occurred on 18 February in the Ramenskoye district near Moscow. ___________________________ On that day, in the vicinity of the village of Starnikovo, experts found a crater under a pipeline and 10-mm holes in a 200-mm gas pipe. On the day after the incident Alexander Alexeyev, a senior police official with the regional police directorate told Gazeta.Ru that judging by the size of the crater, either two explosive devices of about 200 grams of TNT or a bucket of petrol blew up under the pipeline. An explosive device planted by unknown saboteurs under another pipe in the same area was discovered and defused by sappers before it detonated. Local police suggested that local teenagers, who had watched too many action movies, could have been to blame.
INSURGENCY LIFESTYLES TO Survive
07.12.04 (5:00 pm)   [edit]
Key Words:

Fourth Generation Warfare - Insurgents - 4GW - Sun Tzu - John Boyd - Imperialism - War - Clash of Civilizations - Maneuver Warfare - Improvised Weapons - Guerrilla Warfare - US National Security Threats - Intelligence - Espionage - Sabotage - Assassination - Energy Vulnerability - Fifth Generation Warfare - Blackmail - Disrupting Alliances - al Qaeda - Iraqi Resistance - High-Tech Sensors and Surveillance - Neutron Bombs; Terrorism - Terror tactics - Counterinsurgency (COIN) - Special Operations - Military Commands – CIA - Suicide bombings - Car Bombs - Conspiracy Theories - Osprey V 22 - AC-130 Gunships - Osama bin Laden - George W. Bush - Rumsfeld - Fourth World War - Islam - Moslems - Crusades - Jihad - Shahid – Martyrs - Permanent war

http://istanbul.indymedia.org/news/2004/07/8532.php" title="http://istanbul.indymedia.org/news/2004/07/8532.php" target="_blank"http://istanbul.indymedia.org...

A WORLD OF 4GW - INSURGENCY LIFESTYLES TO
SURVIVE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

Dear citizens interested in turning the tide of USA-led fascism, I am a military strategist. I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the 4th World War (4WW) - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare -- 5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon. (See Authors notes at bottom – or at www.soldierrebelion.squarespace.com)

[i]There will be war,
a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.[/i]
[b]A Good Defense Anticipates Enemy Offense: Rifleman Democracy[/b]

Traditional individual fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.

Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. So, to be successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box (or Box-cutter!), teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore. Falluja and Najaf/Karbala (in Iraq) support and yet also call into question this Rifleman analysis. Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. We are part way into a permanent war -- which is to say a long and complex war -- The Fourth World War. Groups opposed to the current power structure will have to master 4th and 5th generation mobile-chaos smart-targeting warfare. This kind of war relies on Secret revolutionary/battle/sabo tage cells, international media savvy, and connecting synergistically with each member and each group’s specialties: hackers, bombers, espionage, media, event-timing and logistics. The strength of Islamic fundamentalists lies in their cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) and their ability to combine cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timing to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader crusader (U.S.A.). The case of the FARC guerrillas in Colombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance! = political – territorial – military - financial POWER.

[u]Al Qaeda takes the long view[/u] that if Islam survives they win. Fundamentalist have cohesion and they have a weapon that embodies the most powerful elements of 4GW warfare: People, Ideas and Hardware. The weapon is suicide bombers and suicide car bombers. The West has no defense against such weapons except to declare martial law and watch the global economy crumble in their hands. A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland and starting World War II was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption. – A sinking ship brings out the rats…(UNO- Uno)

[u][b]A New Warfare to Fight the Permanent War of Totalitarianism: 4 GW[/b][/u]4 GW describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. (IV.1)

(IV.2.), 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name: Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible – or it could evolve into a war of insurgents versus States – a judo war of cultural attrition – which side can stand to lose what is important to their culture (civil rights, freedom, shrines, travel, vacations, airconditioning?) for the longest period of time. In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops. (IV.3.)

We live in a world of "Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)" where the tactics of the weak confound the tactics of the strong. Nation-states confront criminal enterprises, fanatical opportunists, terrorists whose gang-like networks transcend national boundaries. This smorgasbord of actors often slips through the cracks of our own security, military, and legal bureaucracies. Sub-national insurgents use guerrilla tactics, insurrection, sabotage and terrorism to subvert nation-states and challenge the established international system. Governments, politicians, and state military-security apparatus of the West; desperately want to engage their 4GW foes in the tried and true conventional ways of the past.

America prefers combat where only the strongest wins. US fourth-generation foes prefer 4GW judo, avoiding a decisive fight, leveraging US addiction to technology and "throwing us" using the USA's bureaucratic weight to do so. The enemy's "weapons technology advantage" in the 9-11 attacks consisted of box cutters and ceramic knives, combined with a steely determination to die for a cause... it worked, and the modern world's vast military-security-enforce ment bureaucracy was helpless to stop it… and will be again and again…

We are witnessing the early stages of a major geo-political transition. This shift is characterized by a global landscape of conflict where the division between combatant, criminal opportunist and civilian is blurred. In this potential global insurgency, the urban guerilla (not to forget their rural counterparts) may be a religious zealot or a child for hire with an RPG. As technophiles, Westerners are enraptured by modern weapons of great precision, but have lost sight that people and ideas are the essence of why wars are fought and for how long. In the traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the "tactics of the weak." However, they have repeatedly been successful in circumventing our military's far stronger conventional strategy, tactics, and thinking.

Well before the 9-11 attacks al-Qaeda recognized the power of asymmetric warfare and adaptive tactics for their jihad struggle. An article entitled "Fourth Generation Wars," in an al-Qaeda affiliated Internet magazine Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War acknowledges that 4GW forms the foundation of al-Qaeda's combat doctrine. In doing so, the author, Abu 'Ubed Al-Qurashi, reputed to be closely linked with Osama bin Laden, cites the landmark 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" as key to understanding contemporary global conflict.

Only a few military analysts recognize the deadly nature of 4GW
If these factors are driving the evolution of conflict, then solutions must lie primarily in their arenas, that is, within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role, performing specific tasks to solve problems that are intractable through other means. The West is searching for a coherent grand strategy to ensure that military (destructive) actions harmonize with their overall objectives and do not undermine the public support needed to prosecute a fourth generation war to its successful conclusion. In grand strategy, the carrot is as important as the stick, and alliances are critical factors which could favor the US in 4GW against al-Qa'ida and those who support similar ideologies.

Technology is important, and may provide options, but the fact is that lack of suitable technology cannot explain America’s poor track record in fourth generation warfare. Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion.


Our Lives are War: Understanding Iraq/Saudi War Strategies - Insurgency as 4GW,
by Jacques Dessalines and

-- Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players -- and the Forces They Represent –
is nowhere to be found...
-- There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to.
-- Awareness is a battlefield…

The ruling class employs phases of escalation to control power and its uses:
Fake liberal democracy; sophisticated riot control and subversion of opposition groups; faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war. This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task.

The third and final phase of the struggle against the ruling class will see the development of sophisticated Guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generation Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets and the media: To build or disrupt alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the West and create doubt. (Uno)

The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. (Dos.)

.....Between advance and retreat. Hidden dragon. Do not act.
--I Ching

]__________________Newsec tion- either on US strat or on Insurgent –

Both sides in the 4thWW will employ-- - harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduces the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics... to win without fighting. (tres)
John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- (OODA) pattern (also called decision-loop) to operate inside his opponent's decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army. (cuatro.)

There are 3 fundamental points to the 4GW:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.
2. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical US strike force (with a hardware component) can be compared to the ancient and news ways of thinking about conflict and maneuver warfare
3. First attack your enemy’s strategy then his alliances and cohesion. (cinco)

Summary of the US 3-4 GW Evolutionary Strike Force:
A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[And- for insurgents - to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy -- especially among the leaders of US strike forces]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (seis.)]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:
U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (siete)
__________(( ADD IN MORE ON US STRIKE FORCE AND its strat -- )))

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won. (( EXorm,ore forfootnotes--))

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US -- though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast! (II.7.- ocho)

Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun's goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. The tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of deception, security, and intelligence.

Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others even when the opponent is stronger or wealthier. Foreknowledge must be obtained from reliable people, people who know the conditions of the enemy. (III.2.) Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem conducted before and during combat operations can unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. If one fails to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become "mentally isolated." If adversaries can keep us in this state -- operating inside our OODA loops -- then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. (III.3.) A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts: phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change. Ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (III.4.)

The Utility of Military Force
For Sun Tzu the best way to defeat an enemy is by "attacking his strategy." Attack early, while the enemy's plans are being laid or employ unusual methods to "seize victory without even battling." Should this prove impossible, Sun Tzu then recommends disrupting his alliances. Some say that this means to attack early (pre-emptive strikes), before the enemy can solidify his alliances. Others suggest it means isolating potential enemies from sources of support, or intimidating them through strong alliances of your own. (V.1.)

The use of armed force by the US government must be carefully thought out so that it does not cause more problems than it solves. (V.2.) For this Boyd expands on Sun Tzu's first two courses of action through his concept of "grand strategy," which serves to:
1. Support national goals and pump up one's own resolve, drain away the adversary's resolve, and attract the uncommitted to one's cause
2. End the conflict on favorable terms in the shortest possible time and with the least possible loss of life
3. Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict – don’t kill too many of the enemy or mistreat prisoners (V.3.)

Insurgents will try to block each of these imperialist actions.

U.S. leaders will commit enormous forces to protect such things as access to crude oil, and given the dependence of the U.S. economy on imported resources, practically any part of the world could become a "vital national interest" in the future (Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia). (V.5.)

Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations
The Balkans, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq have shown the limited capacity of the major powers to deploy forces relevant to keeping the peace and rebuilding states shattered by civil war. Civil affairs capabilities have proven to be almost non existent. Keeping the peace requires soldiers to act like policemen, a job for which they are ill prepared and ill equipped. Many Third World countries resent the U.S. ready resort to military power. (VI.1.)

Since the Bush invasion of Iraq, large majorities around the world have grown to fear the threat of an Imperial-Crusader US foreign policy and the US proclaimed right to pre-emptive strikes, lies and bullying that it uses to get its way with the people of the Middle East, US allies and the UN. The U.S. is rushing to court unpopularity across the world, contrary to expectations that the Bush national security establishment would conduct itself with sophistication. U.S. foreign policy under President Bush suggests a lack of coherence and a hegemonic arrogance. The Bush administration has set a record for alienating so many nations in such a short period. And then there was Iraq... (VI.2.)

Forgotten are the lesson of the Tao Te Ching, that any use of "power," even (especially) if it is successful, breeds resentment and may plant the seeds of future conflict. (VI.3.) Boyd, Chester and most liberals miss the point of Bush's actions. Having grasped the seriousness of Boyd's predictions about 4GW, the US has been forced to accelerate its program of global domination. Though some mistakes were made -- as in all conflicts -- Bush seeks to draw out potential large nation enemies so that the US can destroy their conventional forces and reduce their support to insurgents. Then the US will only face 4GW and strategic threats of a diminished nature. (VI.4.)

What Makes a Military Force "Effective"? -- Sun Tzu's and Boyd's Perspective
Sun Tzu focused on the problem of how to get groups of people to work together harmoniously under conditions of hardship, danger, and the inevitable confusion of conflict (and it applies to all forms of conflict, including business, politics, and sport). Before envisioning conflict with another state, the ruler and his immediate advisors must survey and compare many factors to guide their plans:

1. Which leadership has the Way? The "Way" (Tao) means harmony among people, so that the people and the leadership are united in purpose to overcome fear of danger. The Way, in this sense, includes unity of purpose between the ruler and the population and other factors, such as the ability to clearly perceive the true situation (which includes the ability to make these comparisons
2. Is the terrain favorable? Is the weather likely to be favorable? Which army can better exploit the advantages of climate and terrain?
3. Which side's generals are the more capable? The political leadership must make objective comparisons of such factors as humaneness, intelligence, trustworthiness, courage, and sternness.
4. Which army's doctrine and discipline is superior? Here the leadership must consider organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and provisions. Whose troops are the stronger, including morally and intellectually?
5. Whose military discipline is more effective? In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out?
6. Whose officers and soldiers are better trained? Whose system of rewards and punishments is clearer? (VII.2.)

Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if wise military practices were applied, war could be waged with certain success. (VII.3.)

Later he restates some of these practices with a more tactical (i.e., who will win the next engagement) flavor:
1. Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious.
2. Those who know when to use many or few troops are victorious.
3. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
4. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious.
5. Those whose generals are able and not constrained by their governments are victorious.

Leaders should improve weaknesses wherever they exist, and the final calculation rests heavily on the experience, intelligence, and intuitive understanding of the commander and the ruler. Success in conflict depends on one's ability to perform these calculations and, in particular, not to deceive oneself. (VII.4.)

Boyd's scheme is:
1. Mutual trust; unity: Similar to The Way in Sun Tzu's list of factors.
2. Intuitive competence, at all levels from private to general. In addition to proficiency with weapons at the individual level, "intuitive competence" also applies at the command levels, where it refers to the "feel" that great commanders have for the progress of the battle, and in particular to their seemingly uncanny abilities to detect and exploit openings while they still present opportunities. This comes from years of practice at ever increasing levels of complexity. The Germans called it fingerspitzengefhl, literally "finger tip feeling" and it implies such a high level of competence that complex decisions can be made without hesitation, similar to the Zen notion of action without a "sticking mind."
3. Mission orientation. The Germans called this auftragstaktik. The basic idea is that commanders and subordinates enter into a type of contract where the subordinate agrees to fulfill the commander's intent, while the commander agrees to give the subordinate wide latitude on how this is done.
4. Focus and direction. Related to the concept of "commander's intent." It often refers to a specific unit and its mission. All other units must make their activities support the fulfillment of this unit's mission. Depending on the progress of the operation, the commander may shift this role to another unit and another mission. (VII.6.)

Boyd's insight was that organizations that operated along these lines would naturally generate higher OODA loop speeds and more irregular ways to employ them. Boyd concluded that such units could:
1. Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistru st with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novel ty as a basis to sever the adversary's moral ties and disorient him.
2. Select the initiative (or response) that is least expected [note: not necessarily the one that has the highest predicted effectiveness, since the enemy can perform these calculations, also].
3. Establish the focus of the main effort (together with other efforts) and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.
4. Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
5. Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for later mop-up.
6. Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic and chaos in order to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse. (VII.7.)

We find echoes in Sun Tzu: 1. Take them by confusion. 2. Throw them into disarray. 3. Cause division among them. 4. Victory is gained by surprise. 5. Take away the heart of their general. (VII.8.)

Cheng and Ch'i: Forcing or Deceiving
The interplay of Cheng (Pinning -- Orthodox) and Ch'i (Distracting -- unorthodox) strategies is a tool of available to those who operate inside their opponents' OODA loops. It applies to the force (people-ideas-hardware) rather than to any particular component alone. Making armies able to take on opponents without being defeated is a matter of unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng) methods ... The unorthodox and the orthodox give rise to each other like a beginning-less circle -- who could exhaust them? (VII.9.) The utility (resiliency, cohesion and cleverness training) of a force can be assessed without predicting how effective it will be. This seeming contradiction hinges on the idea that the actual performance of the force in the field depends on the enemy's actions, which cannot be predicted.

True war-winning effectiveness comes from the force's ability to play the cheng / ch'i game, that is, to set up the opponent, then quickly shift to something he does not anticipate, and then to exploit to the fullest the resulting confusion. A key element of strategy is to "drive the opponent crazy" before actually committing military forces. Isolation in all forms -- particularly diplomatic and economic -- is an effective tool for accomplishing this. (VII.10.) Morally-mentally-physical ly isolate our adversaries from their allies and outside support as well as isolate them from one another in order to magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis, bring about their collapse and/or bring about a change in their political / economic / social philosophy so that they can no longer inhibit our vitality and growth. – Boyd (VII.11.)

Drawn out campaigns tend to strain both alliances and domestic support, and what is seen as gratuitous destruction alienates support in the US, among allied countries, and within those groups in the target society that would support the U.S. The insurgents will seek to exploit the weaknesses in this strategy and make it backfire. They can take advantage of election cycles and mistakes to add to strains in alliances and catch shifting public opinion with symbolic or terror-inducing strikes (assassinations, bombings and kidnappings). (VII.13.)

Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
In creating forces and assessing them, one needs to ask:
1. Do they offer the requisite variety? Do they present a range of options to the people actually conducting the conflict? Do they facilitate the creation of cheng / ch'i situations? Do they create options that would be least expected by the enemy, not necessarily the one that is predicted to be the most effective?
2. Can commanders rapidly shift the focus if required? When a decision is made, are forces structured and trained so that it can be rapidly carried out? Is this capability being tested and exercised under a variety of circumstances? When selecting between quickness and predicted effectiveness, is there a strong bias towards quickness?
3. Are people and forces being trained to act in harmony? Are organizations formed to foster harmony? Is this quality exercised in a variety of circumstances and are those who prove adept in its employment promoted?
4. What is being done to ensure that people at all levels will take the initiative in harmony with others in the force to achieve objectives? In particular, are all commanders trained to issue mission orders? (VIII.2.)

Instead of detailed tactics, followers of Sun Tzu evolved a way of thinking about conflict. That guerillas should be using Sun Tzu is not surprising, given his emphasis on deception and formlessness, since guerillas that become predictable are quickly eliminated. As the world moves into the 21st Century, such forms of highly irregular and unpredictable conflict are becoming the only way for many opponents to confront U.S. military forces. 4GW (asymmetric" conflict pushed to its limits) is what the U.S. military will have to face in the future. (VIII.4.)

The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others' failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard. (IX.3.) Future wars will be fluid with no defined fronts or formations; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops ask permission and wait for orders; war designed to place the enemy in a dilemma, to suck him in to traps of his own creation, taking advantage of his stupidities and weaknesses and avoiding his strengths; war where soldiers act on judgment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common culture and common outlook; a willingness to fight close, not just applying firepower from a long standoff, but infiltrating when the opportunity arises. (IX.4.)

According to Sun Tzu, The Way of military operations winds through unit cohesion:
Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
Good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of momentum, not from individual people. (X.1.))

Cohesion works because it creates and in turn depends on trust. Harmony is an essential element of any successful organism, and "mutual trust," (translation of the Germaneinheit -- literally, "oneness") is at the top of Boyd's "organizational climate for operational effectiveness.” He concluded that: Harmony in operations is created by the bonds of implicit communications and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar mental images or impressions each individual creates and commits to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of experience in the same ways. (X.2.)

Military hardware and organizations must possess the inherent variety of action to facilitate cheng / ch'i (orthodox/unorthodox) maneuvers. The range of options that a force offers and the rapidity with which it can switch between them is crucial. A clever and motivated enemy can develop counters to any particular capability. One force will win because -- through training, cohesion, and leadership -- it can create options for itself and dilemmas for the enemy, and switch between them more rapidly, more inconspicuously, and with more irregularity than the enemy can cope. When a vulnerability ("gap") has been created or discovered, it can be exploited. Since the enemy is a clever and determined human being, one must assume he will find and close gaps as rapidly as possible, or, even more insidiously, change them into traps, or convert some of them into chengs of his own by attempting to create and exploit gaps in one's own forces. If he can do this more rapidly than friendly forces can cope, he can create Boyd-type effects: panic, confusion, and chaos, leading to collapse. This suggests that forces with mission cycles measured in days, or in some cases even hours, will find it difficult to function as the ch'i component of maneuver warfare, thus limiting the options for commanders. (XI.2.)

Logistics and support requirements play a role in sustaining high operational tempos (ammo, fuel, spare parts). These can interfere with the ability to maneuver and create and exploit gaps. Systems that require extensive logistical support also tend to focus commanders' attention inward. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, it was the rare commander who could envision how to break free of the railroads that were providing his sustenance. Part of the genius of both Grant and Sherman is that they were able to convert this obvious dependency into a cheng, that is, fool Confederate commanders into attacking "lines of supply" while they launched out cross country: Grant towards Jackson and Vicksburg, and Sherman towards the sea. (XI.3.)

Complex hardware and systems focus organizations inward, which can accelerate the trend towards confusion, disintegration, and collapse. However, technical complexity per se is generally not the most severe issue, since it generally "just" degrades how often the system is available for combat. Organizational complexity is much more debilitating and is the key component in Clausewitz's famous friction. It represents organizational entropy that dissipates energy and converts it into chaos, without having to wait for the enemy to do it. In particular, the OODA loops of complex organizations can degrade quickly in such an environment, making them vulnerable to cheng / ch'i maneuvers by the other side.

The real problem with very complex equipment is that it spawns complex organizations to operate, support, and maintain it. In other words, technical complexity tends to generate organizational complexity and thus predictability and slowness. (XI.5.) However, the US defense establishment is so vast that within its shadows there exist focused operational systems (even whole divisions) who are learning from Iraq and adapting technology to aid the new tactics they have adopted. This will force insurgents to become more creative, more cunning and more destructive.

Complexity (technical, organizational, operational) causes commanders and subordinates to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interaction -- hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or even internal) circumstances. The effects of this internal focus were noted above: confusion, disruption, disintegration -- the very effects one should be trying to create in the enemy.

Guerrilla Insurgents and New Technology
Advanced technology has been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision systems, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

To counter enhanced guerrilla technologies "Finders" -- intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets are being deployed. The role of wide-area assets is to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. A limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage -- a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars will enhance U.S. surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor. (XII.5.)

Advanced Sensor and Surveillance Technologies
Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors make it possible to examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination. Other technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical "sniffers." Miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. Lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles may soon patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysi s devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a "mothership" or a ground station. Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors.

One can listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building's windows. Experiments are under way with radars that have the potential to "see" through walls. Tagging suspected vehicles helps develop information about patterns of activity and assists shooters in engaging elusive targets. An operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. The transmitter permits authorities to monitor that vehicle's movement. Signals from the transmitter make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle "in the crosshairs" should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy the vehicle. (XII.6.)

Most researchers ignore that technology promotion by the US is primarily to re-assure its people of US superiority, second to prop up the profits of the Congressional-Military-In dustrial Complex and by creating so many and diverse technological gadgets and systems some of them turn out to actually be useful. Effectiveness concerns have also overcome institutional momentum in a few notable cases. The Commanche helicopter program was scrapped after costs and concerns that insurgents will posses advanced surface to air missiles rendering the aircraft obsolete. (XII.7.)

Force Structure Options
Summary of the guidelines for a Sun Tzu / Boyd force:
1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly.
2. Military forces, when they are used, should obey Sun Tzu's dictum: end the conflict in the quickest possible time with the least possible damage to either side.
3. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.
4. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it. (XIII.1.)

The changing nature of conflict has led the US to focus on littorals (regions within 100 miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests demands an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions. The rise of 4 GW results in a need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors. Characteristic of this are the following:
a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.
b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/ strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.
c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.
d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources. (XIII.3)

Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options
The U.S. Marine Corps provides all the conventional ground warfare capability needed to engage the land forces of any Third World country. The three active duty U.S.M.C. divisions provide a range of capabilities, including heavy armor, light armored vehicles, organic artillery, air support and infantry. The Marine Corps, beginning with its 1989 edition of Warfighting, is the farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Using them, the Marines liberated Kuwait in two days and probably could have done it sooner. Once the rout began, there was nothing to stop a Patton-esque penetration -- properly supported from the air (as Patton's was) and logistically (as Patton's was not) -- from continuing straight on to Baghdad. The big hook around the left flank was at best cheng, perhaps unnecessary, and in any case, failed to accomplish its stated objective, since the bulk of the capable Iraqi forces escaped over the Euphrates. (XIV.1.)

Fire Support and Weapons Requirements
Before World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Then the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment was developed where the objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy's war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War was the first time that precision guided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force (Bosnia and Kosovo). Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. (XV.2.)The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead and coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laser homing guidance.

Similar capabilities have been demonstrated in Iraq (2003-2004). However, the shock-and-awe initial attacks were not particularly effective and the US has failed to kill a single Iraqi leader with bombs as of June 2004. Weapons or technology without solid intelligence to guide them are dangerous and of marginal tactical or strategic value. (XV.3.)

LOCATING & ATTACKING TERRORISTS & RELATED TARGETS
Improvements are being developed so that U.S. air forces can identify and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist to define new and more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets. Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. They may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments, or they may choose urban environments (again occupying unexceptional buildings). Within these environments, terrorists may be stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatant (family members or unrelated strangers). New concepts for engaging such a demanding target set will seek to incorporate innovations among "finders, controllers, and shooters." (XV.4.)

U.S. forces can apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 Specter gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions. It combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. The crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy's ability to observe preparations for an attack. (XV.5.)

One can also envisage situations in which U.S. involvement in counterterrorist operations is desired but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. The Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind "fingerprints" associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes. Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged. (XV.7.)

To cause larger enemy formations to stop moving and to engage land forces ashore, a US strike force needs an effective close air support and air interdiction capability. This would facilitate maneuver warfare in littoral areas outside the battleship range, and it could also provide fire support and interdiction in conjunction with unconventional forces operating much deeper -- perhaps in a thrust / feint towards the capital or ruling juntas residences, weapons of mass destruction storage / launch facilities, etc. In order to support high operational tempos and interfere with the enemy's, an aircraft must be developed capable of operating from carriers, as well as far forward from austere bases (and generating high sortie rates). Such considerations suggest a short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft with system redundancy, a low vulnerable area, low visible signatures, and high loiter capability. Particular attention should be paid to allowing it to operate successfully in an environment infested with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS -- shoulder-fired infra-red missiles), of which there are upwards of 500,000 in the world today (accounting for 2/3 of all aircraft destroyed by ground fire in the last 15 years). This implies a low infra-red signature (less than one-tenth that of an F-16, which is itself some 35 times that of an AH-64 Apache helicopter). It should be designed to rain enough chaos from the sky to cause Third World troops to rapidly leave their vehicles and not return for an appreciable time. (XV.8.)

The Marines have the AV-8B Harrier, but it is expensive, complex, and vulnerable to ground fire. U.S.A.F. studies in the1980s demonstrated the feasibility of developing a simpler and more rugged aircraft.

OspreyCV-22
With a range of 515 miles and capable of transporting 24 troops plus the two man crew (at 275 knots), the V22 is set to play an important role in transporting Special Forces. The vertical takeoff plane can carry a 10,000-pound payload 50 nautical miles at 3,000 feet. During the previous OPEVAL (operations evaluation tests), 24 combat loaded Marines were flown in the MV-22. Ingress and egress were demonstrated without difficulty. The Air Force requires the CV-22 to provide a long-range VTOL insertion and extraction capability and to supplement the Special Operations Forces (SOF) MC-130 aircraft in precision engagement. The V-22 design, incorporating advanced mature technology and b survivability and crashworthiness. A tiltrotor combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft represents a technological breakthrough in aviation that meets long standing military needs. The US has the capability to quickly move more than 10,000 troops into any nation’s capital or key cities and back them up with sustained firepower.

FFOOTTHNNOTE SSS

Uno

Dos : See full article and introduction with a comment on the Massive US base
at Diego Garcia: Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/0 58642.html" title="http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/0 58642.html" target="_blank"http://www.mblog.com/imperial...
Rifleman Democracy (plus INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION; long w/footnotes plus ); http://communitydefense.blogs...

Tres.:

Cuatro
Cinco
seis
siete
ocho:- See complete article at: Section II. National Defense Review --
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us -national-defense-review.html" title="http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us -national-defense-review.html" target="_blank"http://communitydefense.blogs...
With Photo Gallery at: Section II. National Defense Review
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I have worked in British intelligence services and for American security firms that directed the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. I have worked for the Iraqi resistance. I am a strategist and not much of a philosopher by training, but I can tell you of my experiences. I cannot tell you which political, social or religious systems work the best -- because what is the best or even what is good for the short or the longterm has been degraded and mystified in this existence that we call the modern world. People cannot talk about the definitions of important things or about why communications/understand ing are so difficult.
I can tell you what I have seen. These are stories from behind the curtain of the rich and powerful. Wherever US-UK money goes it breeds the most vile corruption. From the sex-slavery of Dyncorp in Bosnia to the same group and many other security contractors committing torture, murder and atrocities in Iraq; from the jokes about the Colombian and Peruvian airlines/airforce drug smuggling to the hilarious naivete of US activists and eco-tourists. There are 100 stories of the tragedies tolerated or promoted by the USA government and its elite classes around the world. To know the details of these evil errors (evil -- but are they errors or intentional? Ah...) is to understand why for billions of people in the world -- and millions of insurgents everywhere - there is no turning back toward (false) ideas of peace or cooperation with the West or its ruling class imperialists.


 
Section XV. The series Beyaond Iraq - Global Insurgency
07.07.04 (4:55 pm)   [edit]
[u][b]Section XV. [/b][/u]

[b]Additional Weapons for 4GW and US Strike Forces
From RPGs and Sniper Support Systems to Mini and Neutron Nukes[/b]

[u]Weapons Of The Insurgents: RPGs and US Defense[/u]

Weeks before the invasion of Iraq, a fight developed between the Army's top general and his civilian boss.. Gen. Eric K. Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee the job would take something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld believed it could be done with about half that number. Missing from the sound bites that framed the debate was the reason behind the discrepancy.

DOD expected entire Iraqi divisions to lay down their arms. Shinseki looked beyond that surrender and worried that without a sufficient force to stand guard, the Iraqi arsenal would be plundered. By the time the first statue of Hussein was pulled off its pedestal, a massive stockpile of rocket-propelled grenade launchers and shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles had fallen into the hands of Islamic insurgents. In the months that followed, half the Americans who died in Iraq were killed by one type of these weapons, the RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade.

[b]RPG-s[/b]
In every patrol in Iraq in which they recover weapons, they find RPG-7s. Cheap to buy, easy to use and nearly as rugged as a club, the RPG-7 is an old weapon that has been reborn in the hands of militants. Developed by the Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise in Russia in the 1960s, its simplicity made it an immediate favorite among armies the Soviet bloc, China and North Korea. The Cold War’s end, RPG-7s had found their way into the inventories of 40 armies, many unfriendly to the US.

At least 1 million RPG-7s have been manufactured by Bazalt or are under license. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the flow of RPGs from military warehouses to the black market has grown from a trickle to a flood. RPG-7s can be bought for less than the price of a laptop computer. The weapon traces its origin to the Panzerfaust tank buster that Germany developed for territorial defense at the end of World War II. Never intended for use against aircraft, the RPG-7 became an effective helicopter killer. In 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawks fighting in Mogadishu, Somalia, were shot down by RPG-7 fire. In Afghanistan, the mujahedeen used the weapons for helicopter ambushes. It has been used in a similar fashion by insurgents in Iraq. (XV. 1.)

[b]New Warheads[/b]
The success of the RPG is Bazalt's introduction of new types of ammunition for its venerable weapon. The TBG-7V, PG-7VR and OG-7V rounds allow a soldier to accomplish an unprecedented range of missions on the battlefield. The thermobaric TBG-7V round has a lethality comparable to a 120mm artillery projectile or mortar shell. The TBG-7V round operates on the enhanced blast principle. The warhead explosion creates a high-temperature field and simultaneously generates a powerful blast wave, When fired against unprotected troops, it shreds and incinerates everyone within a 30-ft. radius. If it strikes armor, it produces a 6- to 18-in. opening. The heat and shock wave from the explosion then enters the vehicle, killing the crew.

One way to defend against this type of round is to apron a tank with reactive armor, which is essentially a coating of explosive. When the round strikes the tank, the reactive armor explodes--in effect, it pushes back against the incoming round. This prevents the focused jet of molten metal created by the impact of the shaped charge from squirting through the crew compartment. The PG-7VR overcomes reactive armor by using a 2-part, or tandem, warhead. It hits the tank with two closely timed blasts. The first punches a hole in the reactive armor. The second attacks the armor.

The OG-7V fragmentation round is designed specifically for urban warfare (targets of brick and reinforced concrete). The OG-7V accuracy is close to that of small arms allowing the round to be dropped through a relatively small opening where the enemy is firing. The Iraqi army (and now insurgents) have these advanced rounds, along with older varieties of antipersonnel and anti-armor munitions. Besides RPGs and anti-aircraft missiles over 5 million machine guns disappeared from arsenals.

RPG-7 is a reloadable, shoulder-fired, muzzle-loaded, recoilless antitank and antipersonnel rocket propelled grenade launcher that launches fin-stabilized, oversized rocket - assisted HEAT grenade (85-mm in the PG-7 version, 70-mm in the PG-7M) from a smooth bore 40mm tube. The launcher with optical sights weighs 6.9 kilograms (15.9 pounds) and has a maximum, effective range of 300 meters against moving point targets and 500 meters against stationary point targets. 500 meters is also the maximum range of rocket assisted flight, which enables a flatter trajectory and more accurate aiming. The RPG-7V is light enough to be carried and fired by a single operator. An assistant grenadier deploys with the shooter, to the left of the gunner to provide cover with his personal weapon and reload after fire. The shooter normally carries two additional rounds of ammunition, and his team member three more rounds. The use of the weapon is fairly simple. Without much practice, a user can hit a vehicle sized target most of the time at ranges of 50-100 meters. More practice enable engagement of targets at extended range, which also provide relative safety to the user. At the maximum range of 920 meters, RPGs self explodes (4.5 seconds from firing) and that's how the weapon is sometime used as a form of "artillery", spraying shrapnel over military installations, or slow, low flying or hovering helicopters. The antipersonnel grenades reach over 1100 meters. Following the conflict in Afghanistan, new anti-personnel grenades were added. A modified version, PG-7BR is also designed to defeat reactive armor. It uses a precursor charge to eliminate the reactive armor and a main charge to penetrate the main armor. Basalt, the original RPG manufacturer has also designed further advanced versions, including RPG-26 and RPG-27, with effective range of 200-250 meters for anti-tank, anti-personnel and anti-material missions. Thermobaric warheads were also adapted for RPGs with the RShG-1 and the RShG-2. Both are optimized for operations in enclosures of up to 200 cubic meters.

The current RPG-7V model can mount a telescope and both infrared and passive night sights. All RPG-7 models have optical sights which can be illuminated for night sighting.

Among the production grenades are the PG-7, PG-7M, PG-7N, The PG-7V rocket has a penetration capability of 330mm of steel armor. PG-7VL antitank grenades with armor penetrability of up to 600 mm of rolled homogeneous steel. The PG-7VR is a tandem warhead designed to penetrate explosive reactive armor and the armor underneath. The OG-7 and OG-7M are high-explosive antipersonnel grenades.

The RPG-18 is another derivative of the original RPG. It was designed as a short-range weapon, The tube-launched, disposable launcher contain a single 64mm PG-18 rocket, similar in principle to the US LAW system. The operator carries the launcher in a collapsed position and extends the inner tube to make the weapon ready to fire. The weapon has an effective range of 200 meters, with a HEAT warhead which is capable of penetrating up to 375 millimeters of steel armor. The fuse of the HEAT grenade activates 2 to 15 meters after leaving the tube and self-destructs after a flight time of 4 to 6 seconds. The folding sight at the forward end of the tube is calibrated for ranges of 50, 100, 150, and 200 meters.


[b]Missile Attacks[/b]
Saddam Hussein's looted arsenal was brimming with SA-7 Grail anti-aircraft missiles. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), over the past 25 years the Grail and later models including the SA-14 have been responsible for attacks on 35 airliners--mostly commercial flights. Twenty-four of these attacks led to crashes, killing more than 500. In Iraq, as many as 5000 Grails are believed to have fallen into the hands of insurgents. CRS reports that between May and November 2003, 19 attacks on aircraft took place in the vicinity of Baghdad International Airport. Each SA-7missile is equipped with an infrared sensor that "sees" the invisible heat trail behind a jet engine as though it were a beacon atop a lighthouse. Guidance-system circuitry reacts to changing input from the sensor by adjusting the fins of the missile. This keeps the Grail pointed toward its target as it streaks through the sky at supersonic speeds. When the missile reaches the engine, its warhead detonates 2.5 pounds of high explosives.

The Grail tracks its quarry with an infrared sensor and heat-activated batteries to power its circuitry. All have a limited shelf life. Although estimates vary, many of the Grails in illegitimate hands are believed to be too old to reliably fire. The second shortcoming has to do with the way the Grail finds its targets. The Grail is a tail-chaser, which means that it must be fired from behind an aircraft. The distance between shooter and target--as far as 6 miles--gives the aircraft crew time to defend itself. One technique is to release flares, creating a target that's "brighter" than the heat from the jet engine. Air Force One, commercial airliners operated by Israel's El Al and military aircraft have installed various types of these systems. Efforts are under way to install similar defensive systems on American airliners.

[u][b]Best RPG Defense: FCLAS[/b][/u]
The most promising plan for defending troops against insurgents' rocket and missile attacks is called FCLAS. The abbreviated acronym stands for "full spectrum active protection close-in layered shield," which in itself is an explanation of how it works. FCLAS is an antimissile missile in a tube. Strategically placed around a vehicle, boat, building or helicopter, these missiles create a sort of invisible shield that detects and then demolishes incoming threats. The idea behind FCLAS is simple in concept but difficult in execution. The forward section of the FCLAS projectile houses two radar systems. The radar at the front looks forward for objects whose speed is consistent with an RPG-7 round or missile. When this threat is detected, a black powder charge, like that used to launch smoke grenades, ignites, propelling the FCLAS out of its storage tube. The second radar system looks up, down and to both sides.

The launch is timed so that it and the incoming target will pass each other when they are about 15 ft. from the vehicle being protected. At this precise moment, the side-looking radar senses the passing threat and ignites the explosive material that fills the middle of the projectile. The force fractures the explosive's metal sheath. Scored lines in the sheathing cause it to shatter into tiny square-shaped shards that radiate outward. Anything in the path of this doughnut-shaped wall of fast-moving metal is shredded into confetti. (XV. 2.)

[b]SENSORS, DRONES (UAV) & What Trillions ($) Will Buy![/b]
New generations of sensors will improve the ability of U.S. forces to detect and monitor the activities of small groups of enemy combatants. The Air Force is developing a new synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that operates simultaneously in the ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) bands and can detect stationary targets under foliage or camouflage. These sensors will not provide the resolution required for identifying (or perhaps even detecting) individuals, but they can be used to detect facilities and equipment (including weapons) that might be associated with terrorist groups and activities.

Improving assessment capabilities is also important. Most of the images and other data collected by U.S. intelligence sensors are never looked at or are given only a cursory examination. To better exploit the burgeoning take of these sensors, efforts are under way to develop new automated assessment tools that will include computer algorithms designed to detect specific activities by people or vehicles and to detect anomalous events or activities against an established baseline.

Technical surveillance systems, such as electro-optical sensors on UAVs, may be useful for this purpose. The problem of emphasizing force-protection measures is that such concerns can begin to compete with the overall mission of neutralizing terrorist groups. To reduce this competition, the DoD will need to develop and field affordable systems appropriate for monitoring activities around friendly bases. Simple, low-cost systems could be adequate to this task. Small, low-speed UAVs with a time-on-station of a few hours have proven suitable for base-protection missions and are less expensive than a Predator UAV. Unattended ground sensors (UGSs) may be useful for these tasks as well. They tend to have a smaller field of regard than sensors on airborne platforms, but they are relatively inexpensive and are on station 24 hours a day. Scanning lasers can be used to detect rifle scopes and other optics pointed at a base, and infrared backtracking systems can identify the source of sniper fire. (XV. 3.)

[b]UAVs: Unmanned Drones[/b]

Top of the Line Armed PREDATOR B - MQ-9 HUNTER/KILLER

In May 1998 General Atomics was awarded a Block 1 Upgrade contract to expand the capabilities of the Predator system. System upgrades include development of an improved relief-on-station (ROS) system which allows continuous coverage over areas of interest without any loss of time on station, secure air traffic control voice relay, Ku-band satellite tuning and implementation of an Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS). The upgrade also covers a more powerful turbocharged engine and wing de-icing systems to enable year-round operations. The upgraded Predator, the MQ-9 Hunter/Killer, has been operational in the Balkans since April 2001.

The Predator B has an operational ceiling of 50,000ft and maximum internal payload of 800lb and external payload over 3,000lb. Predator B has been flight tested with Hellfire II anti-armour missiles and can carry up to 14 missiles. Flight trials have also taken place with the General Atomics Lynx SAR (synthetic aperture radar) payload. Lynx also features ground moving target indicator technology. The USAF has also ordered two versions of Predator B with turbofan jet engines. The Predator was flight tested with a L-3 Communications Tactical Common Datalink (TCDL). A Northrop Grumman Bat submunition was successfully dropped and a FINDER mini-UAV was launched from a Predator UAV in 2002. Refueling capabilities are also being examined. (XV. 4.)

[b]Surveillance Drones: Hermes UAV (Israeli)[/b]
This is a large endurance UAV that can be mistaken for a twin-engine passenger aircraft. It is a well-appointed UAV for long-range surveillance and tactical reconnaissance. These aircraft were bought by Israeli allies and business interests (South Africans, Argentines, and Singapore), as well as some civilian scientific agencies for land survey and mapmaking. This UAV was chosen to serve as the backbone system for the development of UAV system applications/ missions. Produced by Israel's Elbit Systems and Silver Arrow, hese workhorse UAVs are in service with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and have accumulated extensive operational experience as the main tactical UAV.

Hermes 450 is an upper range tactical UAV system with advanced composite structure and optimised aerodynamics. Advanced avionics enable autonomous flight and precise GPS navigation. Fully redundant systems significantly increase reliability. Target detection and recognition are performed by gimbaled, electro-optical, state-of-the-art payloads. The UAV is equipped with sophisticated communication systems transferring imagery in real time to ground control stations. The Hermes 450 maximum payload weight is 150kg, its operational altitude is 18,000 feet and its maximum endurance is 20 hours.

July 2003, Elbit Systems Ltd. announced that its subsidiary EFW Inc, Fort Worth, Texas, had been awarded a contract by SENTEL Corporation to operate its Hermes 450 UAV system in support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Director of Test and Evaluation, Joint UAV Joint Test and Evaluation (JUAV-JT&E), at NAS Fallon, Nevada. Elbit/Silver Arrow is working on its twin-engined Hermes 1500 and IAI/MALAT, the Heron 1. The contract was awarded after a validation programme which demonstrated the Hermes 450's capabilities and versatility. Under the contract, the Hermes 450 will provide a reliable turnkey system for seamless integration of UAVs with other operational military elements. The effort, which is to run through July 2004, will encompass operations with forces from all US Military Services. The system had already conducted more than a dozen highly successful missions in support of US Navy carrier air wing training and JUAV test and evaluation exercises.

The contract to supply and operate its Hermes 450 is a breakthrough for the company into the largest market in the world. Elbit/Silver Arrow also offer the smaller Hermes 150 and the larger, High Altitude Long Endurance Hermes 1500 in the US market as an important, cross-Service role. Versions of the Hermes are used by the US Border patrol to monitor activity on the Mexican border. (XV. 5.)

[u][b]Marines Have OWLS[/b][/u]

AL Taqqadum, Iraq (June 17, 2004) -- Just as an owl uses its keen sight to search a landscape for prey, the "Night Owls" have used advanced technology in the air to aid allies on the ground to complete mission after mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Likewise as the owl has been traditionally known as a wise bird, it is a fitting name for the Marines of Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2, Marine Air Control Group 38, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, who have used their unique RQ-2B Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle to provide aerial intelligence. The squadron can provide many different kinds of intelligence, said Staff Sgt. R. Brian Ward, internal and external UAV pilot, VMU-2. "Our main focus right now is aerial reconnaissance. We also do battle damage reports, artillery adjustments and search and rescue," said the 33-year-old Anderson, S.C., native. "We try to be the eyes for the guys on the ground. Even if we find out that there's nothing on the ground, that's good (intelligence)."

The UAVs have daytime lenses and forward-looking infrared lenses so they can obtain detailed footage in any lighting condition, said Staff Sgt. Thomas B. Kush, imagery chief, VMU-2.

"With a lot of the things we do, we can tell exactly what is going on. We can watch all four sides of a house so we can track anybody going in or out of the house," said the 35-year-old Weirton, W.Va., native. "We can tell guys on the ground to go in the blue door or the red door if we need to."

The squadron has also been tasked with monitoring the Iraqi roadways for various threats to coalition forces."We've found (improvised explosive devices) on the sides of roads. We've found checkpoints for ambushes on our convoys," said Kush.

After flying 1,200 hours in 8 months during their last deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, VMU-2 is within 200 hours of surpassing that number on their current deployment in Iraq. "We broke a thousand hours in three months. We are allotted 300 hours a year. So in three months, we've flown almost four years worth of flight hours," said Ward.

Part of the reason for the increase in flight hours is due to many people discovering the value behind the Pioneer's capabilities. "People didn't know what we could do in the past. Now people request the services we can provide," he added. "We get requests for targets to check and we divide them up between upcoming flights. We (check) roughly 15-20 targets daily."

Regular wear and tear from flying increased hours in desert conditions would be a problem without the maintenance Marines, said Cpl. Jeff Witherspoon, internal UAV pilot, VMU-2. "Maintenance has been doing an exceptional job. We've been flying for three months straight and that takes a toll on the aircraft," said the 27-year-old from Burkburnett, Texas.

The maintenance Marines have made a few changes due to the operational tempo, said Sgt. Jamie D. Shepler, UAV plane captain, VMU-2. "Each aircraft has assigned mechanics. But with 24-hour (operations), you work on what needs to be worked on," admitted Shepler. "It takes eight maintenance hours (for) every one (hour of flight)."

The method that VMU-2 uses to approach flight separates it from other flying squadrons in the Marine Corps, said Lt. Col. Douglas M. Hardison, commanding officer, VMU-2.

"With this airplane, it's not so complex, so the Marine Corps can push the responsibility on to the enlisted Marine," said the 42-year-old Dallas native.
While an officer still signs for the aircraft and becomes the mission commander, he gives control of the aircraft to an enlisted pilot.

"Mission commanders are aviators that watch over the mission. He signs for the aircraft and allows us to fly it," said Ward. "This is about the closest an enlisted Marine can come to flying an aircraft."

Flying a UAV is less like piloting a manned aircraft and more like flying a remote controlled airplane, said Ward.
"Where other pilots can be inside the cockpit and feel shudders and hear noises, I have to do everything visually," he said. "It's a pretty stable bird with autopilot. It's like a (remote control) aircraft, but on a bigger, heavier scale."

The UAV pilots take pride in their enlisted heritage in a field now dominated by commissioned officers, said Ward.

"We are the last of the flying sergeants," he added in reference to the days of World War II when enlisted noncommissioned officers were chosen to be pilots based on their potential to fly.
Using enlisted Marines to pilot UAVs instead of higher-paid officers, maintains a high level of skill at the position while cutting down the cost, said Hardison.

"I give the guys a lot of latitude to fly the airplane. Nine times out of 10 he does a great job -- just like any aviator would," he explained. "For the Marine Corps, we are a great bang for their buck."
With cost and safety in mind, UAVs are the future of Marine Corps aviation, said Hardison.

"We have the technology now so we can do all the things we do in the air from the ground. You would need a huge airplane to do all the things we do here on the ground."

Marines of VMU-2 are happy to be working with the wave of the future, said Shepler


[b]Mini UAVs[/b]
Desert Hawk is constructed of mold-injected expanded polypropylene - a Styrofoam-like material which is flexible, damage-resistant type of foam. Kevlar skids are used on the nose and tail to improve durability. The sensors are carried in the middle of the fuselage, peeking down at the surface through a notch opened in the lower fuselage. Both color CCD or infrared cameras can be used. The GPS antennae and communications links are mounted on the wings. It uses an electric motor and therefore maintains a quiet operation. The vehicle weighs 3.5 kilograms and is only 13 centimeters long.

Launched into the air by two people using a bungee cord as a slingshot, the mini UAV flies its mission fully autonomously, at speeds of 40 to 80 km/h, following a flight path that has been plotted out beforehand on a laptop using GPS coordinates. The plane can be directed to circle over an area of interest, or the operator can alter its flight path while the plane is in the air during its 75 minutes aloft. Its payloads comprise of interchangeable systems, including an infrared thermal imaging system for night use, or a set of three color cameras for daylight.
Each Desert Hawk system, which consists of six aircraft, a ground station, and spare parts, costs $300,000. An improved version of the desert Hawk is currently in development. Most of the improvements will focus on system integration, including cooperative target engagement, with UAVs automatically assigned to locate and track targets detected by ground surveillance radars. Of the 48 systems ordered, four have been delivered to the British Army and more are planned for delivery to special forces units. (XV. 6.)

[b]Viper Strike - Laser Guided Weapon for UAVs[/b]
http://www.defense-update.com/directory/viper-strik e.htm" title="http://www.defense-update.com/directory/viper-strik e.htm" target="_blank"http://www.defense-update.com...
Viper Strike uses a semi-active laser seeker to find its designated target. The weapon was developed as a derivative of the autonomous Brilliant Attack Munitions (BAT) Submunitions during a quick reaction, nine-week program at Northrop Grumman's Land Combat Systems facility at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Ala.

The weapon is intended for operations that require top-down attack, particularly in built-up areas where strict rules of engagement are in force. It requires a "man in the loop" to lase the target, either from the ground in sight of the target or from the Hunter's ground station, which ensures the greatest possible accuracy and minimizes the chances of collateral damage. The Viper Strike's warhead is smaller than the hellfire's, which is used with the US Air Force armed Predator UAVs, containing only four pounds of Anti-Tank High Explosive (HEAT) charge, for reduced collateral damage in an urban built-up area. It also has a self-destruct mechanism, to eliminate post-strike hazards. The final version of Viper Strike could be equipped with optional blast fragmentation and thermobaric warheads. (XV. 7.)

[b]Sniper Coordination Systems (SCS) [/b]
Much of the work done on these systems comes from the Israelis. They provide improved planning and employment of snipers, as well as more effective monitoring of these assets. The system offers image transfer capability in real time, to monitor the line of sights of multiple snipers and verify individual targets for each shooter. Advanced systems also enable effective monitoring of targets around the corners, and actually firing around the corner, using the weapon's mounted camera, coupled via wireless link to an eyepiece or wrist mounted display.

The SCS utilizes a lightweight image splitter attached to the sniper rifle's sight, and a wireless transmitter which sends the sight image in real time to the command post, where up to six different snipers can be supervised simultaneously. The images can also be sent to other elements in the field, viewed on wrist mounted display or on PDAs carried by the troops. Some of these tools are being tied into general urban warfighting strategies and monitoring systems- C4.

[b]C4: Tactical C4ISR (RTC) RAFAEL (Israel) [/b]
The RAFAEL system provides tactical units with independent support for mission planning, navigation, situational awareness and target acquisition and engagement. Employed with mobile and dismounted forces, including Special Forces, the system can also interface with other systems in a wide area to establish large scale networking. The RTC links to standard combat net radios to access the network and transfer data between the network's units. RTC provides battle management support including target acquisition, allocation and management of all firing assets under the commander's control, as well as fire management and control of individual firing units such as anti-tank missiles. This application was formerly known as Spike C4I and was tested with Spike equipped units where it demonstrated how it can simplify the communications between different element in the group, increases the agility and precision of the supported forces, and accelerate the sensor-to-shooter cycle between reconnaissance and assault forces while minimizing the risk from fratricide "friendly fire". The system can also integrate various sensor platforms including individual sights of the anti-tank weapons, UAVs and other airborne sensors, acoustic sensors and observation posts. (XV. 8.)
[u][b]
NUETRON BOMBS [/b][/u]
Tactical neutron bombs are primarily intended to kill soldiers who are protected by armor. Armored vehicles are very resistant to blast and heat produced by nuclear weapons, but steel armor can reduce neutron radiation only by a modest amount so the lethal range from neutrons greatly exceeds that of other weapon effects. The lethal range for tactical neutron bombs can exceed the lethal range for blast and heat even for unprotected troops. (XV. 9.)

Also called ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEAD, these specialized type of small thermonuclear weapons that produce minimal blast and heat release large amounts of lethal radiation. The neutron bomb delivers blast and heat effects that are confined to an area of only a few hundred yards in radius. But within a somewhat larger area it throws off a massive wave of neutron and gamma radiation, which can penetrate armour or several feet of earth. This radiation is extremely destructive to living tissue. Because of its short-range destructiveness and the absence of long-range effect, the neutron bomb would be highly effective against tank and infantry formations on the battlefield but would not endanger cities or other population centres only a few miles away. It can be carried in a Lance missile or delivered by an 8-inch (200-millimetre) howitzer, or possibly by attack aircraft.

The neutron bomb is another generation beyond a thermonuclear device. It has the same core of a fusion bomb, but the blanket of heavy U-238 isotopes is removed, so only the energy released from the fusion core comprises the total explosive yield. This energy is in the form of a massive flux of neutrons, combined with some gamma radiation. Neutrons are highly lethal to humans and animals, and the N-bomb instantly kills everything in its radius of lethality. Any living creatures that receive non-lethal doses of the neutrons will be dead within a day or two from radiation sickness. Neutron radiation literally vaporizes the soft flesh of humans at close range, and Zechariah’s remarkable prophecy, regardless of what he was really prophesying, is an extraordinary description of the effects of a neutron bomb on human beings.

Neutron bombs are also much cleaner than conventional nukes. A neutron blast only kills living things, leaving all buildings and weapons intact. It is the ultimate weapon to use against massed troops and armor, as all the enemies die instantly, no structures or vehicles are damaged, and, most importantly, no radioactive fallout is left behind. Unlike fission or fusion nukes, neutron bombsites are safe to walk into immediately after the explosion. Neutron technology has been developed to such a level that these devices can be produced in as small a package as the size of a common baseball! They can be used in field artillery and small rockets, and even soldiers dug in behind several feet of earth are not safe from a neutron blast. Until the Clinton/Gore Administration, only two nations wielded this fearful weapon, the United States and Israel. Thanks to the DNC/Chinagate scandal, however, China is now known to possess neutron devices, and several other countries are rumored to be actively pursuing this technology. (XV. 10.)

[b]Mini-Nuclear Weapons -- Bunker Busters[/b]
[u][b]
Possible targets[/b][/u]

The budget is busted; American soldiers need more armor; they're running out of supplies. Yet the Department of Energy is spending an astonishing $6.5 billion on nuclear weapons this year, and President Bush is requesting $6.8 billion more for next year and a total of $30 billion over the following four years. This does not include his much-cherished missile-defense program, by the way. This is simply for the maintenance, modernization, development, and production of nuclear bombs and warheads. (XV. 11.)

Seven countries -- China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria -- are listed as targets of U.S weapons in the classified Nuclear Posture Review, a 2001 Pentagon document describing Bush administration policy. (XV. 12.)

The design contest between Livermore and Los Alamos is expected to last two to three years and cost about $15 million per year. The winning lab will then shift to an engineering phase, a move that would require congressional approval and funding. The U.S. arsenal already contains a nuclear bunker-buster -- known as the B61-11 -- but it was built to penetrate only soil and will not survive attacks against rock. A nuclear penetrator is built in the shape of a thin cylinder with a pointed nose. Dropped from an airplane, its weight and speed allow it to smash through the surface of the ground or puncture rock or concrete and buries itself 20 to 30 feet deep before exploding. The power of the explosion couples with the earth to send shock waves down toward buried targets. The shock waves from a penetrator loaded with conventional high explosives `would probably struggle to destroy a target 100 feet deep. But a nuclear weapon could reach much deeper.

Both sides of the bunker-buster debate agree that intelligence -- knowing where the bunkers are -- is vital, as has been demonstrated by the difficulty encountered by the CIA and military in finding Saddam. Deep targets with imprecise coordinate would require a larger nuclear explosion. In several policy documents, the Pentagon has called for a responsive' nuclear force to meet changing situations. Foreign leaders who are not deterred by the current U.S. nuclear weapons -- because they do not believe President Bush will use them -- might be deterred by a nuclear bunker-buster specifically designed to put them personally at risk in their underground quarters.

A retired Sandia official, opposes the drive for more nuclear weapons calling it: Outlandish and stupid. It is an effort to maintain a payroll at the weapons labs.

[b]
Other Weapons: (XV. 14.) [/b]


[u][b]Footnotes: Section XV. :[/b][/u]

1. A. Black market rockets and missiles are killing American soldiers. Here is how we'll fight back. Captain Scott C. Jansen. "The Story of the Rocket Propelled Grenade." RED THRUST STAR. April 1997.
B. Jane's Infantry Weapons. Terry J. Gander and Ian V. Hogg, editors. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1995, p. 303-305.
C. http://www.defense-update.com...
D.

2.

3. A.

B. For more on concepts for countering snipers, see Alan Vick et al., Aerospace
Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, RAND, MR-1187-AF,
2000, pp. 131–138.

4. PREDATOR B - MQ-9 HUNTER/KILLER
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/predator/" title="http://www.army-technology.com/projects/predator/" target="_blank"http://www.army-technology.co...



5. http://www.defense-update.com...

6.

7.

8.

9. http://www.manuelsweb.com/neu...
reference: http://www.virtualschool.edu/...

10. http://www.zealllc.com/commen...

11. Our Hidden WMD Program: http://slate.msn.com/id/20994...
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020408.htm" title="http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020408.htm" target="_blank"http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week...

12. Bush Nuclear Policy
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/do d/npr.htm" title="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/do d/npr.htm" target="_blank"http://www.globalsecurity.org...

13.

14. A. NEW US WEAPONS SYTEMS
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1481&Start Row=11&ListRows=10&&Order by=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID =23&typeID=" title="http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1481&Start Row=11&ListRows=10&&Order by=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID =23&typeID=" target="_blank"http://www.cdi.org/program/do...(4,5)&from_page=relatedit ems.cfm
The United States is the world’s largest small arms producer. The United States is home to the largest number of companies of any single arms producing country. It is also a major exporter of small arms, and has one of the world’s largest domestic markets for firearms. The United States is estimated to export approximately 400,000 small arms, including military firearms, every year. This is one more reason why United States has the responsibility to lead, not merely comply with existing international agreements.

B. http://www.cdi.org/program/is...

C. http://www.globalsecurity.org...

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" title="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" target="_blank"http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi...

D.http://www.cdi.org/program/do...(8)&from_page=relateditem s.cfm

E. Advanced 120mm Mortar Munition - Under development by Talley Defense Systems

XM984 Extended Range Mortar Cartridge (ERMC) is currently under development for the US Army 120 mm M120/M121 mortar system. Compared to a conventional M934 bomb fired from this system will reach a maximum range of 7,200 metres, the XM984 is expected to almost double the range, to reach 12,000 m'. The range extension being produced by a nose-mounted rocket motor that cuts in at a pre-determined point during the bomb's trajectory. The rocket will fire 12 seconds after the launch, and burn for a period of four seconds. After a predestinated delay, 54 M80 grenades will be released from the bomb, effecting a target are 233 percent larger than an HE bomb.

F. Ceramic Armor Materials
Current design trends indicate wider use of ceramics, for vehicle armoring as they lower the overall weight, while enhancing abilities to defeat ballistic threats. Composite ceramics can be used in layered formations, matrixes of different materials or monolithic elements. Typical materials used for this application are Alumina, silicon carbide (SiC), boron carbide (B4C) and titanium carbide and titanium diboride, these are lighter than most metals, including titanium, by a factor of 2 -- 3. While monolithic ceramic elements can be used, most vehicle protection applications are utilizing composites of several materials, which offer improved endurance tenacity, imperative for advanced protection and survivability.

The physical properties of ceramic materials have been recognized for many years. However, manufacturing techniques limited their utilization to relatively small parts and simple shapes. Recent advances in manufacturing process offer lower cost production techniques of larger, more complex structures. Some of these cutting edge procedures are also employing exotic technologies which dramatically improve the physical characteristics of the end product. Among these are the Fibrous Monoliths (FM) and Displacive Compensation of Porosity (DCP) ceramic materials manufacturing technologies, the use of nanoparticles in raw material powders and coating, and new concepts for treatments of metallic structures -- such as metal matrix composites (MMC), and liquidmetal.
 
Section XII. Force Structure Options -- The Series: Beyond Iraqi Strategies
06.24.04 (1:30 pm)   [edit]
[u][b]Section XIV. Force Structure Options[/b][/u]


If hardware is tertiary, why not just stick with what the U.S. military already has? The problem with this alternative is that it requires spending at Cold War levels on Cold War equipment, but without a Cold War threat. It also turns leaders’ attention away from creating effective forces and towards lobbying for hardware programs. The issue is whether the US could carry out a maneuver warfare strategy by using fewer resources, do it better, and in the process avoid some of the problems caused by continuing an enormously large defense establishment.


[u]In war or in business[/u], implementing lean-production forces any organization to eliminate waste and reduce costs while simultaneously improving quality, efficiency and time to market. Enterprises that successfully employ lean production routinely take market share from those who do not, and, because of their lower costs, generally post far better bottom lines. Improving mutual trust is a key element in implementing lean production, and that coincidentally, the people who invented lean manufacturing were careful students of Sun Tzu. To see the power of Sun Tzu’s strategy applied to business, one need only note that between 1980 and 1990, General Motors’ share of the U.S. market declined from 52 percent to less than 30 percent, largely driven down by the inroads of Toyota, Nissan, and Honda.


[b]To summarize the guidelines for constructing a Sun Tzu / Boyd force following the discussion above:[/b]


1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly.

2. Military forces, when they are used, should obey Sun Tzu’s dictum: end the conflict in the quickest possible time with the least possible damage to either side.

3. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.

4. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it.


[u]Maneuver warfare provides a framework[/u] for implementing such a force and history suggests that there are some characteristics of a force that can reinforce its capabilities for maneuver warfare in the post-Cold War era. The following table is from a recent book on maneuver warfare by experts on the subject from all four armed services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (reflecting their personal views, not official policy):

1. Increased focus on littorals (regions within a hundred miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated.

2. Decreased need for large standing land and air forces, and an enhanced role for reserve forces.

3. Decreased need for heavy naval forces configured for global war at sea and heavy bombing forces, with a concurrent shift to maintaining control of littoral regions in support of interventions.

4. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests, with an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions.

5. The rise of fourth-generation warfare, resulting in an increased need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors.

[b]Characteristic of this are the following:[/b]

a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.

b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/ strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.

c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.

d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources.



[u]With this in mind,[/u] let’s construct an alternative defense capability. Neither Boyd nor Sun Tzu ever built such a force, so the recommendations are merely speculations by Chester and his group of researchers.. The other caveat is that if Chester’s recommendations are successful, the force represented below will satisfy the requirements of maneuver warfare, but that is not to suggest that it is the only force that will do so, or even the best that could ultimately be attained by continuing to experiment and select.


[url=]http://www.army-technology.co...
PREDATOR B - MQ-9 HUNTER/KILLER[/url]


NUETRON BOMBS –
http://www.manuelsweb.com/neutronbomb.htm" title="http://www.manuelsweb.com/neutronbomb.htm" target="_blank"http://www.manuelsweb.com/neu...
 
Photo Gallery - War and Soldiers
06.15.04 (4:01 pm)   [edit]




Provided by Zorpia
 
The World of War - Smoke as Mirrors
05.10.04 (4:32 pm)   [edit]
[u][b]THE FIRING GROUP [/b][/u]- [i][b]Guerrillas in Action[/b][/i]-----------

_________________________ _______________

In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized into small groups. A team of no more than four or five is called a firing group. A minimum of two firing groups, separated and insulated from other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two persons, this is what makes a firing team.

Within the firing group, there must be complete confidence among the members. The best shot, and the one who knows best how to handle the submachine gun, is the person in charge of operations.

The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and stores weapons, and studies and corrects its own tactics.

When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But there is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason, it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the guerrilla organization, in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the flrlng group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional revolutionaries, doesn't exist in our organization. This means that, except for the priority of the objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to raid a bank, to kidnap or execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a foreign spy, and can carry out any type of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy, without the need to consult with the general command.

No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so, and thus becomes a part of the organization.

This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to greatly increase the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it onto the defensive.

The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched and carried through to success. The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, the general command helps the firing groups with their difficulties and with carrying out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country.

The organization is an indestructable network of firing groups, and of coordinations among them, that functions simply and practically within a general command that also participates in attacks—an organization that exists for no other purpose than that of pure and simple revolutionary action.


THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

Conventional logistics can be expressed with the formula FFEA:

F—food F—fuel E—equipment A—ammunition
_________________________ __________
Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply lines. Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear areas. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient, and they have no fixed bases except in the rudimentary sense of a weapons factory within a house. While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the "gorillas" who are used to repress rural and urban rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics which have nothing in common with conventional warfare and are directed against the government and foreign domination of the country.

For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and who has no support at the beginning, logistics are expressed by the formula MMWAE, which is:

M—mechanization M—money W—weapons A—ammunition E—explosives

Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseperable from the driver. The urban guerrilla driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and the automobile, as well as the submachine gun becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day, and apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a driver. As to the vehicles, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs. When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with his other methods of acquisition.

Money, weapons, ammunition and explosives, and automobiles as well, must be expropriated. The urban guerrilla must rob banks and armories, and seize explosives and ammunition wherever he finds them. None of these operations is carried out for just one purpose. Even when the raid is to obtain money, the weapons that the guards carry must be taken as well.

Expropriation is the first step in organizing our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character. The second step is to reinforce and expand logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy is surprised and his weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other resources are captured.

Once he has weapons, ammunition and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems facing the urban guerrilla is a hiding place in which to leave the material, and appropriate means of transporting it and assembling it where it is needed. This has to be accomplished even when the enemy is alerted and has the roads blocked.

The knowledge that the urban guerrilla possesses of the terrain, and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as scouts specially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in solving the eternal logistics problems faced by the guerrillas.


[b]Guerrilla War / Guerrilla War Game [/b]are
a meeting place for enlightened new-militia and for
all awakening citizens (even former lefties) –
for everyone enraged or bemused by the corrupt dictatorship that the bloated federal bureaucracy
has manifest.

It’s a discussion group for war gamers on small unit strategies and applied tactical examples. Historical and hypothetical scenarios are examined for application to various contexts. Costs, risks and shortcomings are considered. Its fun to imagine, its good for your chess playing potential and it might just save your life or your family or your country. Thanks!

[i]For information or to contribute links or articles[/i] : politicalsoldier@lycos.com

… In the fourth-generation wars that now engulf
the planet, improvisation, innovation and
integration of the lessons of the past are the
secret to success…


[u][b]I.1 Introduction to the Game of War[/b][/u]
_________________________ _________

3. Guerrilla Manuals and Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy
[ add in or link in a summary rewrite of this whole manual or part of it ]

3.1. http://www.marxists.org/archi...
_________________________ ____________
3.11 A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.12 PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.13 HOW THE URBAN GUERRILLA LIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.14 TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.15 THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S WEAPONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.16 THE SHOT; THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.17 THE FIRING GROUP
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.18 THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
_________________________ ______________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.19 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S TACTICS
_________________________ ______________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.20 THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Page last updated 11 Mar 2004

3.21 SURPRISE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
_________________________ ___
3.22 KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.23 MOBILITY AND SPEED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.24 INFORMATION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.25 DECISIVENESS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.26 OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS
_________________________ _______________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.27 ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF MISSIONS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.28 ASSAULTS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.29 THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MISSION
_________________________ ______________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.30 RAIDS AND PENETRATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.31 OCCUPATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.32 AMBUSH
___________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.33 STREET TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.34 STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.35 DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
_________________________ ___________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.36 LIBERATION OF PRISONERS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.37 EXECUTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

_______________
3.38 KIDNAPPING
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.39 SABOTAGE
_____________
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.40 TERRORISM
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.41 ARMED PROPAGANDA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.42 THE WAR OF NERVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.43 HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION
_________________________ _______
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.44 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.45 RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.46 GUERRILLA SECURITY
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

_________________________ ______
3.47 THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.48 POPULAR SUPPORT
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
_____


[u][b]3.5 Ireland's OWN: History (IRA & RIRA); [/b][/u]
_________________________ ____________

http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#gueform" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#gueform" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
[ put in or link to a summary of this – part of it is similar to contra manual too ! ]
[b]
Table of Contents:: [/b]
_________________________ ________________
Successful Implementations of Guerrilla Warfare : http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Ground Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare
The IRA
Understanding the Enemy
Guerrilla Commanders
Guerrilla Formations
Guerrilla Units
The Flying Column ; http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Defence and Attack Methods
Guerrilla Equipment:
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Arms and Explosives
The Barrack Buster
Semtex
Traitors
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare
Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrillas Should be Volunteers
Importance of Communication
Reaching out to the Masses
Inside Cadres
The Internet
Conclusion

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" title="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" target="_blank"http://groups.yahoo.com/group...


3.6. [u][b]For interesting Scenarios and information
on tactics & strategy see:
_________________________ _
www.guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/b][/u]


[url=]guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/url]



[b]3.7. Future Strategy -
_________________________ ___________

Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights[/b]

_________________________ ____________________
Every political move – referendum- law – appointment is a military move – since war is in hearts and minds as much as on the field – you have to respond to each political move – keep the enemy off balance
The elite are always way ahead of us street people – we are always reactive – slow – hesitant.
Just like in Colombia where they say that a massacre is always foretold – obvious – if you look at US policies in Iraq or in Latin America you see the wars – the massacres – forming.



[b]………….. Key overall guiding principles: [/b]



[i]Three Types of attacks[/i]
( See Escalation Theory at: www. )


1. Serious strategic attacks – Takeout key people, enemies , leaders – or major infrastructure ( Power Plant – Key Transformers and substations, Chemical Plant – Oil Facilities – Storage, Gas lines, Bridges, Dams, Aqueducts–Pumping Stations, Railroads, oil and LNG export and import terminals, docks, airport control towers, navigation beacons and aircraft, port facilities, and attacks on a helicopter center or a production facility for choppers, aircraft or other weapons, – and always - government buildings!

2. Tactical strikes – to acquire weapons, money, fame, or takeout limited equipment – a plane – a chopper – a communication facility.

3. Symbolic Strikes – Sword of Bolivar – Statue of Liberty – Governors’ Mansion -

_________________________ _____


[u][b]3.8 GW Commando Resistance[/b][/u]
This news source occasionally provides analysis and recommendations for resistance groups:

[u]A new low-tech national security strategy [/u]

– Venezuela and its emerging allies should adopt commando – citizen resistance strategies to defeat
the US and to prepare the people for self and community defense. And Strategic Hamlets should
be established on all border areas by the hundreds!


_________________________ __________
[u][b]3.9. Scenarios and Battle Examples[/b][/u]

[b]3.91 A Typical Urban Guerrilla Attack Plan[/b]:
_______
TARGET – is a large gun shop or dealer

1. Recon – Security at site, where supplies you want are located – the right gun powders – weapon models etc –
2. Recon the nearest police stations and substations – and queuing areas – coffee shops – hangouts –
3. Observe security and employee shift changes, and traffic changes by shoppers or commuters at or near the place of the primary target (gun shop or armory).
4. Recon the electric distribution system of the area - also supply transformers if near or if they are big or it is the right time of year (summer or winter extremes) Where are key power lines – gas lines – water system components?
5. Escape plan – route – stash places – breakdowns – re supply options.
6. Fall back contingencies – injuries – heat – possible complications.
7.

[b]Battle Plan :[/b]
1. Large fires or car bombs are set near a rich part of town away from a targeted gun shop. Attacks on fire department and police stations are made to look like they are large scale attacks in that part of town. Then that attack group falls back to cover – and to keep out enemy forces – say to the north. Meanwhile, the gun shop is hit and power lines/substations are taken out all over – communication towers and – or jamming systems are used. Then the roads or police stations are taken out as the group retreats quickly with the stash. Takeout some of the local police or military helicopters before the raid and prepare to shoot others down at the time of the raid and the retreat – (dusk - ?? ).

Break down part of the shipment quick – smaller trucks – cars – and go in different directions. Set more fires elsewhere ( or time them to go off at the estimated time) and return snipers to attacks on fire department and police. Litter the roadways with nails, caltrops or small car bombs (or smoky fires) for max chaos but minor deaths. – Get away – send those communiqués – and celebrate the precious arms that have been liberated !!

[b]A smaller and continuous harassment[/b] would be to rob police randomly at different areas – times – and ways -!! Get mony, cars, radios, weapons, uniforms and some priceless fun…

[b]

_________________________ ___
Send your links and comments to:

[url=]politicalsoldier@ly cos.com[/url]



Study guerrilla tactics and read about revolutionary groups while pondering the issue and what you would do in various scenarios.

_________________________ _____________

[b]Mao Tse-tung-- PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY
IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN [/b]

http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/PSGW38.html" title="http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/PSGW38.html" target="_blank"http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/P...

From the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung; Foreign Languages Press Peking 1967
First Edition 1965; Second Printing 1967, Vol. II,pp.79-112. Prepared for Internet by David J. Romagnolo, June 1997)
------------------------- ------------------------- ----------------


[b]Chapter I :: Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War[/b]?

[b]Chapter II :: The Basic Principle of War is to Preserve [/b]Oneself & Destroy the Enemy

[b]Chapter IV :: Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives[/b]
Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within
Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations

[b]Chapter VI :: The Establishment of Base Areas[/b]The Types of Base Areas Guerrilla Zones and Base Zones: Conditions for Establishing Base Areas
The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas
Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another

[b]Chapter IX :: The Relationship of Command[/b]

[b]NOTES[/b]

[7] Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. [p.95]

[9] Weichi is an old Chinese game, in which the two players try to encircle each other's pieces on the board. When a player's pieces are encirded, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then the latter are still "alive" (not captured). [p.102]

[10] In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present Hotse County in Shantung). The siege of Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei". [p.104]

_________________________ ___________
[b]Role-Playing Games: Theory and Practice[/b]
www.members.ozemail.com.au/~tarim/rpg/rpgpage.htm


The Dragon's Trove.
Enter to find those items for your adventure games
that you have been unable to find anywhere else.

www.dragontrove.com/

www.gamespot.com/pc/rpg.html

RPGGateway Role Playing Games Search Engine by Effie Rover

www.rpggateway.com/

Scifi-RPGS: For Science Fiction and Fantasy Role-Players
.
www.scifi-rpgs.com/


http://www.google.com/search?q=" title="http://www.google.com/search?q=" target="_blank"http://www.google.com/search?...%22role-playing+games%22& hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF -8&start=20&sa=N


________________
[u][b]APPENDIXES[/b][/u]
________________

[b]Bibliograghy[/b]


1. [b]Title: Commando Raids: 1946-1983[/b],
by Bruce Hoffman
Document No: N-2316-USDP Year: 1985 Pages: xiii, 64
http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=N-2316&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" title="http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=N-2316&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" target="_blank"http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/A...|warfare

Keywords:
Raids (Military science); Terrorism; Commando troops

This Note assesses the effectiveness of a sample of raids executed by small commando and commando-type forces in response to terrorist threats. One hundred raids by irregular forces (guerrilla groups, terrorist organizations, and private individuals) and elite units (organized military units belonging to a country's national armed forces) were examined in terms of: (1) previous training of the personnel involved in the mission; (2) the geographical position from which the raiding parties embarked; (3) the effectiveness of methods of transportation used; (4) the character of the mission (destruction, stand-off assault, rescue, kidnap, or assassination); (5) the size of the raiding party; and (6) the effect of disguise or deception on mission outcome. Seventy-seven percent of the raids accomplished their objective, indicating that obstacles such as geographic distances and well-defended enemy positions can be overcome by the stealth and mobility of small paramilitary and military units.

[b]2. Title: An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments,[/b] by Brian Michael Jenkins
Document No: P-4670/1 Year: 1972 Pages: 13

Keywords:
Asia; Counterinsurgency; Latin America; Revolutions

The author synthesizes a five-stage strategy by which urban guerrillas take over a city, and suggests government countermeasures. The guerrilla struggle appears to follow a sequence of (1) dramatizing their cause by terrorist bombings and assassinations, (2) expanding and reinforcing their organization; (3) launching an offensive to control the streets and isolate the police, (4) provoking repression to win mass support, and (5) coordinating mass support with guerrilla warfare to wage full-scale urban warfare.

3.
[b]Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad[/b]; RAND MR1738-1
[url=]http://www.rand.org/publicati...[/url]

The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. In fact, the crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may, at times, have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. … like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. In such circumstances the Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind “fingerprints” associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes.

Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can, in many circumstances, greatly increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged…

U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead. These features, coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laserhoming guidance.

“Finders”—intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets— will be of two broad types: those that provide wide-area coverage and those with a narrow field of view but higher resolution. The role of wide-area assets will be to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. Each of these types of assets has its strengths and limitations. A severe limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage—a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars, which have been under development for several years, could significantly enhance U.S. wide-area surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor.

Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors will make it possible to remotely examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. Because every material has a unique signature, data from such sensors can be processed and used to classify objects automatically and with greater fidelity than is possible with sensors that operate in only a single waveband. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination.1

Other promising technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical “sniffers.” Essentially miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. If it were possible to develop sniffers to detect particular types of explosives, then lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles could patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. In addition, certain types of illegal drugs or the chemicals used in their processing might be useful targets for sniffers, given the nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists in some areas (e.g., Colombia). Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysi s devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a “mother ship” or a ground station.
______________
1For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations
against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing
Airpower’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp.

Sensors employed for wide-area searches help analysts to gain a clearer picture of the nature of the enemy’s organization and operations and to identify places where other human and technical assets can be concentrated in hopes of gaining confirmation of the presence or absence of the enemy and, perhaps, the identity of individual terrorists. Such sensors, be they human sources or technical means, ideally should provide continuous monitoring of suspect areas and persons. They should also be covert; that is, able to function without tipping off targets that they are under
surveillance.

These requirements—high resolution, continuous and long-term coverage, and secrecy—suggest that sensors to support targeting should, in general, be small so that they can be easily concealed. Small imaging sensors, in turn, must be placed close to their targets, given the need for high resolution and restrictions on focal length.2 And sensors that need to “stare” at their targets for prolonged periods should generally not be on airborne platforms but rather placed on buildings or other fixed structures, or in trees.3
______________
2For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their
potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83–107.

3In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26–27.

Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts more efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors. Such tools are especially important in counterterrorist operations because the signatures associated with most terrorist groups are generally very small and the “noise” surrounding them is often considerable. For example, U.S. and Pakistani officials today are attempting to apprehend perhaps several hundred individuals in the city of Karachi, which has a population in excess of five million. Under such circumstances, a surveillance and identification system that boasted an error rate of only 1:1000 could still give off many false alarms for each correct identification.

Conventional cameras cannot see inside buildings if the occupants are cautious and if it is not possible to plant devices inside. One means of gaining information about activities inside a building is to listen to what is being said there. Occasionally, it may be possible to plant listening devices (“bugs”) in buildings or vehicles being used by terrorists. More often, antiterrorist forces will have to rely on remote means of monitoring. It has been demonstrated that one can sometimes listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building’s windows.

Experiments are also under way with radars that have the potential to “see” through walls. The resolution of such radars is, of course, modest, but it is possible to determine whether particular rooms in a structure are occupied or not—information that can be valuable when planning an attack. Another emerging technology that can be useful in identifying terrorists is facial-recognition software. If cameras can be placed in areas where terrorists might pass by, the images they collect could be rapidly screened against a database of facial images and perhaps other physical characteristics of known terrorists. Computer algorithms capable of comparing collected images against a large database and discriminating among key features of those images will be essential if this approach is to be effective. Even with these systems, additional efforts would be required to verify the identity of potential targets, given the large number of samples collected and likely false-alarm rates.

Tagging suspected vehicles could help in developing information about patterns of activity and assisting shooters in engaging elusive targets. For example, an operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. Once attached, the transmitter could permit authorities to monitor that vehicle’s movements, perhaps pointing them to other groups of terrorists. Signals from the transmitter could also make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle “in the crosshairs” should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy it.

One serious shortfall in U.S. special operations capabilities today is the lack of a means for inserting and extracting SOF teams stealthily. SOF helicopters and C-130 cargo planes are equipped for low-level
operations, but if they fly within line of sight of radars they can be readily detected and tracked. Because surprise and survivability are such important elements of successful SOF operations, the Air Force should explore concepts for a stealthy medium transport aircraft. To be of use to SOF in a wide range of scenarios, such an aircraft could be somewhat smaller than the C-130, which has a payload of around 40,000 pounds. But it would need to have a mission radius of 1000 miles or so to permit operations deep within the territory of hostile countries. Equally important, this SOF transport should be capable of landing at and taking off from short, unimproved airstrips or

Transport aircraft with these features might also prove to be well suited to serving as a successor to the AC-130 gunship. Developing a more-survivable gunship should be a priority because surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the AC-130 are proliferating and SOF and other light forces often require the type of sustained, precise fire support that the AC-130 provides.
______________
5The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is committed to procuring some 50 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. These vertical takeoff and landing machines will replace some of AFSOC’s helicopter fleet, offering greater speed and range, but they are not stealthy and cannot substitute for the C-130 in delivering large payloads over ranges greater than a few hundred miles.



1.2 Glossary of Terms:

AFSOF --Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS --Close Air Support
CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency
C3I --Command, Control, Communication & _____________ Intelligence

C4I --Command, Control, Communication, _____________ Computation and Intelligence

COMINT --Communication Intelligence
DIA -- Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD -- US Department of Defense
FLIR --Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC --High Intensity Conflict
HUMIT -- Human Intelligence
LIC --Low Intensity Conflict
NSA -- National Security Agency
OOTW --Operations Other Than War
PGM --Precision Guided Munitions
SAM --Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR --Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
SOCOM -- Special Operations Command
UAV --Unmanned Airborne Vehicle



[u][b]Below are Links for STRATEGY [/b][/u]
_________________________ _____

globalsecurity

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" title="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" target="_blank"http://www.globalsecurity.org...

Military Analysis

[url=]http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi...[/url]

Links – Institute Terrorism

http://www.ict.org.il/" title="http://www.ict.org.il/" target="_blank"http://www.ict.org.il/

Defense Daily

www.defensedaily.com/reports/non_tradition al_threats.ppt+%22guerrillawar%22&hl =en&ie=UTF-8

Soldiers For The Truth

[url=]http://www.sftt.org/terrorops...[/url]

_______________________
[b]Contract Information:[/b]
Mr. Robert D. Steele, CEO OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Inc.
Post Office Box 369, Oakton, VA 22124-0369
Voice: (703) 242-1700Fax: (703) 242-1711;
Email: bear@oss.net

Web: http://www.oss.net/extra/tool...


[url=]www.defensedaily.com/reports/non_tradition al_threats.ppt+%22guerrillawar%22&hl =en&ie=UTF-8[/url]
http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=MR-243&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" title="http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=MR-243&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" target="_blank"http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/A...|warfare

Document No: MR-243-SOCOM Year: 1994
Capt. Damien Schlussel, 31st Fighter Wing security forces and anti-terrorist trainer

http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/k-guerri llawar/browse" title="http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/k-guerri llawar/browse" target="_blank"http://209.157.64.200/focus/f...
 
Guerrilla War Resources for Community Survival
05.07.04 (5:43 pm)   [edit]
[b]Below are 2 links for STRAT _ NEW[/b]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" title="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" target="_blank"http://www.globalsecurity.org...
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8 &oe=UTF-8&q=" title="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8 &oe=UTF-8&q=" target="_blank"http://www.google.com/search?...%22Chechnya+Photographs%2 2&spell=1

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" title="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" target="_blank"http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi...


[b]Glossary of Terms:[/b]

AFSOF --Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS --Close Air Support
C3I --Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, Computation and Intelligence
COMINT --Communication Intelligence
FLIR --Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC --High Intensity Conflict
LIC --Low Intensity Conflict
OOTW --Operations Other Than War
PGM --Precision Guided Munitions
SAM --Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR --Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
UAV --Unmanned Airborne Vehicle


Americans have no direct means of influencing their government. "Opinions" are occasionally sampled through polls. November 1995 CNN-Time poll, 55 percent of the people believe "the federal government has become so powerful that it poses a threat to the rights of ordinary citizens.



Links – Institute Terrorism
http://www.ict.org.il/" title="http://www.ict.org.il/" target="_blank"http://www.ict.org.il/

lots of links - above

http://www.sftt.org/terrorops.html" title="http://www.sftt.org/terrorops.html" target="_blank"http://www.sftt.org/terrorops...
above is like SOFortunes



II.
From Creative Stratego


A discussion group for war gamers on small unit strategies and applied tactical examples. Historical and hypothetical scenarios examined for application to various contexts. Costs, risks and shortcomings are considered. Its fun to imagine, its good for your chess playing potential and it might just save your life or your family or your country. Thanks!


2.1 U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business
By J. David Galland ( defensewatch02@yahoo.com )
After a hiatus of 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers will fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks. The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements. Collection skills have improved with time and experience. National-level intelligence agencies have shoehorned themselves into Special Forces intelligence operations that were initially designed for collection of tactical human intelligence. These ops gained strategic and global intelligence direction as they yielded bonanzas.

In the post-9/11 world, the intelligence community recognizes strength in the Special Forces that their own operatives lack. Establishing indigenous human intelligence operations in a rapidly developing or already fluid combat environment has not been a strong area for the ivy-league operatives. At least, not since the termination of the legendary Phoenix program in Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The Phoenix Phung Hoang (or Operation Phoenix) was a stroke of manifest brilliance by a former Saigon CIA station chief (and later CIA Director) William Colby. **** [ Actually a brutal war crimes campaign that killed or imprisoned thousands of innocent
Vietnamese ; see: http://www.members.authorsgui... ]

The CIA relied upon the Special Forces as key players in the Phoenix program. The soldiers were often dispatched into the "denied-areas" in the war zone to perform their dangerous missions. Phoenix was basically the shortest distance between two points during the Vietnam War – those points being (1) the decision to liquidate an adversary, normally a well placed Viet Cong official, or his minions, and (2) the end-game of the operation: the capture, disappearance, or publicized assassination of the target.

Why are Special Forces soldiers once again preparing to begin conducting their own intelligence collection, which will likely be fully sanctioned and supported by the CIA?

[b]Because they can. [/b]

What is clear is that the Department Of Defense is not going to be constrained and restricted, as in past decades, when it comes to aggressive intelligence collection efforts against our country's adversaries. In keeping with the veracity of the threat, Don Rumsfeld has also created the Pentagon's, first-ever, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

The Army is stepping up intelligence training for Special Forces soldiers at SOCOM Headquarters in Florida, and at Ft. Lewis, Wash., the home of the 1st Special Forces Group. A source says that the Tacoma location is being run like a "Mini-Farm," referring to the highly classified CIA training facility at Camp Peary, Va. ( known to the CIA as "The Farm").

Rumsfeld has given SOCOM new powers to plan and execute, "kill-or-capture-missions " against terrorists. To accomplish this goal, the SOCOM troops must have mission-unique intelligence information that is absolutely current -- a CIA paramilitary force. CIA activities must be acquiescent to U.S. law. At the same time, the CIA largely engages in activities that are intended to, and do evade international law. Special Forces soldiers are bound by both sets of legal standards. While Special Forces soldiers have been "sheep-dipped" in the past, and lived by CIA standards, the Pentagon does not want its soldiers violating laws that pertain to soldier conduct. CIA personnel on the other hand are unrestricted by the laws of war that particularly deal with uniforms, equipment and identities. They exploit this freedom to create "cover" identities for their missions.

If Special Forces soldiers are captured they have protection under the Geneva Convention that governs the treatment of POWs, but if the soldiers are operating undercover with CIA paramilitary units, they risk losing that protection. Enemies are aligned against the US in an unconventional fashion that is now termed, "fourth-generation warfare"… characterized by our adversary’s adroit use of methods that differ greatly from our usual mode of military doctrine and operations. They undermine our strengths and exploit our weaknesses as the single global superpower and seek to portray the US as a global villain picking on the little guy.
If the US military doesn't "out-guerrilla the guerrilla," they lose the global war on terrorism.

[i]So it's imperative this new SF-CIA partnership continue.[/i]


[b]2.2 US Airforce Counter Guerrilla Task Force[/b]
Rand Study (and Related Information); Link is to an Israeli adaptation:[url=]
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html#Chapter" title="http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html#Chapter" target="_blank"http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa...%202[/url]

[ [b]Adversary Strategies[/b] ]

[b]Main Measures of Guerrilla Strength include:[/b] military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies (states and guerrilla movements) and weapon systems.

[b]Guerrilla as a Strategic Threat[/b]

The existential threat presented by guerrilla warfare derives from the guerrilla movement's goal of capturing a given territory and a given population controlled at the time by the regime, and sometimes also of destroying the existing regime. Guerrilla activities corrode social and political cohesion, and call into question the internal security of the state and its individual citizens. Even when a strategic threat is identified, the regime continues to counter it largely with military means, without recognizing the need to act against all the guerrilla's sources of power.

…………….Technology and Guerrilla Warfare

While the guerrilla's weapons remain the bomb and the rifle, more recently, advanced technology has also been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision system, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

.................... Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the goal of the guerrilla movement. The characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses.

The goals of a war against guerrillas is the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes."29 Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting against guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces are improving by adapting new weapon systems, but they still do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).

Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of the conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon, who display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices.30 A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki 31.

Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force

Air power, in most cases, cannot win a counter-guerrilla war alone. However, unification of all functions of offensive operations (intelligence, planning, and execution) under the command of the air force, can bring about a revolution in the long term outcomes of campaigns against guerrilla forces. A model for the integration of advanced technology and quality manpower is the Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force, a specialized task force for well-defined goals and missions, whose principal role is counter-guerrilla warfare. Its headquarters - an air force unit - would enjoy responsibility and authority for training the units, the development of operational and tactical doctrines, command in combat, and the operational evaluation of operations weapon systems. The US Air Force has built a Special Operation Forces unit (AFSOF). This unit is organized and employed in small formations, capable of both independent and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling timely and tailored responses. 39

………………Structure of Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force 40

1. Intelligence Element : Collection Planning teams; UAVs unit; Ground observers; Target production; Analysis team; counter-intelligence

2. Command and Planning: C3 systems; C2 Teams; Professional experts

3. Operational Unit: Assault helicopters; Attack aircraft; Airborne commando; Electronic warfare

[b]............Conduct of Operations[/b]

[u][b]*** NOTE: [/b][/u]

[ [i]The following description of a large special forces operation is about to be launched into Colombia from Peru and Ecuador - to kill or capture guerrilla leaders - or the US may wait until it decides to assassinate Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, A possible cycle of activities in a single operation is described[/i]. ]

The intelligence element belonging to the task force would search and locate a guerrilla force moving far from the front-line. Forces would be scrambled to engage the guerrilla force and one force would be flown to the designated area in order to engage the guerrilla. A special force of the airborne unit, deployed by assault helicopters nearby the guerrilla unit, would use laser designation systems in order to mark it for attack by air. Simultaneously, attack aircraft loaded with precision anti-personnel munitions would take off towards the guerrillas for the completion of the mission. Assault helicopters manned with an airborne elite unit would be deployed in ambushes on the expected retreat routes of the guerrillas, in order to capture the survivors. Throughout the entire procedure of scramble and engagement, contact would be maintained with the guerrilla force by means of data collection (UAVs or sensors attached to guerrillas, spies or equipment) and would designate it by laser designators and other means for aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the first wave would be to destroy a part of the force and to 'freeze' the rest of it in place. At this point, after the guerrilla force has lost its maneuverability and mobility, since movement would expose it to additional volleys, attack aircraft and attack helicopters would continue to destroy the guerrilla force. Finally, the elite unit would close in and finish off the battle. The few guerrillas who succeeded in escaping would probably run into the ambushes and be hit by them.

[u][b]*** NOTE:[/b][/u]
[ How to counter this strategy and these operations? How to turn it into a trap ... or a defeat? ]

[b]............... Intelligence[/b]

Counter-guerrilla Air Warfare planning and execution is intelligence- intensive. Operations planners should use all-source intelligence from both organic and external intelligence sources. Harkabi, as a representative of the military viewpoint, emphasized the importance of tactical intelligence: "Development of tactical intelligence is important for counter-guerrilla warfare. Exploiting blind power against a 'stealthy' enemy as guerrilla is useless and dangerous."43 Air power requires 'real time intelligence,' since the swiftness of its operations demands knowledge on the enemy at the time of the execution of operations. Specific efforts should be invested to satisfy this requirement." 44

[u][b]NOTE:[/b][/u]
[ In Afghanistan these techniques of landing Rangers or other Special Forces near airforce targets worked extremely well. With the forward US forces identifying targets with laser devices, the accuracy of the JDAMS and other smart and not-so-smart bombs was precise and devastating against the Taliban bunkers. ]

A proper focus of intelligence on irregular forces should establish a database on various groups' identification and intentions, local political alignments and alliances, guerrilla goals and objectives. It should also monitor disaffected and radicalized individuals, and assess the influence and intentions of local religious leaders.

Air force intelligence gathering with special equipment and employing methods peculiar to aircraft is vital to counter-insurgency. By means of aerial reconnaissance, changes in insurgent deployment may be detected. . . .Intelligence material is needed for target allocation, for the preparation of 'hard cop' for air crews and as evidence to be used in public relations operations and any political campaign directed at the insurgents. In intelligence gathering, use is made of available means, such as remotely piloted vehicles, and SIGINT (mainly COMINT). It further involves the operation of the intelligence infrastructure as a whole, as it would in a conventional war, including for instance infra-red photography, fast dissemination and briefings.46

The intelligence community would provide intelligence infrastructure and equipment such as software, SIGINT systems and maps, and long-term intelligence, for example information on leaders, sources of recruitment, doctrines, weapon systems, and links with states and other organizations. The air force, which would supply air photos, expensive and rare systems and operations such as reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, SIGINT system, and new information warfare systems.47 The intelligence component would gather, collate, analyze and process tactical short-range, near-real-time information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual and potential guerrilla enemies by using visual, imagery and electronic reconnaissance.48 At the same time it must identify the threats which might interfere with the operations. Accurate information on target is the Achilles' heel of counter-guerrilla air warfare. Tracking human moving targets is more difficult than locating armor and fixed targets. Therefore, air power must shape unique requirements for sensors' research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement. An LIC American expert criticized the US military intelligence tendency to emphasize the technological side of intelligence, while LIC operations require effective political/human intelligence, which can be gathered and analyzed by well-educated people with operational experience....


[b]3. Guerrilla Manuals and Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy[/b]

3.1. http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.11 A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.12 PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.13 HOW THE URBAN GUERRILLA LIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.14 TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.15 THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S WEAPONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.16 THE SHOT; THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.17 THE FIRING GROUP
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.18 THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.19 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.20 THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Page last updated 11 Mar 2004

3.21 SURPRISE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.22 KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.23 MOBILITY AND SPEED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.24 INFORMATION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.25 DECISIVENESS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.26 OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.27 ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF MISSIONS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.28 ASSAULTS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.29 THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MISSION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.30 RAIDS AND PENETRATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.31 OCCUPATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.32 AMBUSH
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.33 STREET TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.34 STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.35 DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.36 LIBERATION OF PRISONERS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.37 EXECUTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.38 KIDNAPPING
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.39 SABOTAGE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.40 TERRORISM
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.41 ARMED PROPAGANDA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.42 THE WAR OF NERVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.43 HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.44 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.45 RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.46 GUERRILLA SECURITY
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.47 THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.48 POPULAR SUPPORT
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...


[b]3.5 Ireland's OWN: History (IRA & RIRA)[/b]
[url=]http://irelandsown.net/guerri...[/url]

[b]Table of Contents[/b]

Successful Implementations of Guerrilla Warfare : http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Ground Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare
The IRA
Understanding the Enemy
Guerrilla Commanders
Guerrilla Formations
Guerrilla Units
The Flying Column
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Defence and Attack Methods
Guerrilla Equipment:
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Arms and Explosives
The Barrack Buster
Semtex
Traitors
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare
Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrillas Should be Volunteers
Importance of Communication
Reaching out to the Masses
Inside Cadres
The Internet
Conclusion

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" title="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" target="_blank"http://groups.yahoo.com/group...


[b]3.6. For interesting Scenarios and information on tactics & strategy see:[/b]

[url=]www.guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/url]


[b]3.7. Future Strategy - Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights[/b]

Every political move – referendum- law – appointment is a military move – since war is in hearts and minds as much as on the filed – you have to respond to each political move – keep the enemy off balance

The elite are always way ahead of us street people – we are always reactive – slow – hesitant.

Just like in Colombia where they say that a massacre is always foretold – obvious
– if you look at US policies in Iraq or in Latin America you see the wars – the massacres – forming.

[b]Key overall guiding principles: [/b]

[b]3 Types of attacks:[/b]

1. Serious strategic attacks – Takeout key people – enemies – leaders – or major infrastructure ( Power Plant – Key Transformer, Chemical Plant – Oil Facility – Storage – Gas lines –Bridges – Dams – Aqueducts –Pumping Station, Railroads, terminals – docks – aircraft – or ports – many choppers or a production facility – government buildings

2. Tactical strikes – to acquire weapons, money, fame, or takeout limited equipment – a plane – a chopper – a communication facility

3. Symbolic Strikes – Sword of Bolivar – Statue of Liberty – Governors’ Mansion -

[b]
3.4 GW Commando Resistance[/b]

This news source occasionally provides analysis and recommendations for resistance groups:

A new low-tech national security strategy

– Venezuela and its emerging allies should adopt commando – citizen resistance strategies to defeat the US and to prepare the people for self and community defense. And Strategic Hamlets should be established on all border areas by the hundreds!



[b]3.8. Scenarios and Battle Examples

A Typical Urban Guerrilla Attack Plan[/b]

[b]TARGET – is a large gun shop or dealer – [/b]

1. Recon – Security at site, where supplies you want are located – the right powder – models etc –
2. Recon the nearest police stations and substations – and queuing areas – coffee shops – hangouts –
3. Observe shift changes and traffic changes – and shoppers at or near the place changes ..
4. Electric distribution of area - also supply transformers if near or big or right time of year – summer or winter extremes – where are key powerlines – gas lines – water system components?
5. Escape plan – route – stash places – breakdowns – re supply –
6. Fall back contingencies – injuries – heat –
7.

[b]Battle Plan :[/b]

1. Large fires or car bombs near a rich part of town away from gunshop – attacks on fire department and police in that part of town – then that group falls back to cover – keep out forces – say to the north – meanwhile gunshop is hit and powerlines/substations taken out all over – communication towers and – or jamming systems are used – and then the roads or police stations are taken out as we retreat with the stash – choppers – some hit ahead of time – some at the time – (dusk - ?? )

Break down part of the shipment quick – smaller trucks – cars – and go in different directions = more fires elsewhere and returned snipers – on fire department and police – nails – caltrops – car bombs for max chaos but minor deaths – Get away – communiqué – and lots of arms !! A smaller and continuous harassment would be to rob police randomly at different areas – times – and ways -!!
[b]
..................4.1 Reader Comments and Musings[/b]

Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia:

Interview militia people in the USA and get perspectives from US and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse.

Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries– McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly
 
SPECIAL FORCES AND THE USA Central Intelligence Agency
05.06.04 (4:36 pm)   [edit]
2. Adversary Strategy

2.1. SPECIAL FORCES AND THE USA Central Intelligence Agency

2.2. US Airforce Counter Guerrilla Task Force [Category: Adversary Strategy: Espionage ]


3. Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy

3.1.

3.2. Mao Tse-tung-- PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

3.3. Marighella: THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

3.4. Future Strategy - Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights


4. Reader Comments and Suggestions
2.1 SPECIAL FORCES Enter The Intelligence World, Mar 05, 04
By J. David Galland (Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch; defensewatch02@yahoo.com )


U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business. They will be actively engaged in the pursuit of "actionable intelligence" in the Global War on Terrorism, in an effort to neutralize the asymmetric non-sovereign aligned threats to the U.S.A.

After a hiatus of nearly 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers are preparing to fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks.

The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements.

 
Introduction and Experimenting
05.06.04 (4:35 pm)   [edit]
A DISCUSSION GROUP FOR WAR GAMERS ON SMALL UNIT STRATEGIES AND APPLIED TACTICAL EXAMPLES. HISTORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS EXAMINED FOR APLLICATION TO VARIOUS CONTEXTS. COSTS, RISKS AND SHORTCOMINGS ARE CONSIDERED. ITS FUN TO IMAGINE, ITS GOOD FOR YOUR CHESS PLAYING POTENTIAAL AND IT MIGHT JUST SAVE YOUR LIFE OR YOUR FAMILY OR YOUR COUNTRY. THANKS!
Thursday, April 29, 2004
The Table of Contents - Small Unit Strategy & Creative Stratego


I. Introduction

I.1.
 
The Few - The Brave - ********************* [ The Clandestine ] -----------------------------******************** Soldiers of the world: +++++++++++++++++++++ Write us; help us; tell the world your dreams and hopes; open up and share - ********************** teach us how to fight! ___________________________ __________________________ .....4.1 Reader Comments & Musings _______________________ _______________________ Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia: _______________________ _____________________ In our region many people are fed up with the federal government goons, the waste inherent in all the laws and regulations and the absolute threats to the Constitution – If it even exists… Abolishing this monstrosity that aims to bureaucratize the whole world is the preferred solution - States’ Rights? – how about State sovereignty and secession? You should interview militia people and their potential supporters in the USA and get perspectives from the many disgruntled US military personnel and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse. *************************** ************************* Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries (sans racist stupidity) – McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly… ______________________ _______________________ _______ _ This game concept is a good way to plug people in and get them thinking clearly and with purpose. - ++++++++++++++++ ++++++++ Bravo! BRAVO !!!