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GUERRILLA WAR :: GAME TIME!
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Send your links and comments to: politicalsoldier@lycos.com
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... Why Take Up Armed Struggle?
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...
or Why Play Guerrilla War
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The art of Revolution:
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A (partially) ANARCHIST VIEW
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No SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
in recent world history has been effected through non-violent means. We live in a world of violent domination, where people are either compliant with corporate rule or done away with. As first-world consumers, we are all guilty of directly causing the subjugation of marginalized people the world over, the destruction of the global ecosphere and the deaths of those in political opposition to any government ours has relations with. Americans who claim to be believers in non-violence are fooling themselves.
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The legitimacy of armed uprising is an issue that each of us has to decide for ourselves. Pacifism is a sort of self-therapy to dismiss anything the pacifist doesn't wish to confront on a personal level. Don't argue the pacifist point of view with me, and don't censure me. Let the government do it's own dirty work. Now, on with the educational portion of this program...
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BUILD YOUR BASE OF SUPPORT...
There are things that have to be done before taking up armed struggle. First, surround yourself with people you know well enough to trust with your life. The second is to prepare to leave everyone else you know behind and prepare for a lonely, painful existence of hardship and uncertainty. And drug, drink and sexual abstinence as well.
Now you and a small band of friends are ready to begin. Before you pull off your first action, though there are a lot of preparations you will have to make.
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Make sure you know as much as you can possibly find out about your base of operations: Who are your neighbors, do they suspect anything? Are they simpatico? Where are good hiding places? Good escape routes? Any fresh water springs or other sources of water in the area? Can you slip in and out of your basecamp ( or your various urban-rural safe-houses and barns) without being seen or looking suspicious?
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Do you know people outside your group who you can ask for help who will not ask questions and do anything (within reason) to help you? These people are going to be the ones who will let your wounded comrades hide out in their homes until they are better, who will help you acquire food and medicine, who will feed you and deliver messages to your above-ground supporters. You will not succeed in your efforts without at least a nominal base of support. Your supporters need not adhere to your political views. They will help you out because they like you as people and think that you are passionate, even heroic. Do not do anything to expose these people to violence from the police and military. They are not combatants. They have not joined your militia. Keep away from them during times of heightened activity from the police and military forces.
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The guerrilla group - or preferably a higher level coordinating cadre (politico-military or intelligence) will also identify people or officials who can be coerced or intimidated into helping (money, protection, information on military plans)
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At this time, you should be propagandizing, letting the community know that there are people around who are willing to stop complying with the legal status quo. Through these efforts, you will better understand the community you are involved with. This is the time to confront attitudes - both yours and other's - and get a feel for who can be trusted and how far that trust can go. This is a time when you are vulnerable to arrest.
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Propaganda vehicles consist of flyers, graffiti, guerilla actions against billboards and any media at your disposal - print, radio, video -- anything that you can use to explain why you feel the way you do.
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It is not important to convert people to your side at this point - emphasis should be in setting the proper context for your consequent actions, so that when they begin, people will know what's happening and why.
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When to begin your activities as a revolutionary fighting unit? Marxist strategy preaches that "the people" should be prepared before there can be a chance for a revolution to be successful. Yet history has shown that "the people" will start kicking ass long before any leadership has emerged. According to Che, the Cuban Revolution proved that an oppressed people sometimes only need a catalyst to prod them into action before they ignite into a mass movement -- to sweep aside the old regime. History has also shown that in the chaos between the fall of the old and the start of the new order, there is a danger of a cultish leader taking control of the revolutionary spirit in order to set himself up as the new dictator.
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The times this has not happened, there has been international efforts made to crush the Revolution before it sets an example the rest of the world could follow. These are dangers that need to be considered during the development of the revolution.
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Once your group is ready to begin activities, there are considerations: how do you keep the unit supplied with ammunition, what are your targets for attack, are you ready for a counter-strike by the enemy? There is a difference, psychologically, in pressing the attack and being attacked. In the former case, there is a feeling of control, you have met the enemy and are now going to kick his ass. When they come after you, however, there is a feeling of defeat from the outset. Coming under fire by your enemy is unnerving. Even when faced with far superior fire- and manpower, the guerrilla group can escape by stealth or directed assault and use their knowledge of the area to make their get-away.
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Essential equipment
Here are the things each guerrilla
soldier must have:
a weapon
a sleeping bag or wool blanket
a backpack
good boots
a hammock
a tarp
some heavy clothing
an ammo belt
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A mosquito net would come in handy during the warm seasons, and the guerilla will do well to have some sort of dry food on him whenever possible. Other things that could help out would include a small flashlight, a cup and small pan, a knife of some sort, especially one similar to a Swiss army knife. Some extra cord, string or twine for repairing equipment and stringing up the hammock and tarp is always a good idea.
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The less stuff the soldier carries in the field, the more mobile the unit is. If your unit is operating in a safe, familiar area, you can stash things, like staple foods , medicines and extra ammunition and weapons in hidey-holes spread throughout your field of operations.
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There should be one or two people outside the unit who can act as go-betweens when the unit needs things like food and medicine. It is not important for the whole unit to know these people, nor for them to know much about the unit. You will hopefully have contact with organizations which support your actions. When the time comes to escalate your activities, these outside contacts will become sources for new recruits.
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Desirable Items of Gear and Weaponry
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308 and 50 caliber sniper
rifles with high powered scopes
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Mortars
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Incendiary and armor piercing ammo
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Spotting scopes and telescopes
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Range finders
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blasting caps and det cord
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familiarity with various timing devices and trip cord booby traps
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The Anarchist Guerilla Group
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Decisions - including the choice of commanding officers - are often made by consensus, though this is not always possible. In battle, when unexpected complications arise (serious accidents occur or during severe weather) the officers take the initiative to remedy the situation - longer-term operations are consulted with by a larger group of soldiers. No Anarchist Guerrilla should put themselves in the position of sticking rigidly to non-hierarchal principles in battle situations. The Guerrilla should be able to trust her fellow militia members who have been chosen at large to act in the best interest of the unit. This is easier to do with people you've known a long time or have faced enemy fire with.
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The typical Guerilla group is small, between five and a dozen people. Any more than that and the odds of being spotted by the enemy are greatly increased. Any less and there are extreme limits to what your group can attempt and expect to survive. There will usually emerge one or two people with organizational skills who will often serve as leaders due to their general competence. These people may not be the same people who are effective combat leaders. The differences should be respected, as well as acknowledged. These people should be deferred to during times of crisis or difficult decision making such as when chosen officers are missing or incapacitated.
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When the conflict escalates, the group will hopefully grow and the experienced members will be thrust into leadership roles with the new arrivals, help them to make the adjustment to clandestine or camp life and teach them how to survive engagement with the enemy. It is worth noting that the successful small group leader will not always be as competent with a larger group. And the person unable to take the initiative with a small group of friends might find herself feeling responsible for the well-being of the new recruits. Let these naturally occurring roles manifest themselves, but always be wary of anyone who takes on too much responsibility. If that person were killed during an action, the group might find itself in deep shit. It is the responsibility of the entire militia to see that all the work is shared by everyone, so that there is always someone available to help out when someone else is lost due to injury or illness.
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When the group has grown to ungainly size, it will need to split up. This then creates a new difficulty of keeping in contact and coordinating actions. Therefore, any activities must be planned well in advance - though not necessarily in great detail. This difficulty will be compounded greatly the more recruits there are. The time will come when the militia will have to expand its base of operations. This is like starting all over again, with new contacts to be made with the people in the area, new maps to be acquired, new terrain to be explored. This is a dangerous time for the group, and should be undertaken with a heightened sense of alertness. There should be time available to send men into new places without their field gear, just to pass through and scope things out. It is important for these people to stay out of difficulties with the police in the new places.
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Insurrection!
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There are no hard-set rules for making your initial engagements with the enemy:
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Never engage the enemy in an attack that you cannot win. Don't send your infantry to assault a well-fortified airfield or attack a barracks outside your territory - use suicidal bombers or standoff weapons (mortars or 50 caliber rifles).
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Always strike fast, with every weapon at your disposal, inflict the maximum amount of damage that you can and withdraw just as quickly.
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Have your escape planned beforehand.
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Select a rendezvous point where anyone separated during the fighting can catch up with the others.
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Make every round of ammunition count. You'll never suffer from an over-abundance of ammunition.
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Recover ammunition and weapons from fallen enemies. Indeed, many of your engagements will be solely for this purpose.
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Don't panic if things don't go well. Get out as quickly as possible and try to make the enemy regret any pursuit attempted.
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.......... ALWAYS fire from a well-concealed position.
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Not just behind a tree or rock, but laying on the ground behind a tree or rock. It is especially important to be on the ground behind a bush or in grass. If not, the enemy will likely see the discharge from your weapon and be able to aim at that. If you're on the ground, underneath some sort of foliage, the enemy may not even see your gun's blast. The smaller a target you present, the less likely you'll be hit.
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Make sure you're not trapped, in a place where any movement will expose you to enemy fire with no chance for cover. Though these may sound like obvious points, you will be surprised at what people will do in the heat of battle. Practice with paint guns before using real weapons.
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If you are being pursued by an enemy column, always kill the lead man (the Point man). This will unnerve the enemy and make the point position difficult to fill. This tactic will sometimes divide the enemy against one another, as some men may refuse to take a position that is going to result in their deaths.
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Your first actions will likely not put a great deal of fear into your enemies. You will have to do armed robberies in order to provision your group with enough food and supplies to get started. Keep some money in reserve in case the group is forced out of their base of operations. Do not rob the families of the people who are your supporters, or who should be your supporters. Rob the wealthy, the powerful and the local tyrants. You'll know who they are, the businesses they own and where they live, if you've made the proper preparations.
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When you've pulled off your first outright "military" action,
this should be followed by a propaganda effort, or propaganda should be made during the action, so that all will know what's going on. From this point on, the Guerrilla is on enemy turf, until they have established complete control of some territory. Once this action is taken, the war is on and the guerrillas will be under constant harassment.
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Defensive positions
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You should have prepared several bunkers at different places throughout your base of operations. Here, you can store excess items rather than carry them around with you all the time. These should offer some shelter, not only from the cold and rain, but also from light artillery, such as grenades launched from guns and mortars. Thus, if the attackers are only a small unit you may have some time to evacuate and retrieve valuable equipment.
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Anytime the unit is under fire and has to withdraw from an area, they should do so in an orderly manner. Several people should fall back and offer cover fire so that the others can pull out. These people will then take up firing positions so that the previously positioned guerrillas can then withdraw, too. The process is repeated until the enemy breaks off pursuit. During such a strategic retreat, an experienced fighting unit may sometimes find itself suddenly in the possession of an easily-defendable position. By regrouping there, they may be able to actually mount a counter-attack against the pursuing enemy. To do this, they must attack with great energy and only if they have enough ammunition to sustain the attack. If they can successfully force the enemy into retreat, there will be opportunities to gather ammunition left behind by fallen enemy soldiers. Of course, when faced with superior numbers and firepower, the best idea is to leave the area as quickly as possible.
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..........Taking Action :
And Seeking Strategic Effect
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In Nicaragua (FSLN)-Sandinistas) & El Salvador (FMLN) rebels pulled off spectacular actions not only to display their capabilities, but also to humiliate their enemies. They would capture the banquet hall where a member of a ruling familiy was holding a wedding reception or loot and burn stores that belong to the rulers. The Tupac Amaru attempted such an action in Peru when they took over the Japanese Embassy. They had undertaken the effort as an act of desperation, without really expecting to win the encounter. They could have attempted to shoot their way out, thus giving their supporters and those in sympathy with them a chance to join in the fray. Had they engaged the army units surrounding them in a prolonged, running battle, they could have set the city aflame with revolutionary fever.
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By carrying out such outrageous actions, the guerrillas illustrate to the people that the powerful are vulnerable. This inspires admiration and respect, not only with the people in the barios, but often in the ranks of the military as well. There are incidents of high-ranking officers in the military, disgusted by the attitudes and behavior of the ruling elite, who would withdraw their troops into their barracks and withhold them from the fighting, then pledge themselves to the revolutionary government. Displays of bravery coupled with upright behavior can win over to the guerrilla's side those who have been apathetic or even opposed to their actions. Not all who serve the powerful enjoy their roles.
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The focus of the guerrilla groups initial activities will be to disrupt the lives of the enemy forces as much as possible and to cut off their supplies. With stealth and a few homemade weapons, the guerilla band can attack airfields, convoys and other means of supply the enemy will use. Mines that can be detonated by remote switches are effective. Shotguns can be converted into grenade launchers and explosive devices (black powder grenades, molotovs, etc.) can be fired with them. Improvised weapons are effective, not only due to their offensive capacities, but also as a psychological weapon against the opposing soldiers, who assume you have nothing in your arsenal other than a few rifles.
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Do not take prisoners unless they are valuable - wealthy or high ranking. If possible, escort surrendering troops to a border and tell them to get lost for the remainder of the war. Do not allow them to return to their bases. Since they will be fellow countryfolk, they may actually want to join your side! They must prove themselves under fire before you can trust them with weapons! Until then they can be treated as suspect new recruits.
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.......... Urban Warfare
Usually labeled as "terrorists", the urban guerilla differs from the traditional "fighting in the fields" guerrilla in their base of operations. The Urban guerrillas are under more intensive scrutiny than those in the woods and have to be careful not to arouse the suspicion of neighbors as well as the police. But, they can hide out just as easily, have more targets to choose from and can often stir up the locals to take part in their actions, even if they are only playing supporting roles. The Sendero Luminoso in Peru existed for years in the slums of Lima.
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The urban guerilla band will never have the security that the "outdoor" guerrillas have, nor will they usually have the number of people involved in their day-to-day activities, still they will be able to maintain social ties to the outside world. This is both good and bad. It's a security risk anytime someone outside the group becomes familiar with one or more of it's members. The good part is that the urban guerrillas can more accurately assess their situation and plan their actions accordingly.
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Urban guerrilla activity is probably the first step to take in a modern industrial state, though it is usually the last phase of the traditional revolution. Due to the amount of police informants, security forces and military available to combat the guerrillas, it is advisable not to stay in one area for very long. Once a few actions have taken place, the guerrilla group can split up and regroup later. This regrouping should be seen as a chance to gather together to plan the next operation and the group should have their combat supplies stored somewhere secure. When the group is dispersed for any amount of time, there is no certainty that all the members will rejoin the group. Some may be arrested, or injured or killed. There is always the danger of being followed or turned in by someone familiar with the guerrillas, maybe even one of its members. In any case, treat a re-grouping with extreme caution, assume the worst and do not wait around for very long for any stragglers.
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.......Some final thoughts about
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Insurrection
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Once a person begins down this road, it is difficult to turn back. Even if one surrenders, there is no guarantee the government forces will accept the surrender, or that they won't have you killed in prison.
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Self-discipline is key to security. Wandering away to have a fling with a babe, getting drunk at a tavern or trying to contact a missed person could result in getting oneself and the entire group killed. The ability to remain calm under duress is extraordinarily useful. If stopped by an agent of the state, try to determine what the matter is all about before whipping out a gun or grenade or taking cyanide. The agent in question could be asking around about something totally unrelated to your activities.
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Try not to be fearful, but allow yourself to use your fear to your advantage.
Fear brings about a heightened state of alertness which can be quite useful at certain times.
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Russia as Weird as the USA
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The Russian authorities have so far ignored Basayev’s statements. They are most probably investigating the incident that occurred on 18 February in the Ramenskoye district near Moscow.
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On that day, in the vicinity of the village of Starnikovo, experts found a crater under a pipeline and 10-mm holes in a 200-mm gas pipe. On the day after the incident Alexander Alexeyev, a senior police official with the regional police directorate told Gazeta.Ru that judging by the size of the crater, either two explosive devices of about 200 grams of TNT or a bucket of petrol blew up under the pipeline.
An explosive device planted by unknown saboteurs under another pipe in the same area was discovered and defused by sappers before it detonated. Local police suggested that local teenagers, who had watched too many action movies, could have been to blame.
|
| The World of War - Smoke as Mirrors |
| 05.10.04 (4:32 pm) [edit] |
[u][b]THE FIRING GROUP [/b][/u]- [i][b]Guerrillas in Action[/b][/i]-----------
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In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized into small groups. A team of no more than four or five is called a firing group. A minimum of two firing groups, separated and insulated from other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two persons, this is what makes a firing team.
Within the firing group, there must be complete confidence among the members. The best shot, and the one who knows best how to handle the submachine gun, is the person in charge of operations.
The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and stores weapons, and studies and corrects its own tactics.
When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But there is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason, it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the guerrilla organization, in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the flrlng group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional revolutionaries, doesn't exist in our organization. This means that, except for the priority of the objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to raid a bank, to kidnap or execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a foreign spy, and can carry out any type of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy, without the need to consult with the general command.
No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so, and thus becomes a part of the organization.
This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to greatly increase the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it onto the defensive.
The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched and carried through to success. The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, the general command helps the firing groups with their difficulties and with carrying out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country.
The organization is an indestructable network of firing groups, and of coordinations among them, that functions simply and practically within a general command that also participates in attacks—an organization that exists for no other purpose than that of pure and simple revolutionary action.
THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
Conventional logistics can be expressed with the formula FFEA:
F—food F—fuel E—equipment A—ammunition
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Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply lines. Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear areas. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient, and they have no fixed bases except in the rudimentary sense of a weapons factory within a house. While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the "gorillas" who are used to repress rural and urban rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics which have nothing in common with conventional warfare and are directed against the government and foreign domination of the country.
For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and who has no support at the beginning, logistics are expressed by the formula MMWAE, which is:
M—mechanization M—money W—weapons A—ammunition E—explosives
Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseperable from the driver. The urban guerrilla driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and the automobile, as well as the submachine gun becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day, and apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a driver. As to the vehicles, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs. When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with his other methods of acquisition.
Money, weapons, ammunition and explosives, and automobiles as well, must be expropriated. The urban guerrilla must rob banks and armories, and seize explosives and ammunition wherever he finds them. None of these operations is carried out for just one purpose. Even when the raid is to obtain money, the weapons that the guards carry must be taken as well.
Expropriation is the first step in organizing our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character. The second step is to reinforce and expand logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy is surprised and his weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other resources are captured.
Once he has weapons, ammunition and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems facing the urban guerrilla is a hiding place in which to leave the material, and appropriate means of transporting it and assembling it where it is needed. This has to be accomplished even when the enemy is alerted and has the roads blocked.
The knowledge that the urban guerrilla possesses of the terrain, and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as scouts specially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in solving the eternal logistics problems faced by the guerrillas.
[b]Guerrilla War / Guerrilla War Game [/b]are
a meeting place for enlightened new-militia and for
all awakening citizens (even former lefties) –
for everyone enraged or bemused by the corrupt dictatorship that the bloated federal bureaucracy
has manifest.
It’s a discussion group for war gamers on small unit strategies and applied tactical examples. Historical and hypothetical scenarios are examined for application to various contexts. Costs, risks and shortcomings are considered. Its fun to imagine, its good for your chess playing potential and it might just save your life or your family or your country. Thanks!
[i]For information or to contribute links or articles[/i] : politicalsoldier@lycos.com
… In the fourth-generation wars that now engulf
the planet, improvisation, innovation and
integration of the lessons of the past are the
secret to success…
[u][b]I.1 Introduction to the Game of War[/b][/u]
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3. Guerrilla Manuals and Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy
[ add in or link in a summary rewrite of this whole manual or part of it ]
3.1. http://www.marxists.org/archi...
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3.11 A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.12 PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.13 HOW THE URBAN GUERRILLA LIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.14 TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.15 THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S WEAPONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.16 THE SHOT; THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.17 THE FIRING GROUP
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.18 THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
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http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.19 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S TACTICS
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http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.20 THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Page last updated 11 Mar 2004
3.21 SURPRISE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
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3.22 KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN
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3.23 MOBILITY AND SPEED
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3.24 INFORMATION
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3.25 DECISIVENESS
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3.26 OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS
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3.27 ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF MISSIONS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA
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3.28 ASSAULTS
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3.29 THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MISSION
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3.30 RAIDS AND PENETRATIONS
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3.31 OCCUPATIONS
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3.32 AMBUSH
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3.33 STREET TACTICS
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3.34 STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS
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3.35 DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
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3.36 LIBERATION OF PRISONERS
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3.37 EXECUTIONS
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3.38 KIDNAPPING
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3.39 SABOTAGE
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3.40 TERRORISM
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3.41 ARMED PROPAGANDA
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3.42 THE WAR OF NERVES
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3.43 HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION
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3.44 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TACTICS
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3.45 RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED
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3.46 GUERRILLA SECURITY
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3.47 THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
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3.48 POPULAR SUPPORT
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_____
[u][b]3.5 Ireland's OWN: History (IRA & RIRA); [/b][/u]
_________________________ ____________
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#gueform" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#gueform" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
[ put in or link to a summary of this – part of it is similar to contra manual too ! ]
[b]
Table of Contents:: [/b]
_________________________ ________________
Successful Implementations of Guerrilla Warfare : http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Ground Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare
The IRA
Understanding the Enemy
Guerrilla Commanders
Guerrilla Formations
Guerrilla Units
The Flying Column ; http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Defence and Attack Methods
Guerrilla Equipment:
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Arms and Explosives
The Barrack Buster
Semtex
Traitors
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare
Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrillas Should be Volunteers
Importance of Communication
Reaching out to the Masses
Inside Cadres
The Internet
Conclusion
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" title="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" target="_blank"http://groups.yahoo.com/group...
3.6. [u][b]For interesting Scenarios and information
on tactics & strategy see:
_________________________ _
www.guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/b][/u]
[url=]guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/url]
[b]3.7. Future Strategy -
_________________________ ___________
Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights[/b]
_________________________ ____________________
Every political move – referendum- law – appointment is a military move – since war is in hearts and minds as much as on the field – you have to respond to each political move – keep the enemy off balance
The elite are always way ahead of us street people – we are always reactive – slow – hesitant.
Just like in Colombia where they say that a massacre is always foretold – obvious – if you look at US policies in Iraq or in Latin America you see the wars – the massacres – forming.
[b]………….. Key overall guiding principles: [/b]
[i]Three Types of attacks[/i]
( See Escalation Theory at: www. )
1. Serious strategic attacks – Takeout key people, enemies , leaders – or major infrastructure ( Power Plant – Key Transformers and substations, Chemical Plant – Oil Facilities – Storage, Gas lines, Bridges, Dams, Aqueducts–Pumping Stations, Railroads, oil and LNG export and import terminals, docks, airport control towers, navigation beacons and aircraft, port facilities, and attacks on a helicopter center or a production facility for choppers, aircraft or other weapons, – and always - government buildings!
2. Tactical strikes – to acquire weapons, money, fame, or takeout limited equipment – a plane – a chopper – a communication facility.
3. Symbolic Strikes – Sword of Bolivar – Statue of Liberty – Governors’ Mansion -
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[u][b]3.8 GW Commando Resistance[/b][/u]
This news source occasionally provides analysis and recommendations for resistance groups:
[u]A new low-tech national security strategy [/u]
– Venezuela and its emerging allies should adopt commando – citizen resistance strategies to defeat
the US and to prepare the people for self and community defense. And Strategic Hamlets should
be established on all border areas by the hundreds!
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[u][b]3.9. Scenarios and Battle Examples[/b][/u]
[b]3.91 A Typical Urban Guerrilla Attack Plan[/b]:
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TARGET – is a large gun shop or dealer
1. Recon – Security at site, where supplies you want are located – the right gun powders – weapon models etc –
2. Recon the nearest police stations and substations – and queuing areas – coffee shops – hangouts –
3. Observe security and employee shift changes, and traffic changes by shoppers or commuters at or near the place of the primary target (gun shop or armory).
4. Recon the electric distribution system of the area - also supply transformers if near or if they are big or it is the right time of year (summer or winter extremes) Where are key power lines – gas lines – water system components?
5. Escape plan – route – stash places – breakdowns – re supply options.
6. Fall back contingencies – injuries – heat – possible complications.
7.
[b]Battle Plan :[/b]
1. Large fires or car bombs are set near a rich part of town away from a targeted gun shop. Attacks on fire department and police stations are made to look like they are large scale attacks in that part of town. Then that attack group falls back to cover – and to keep out enemy forces – say to the north. Meanwhile, the gun shop is hit and power lines/substations are taken out all over – communication towers and – or jamming systems are used. Then the roads or police stations are taken out as the group retreats quickly with the stash. Takeout some of the local police or military helicopters before the raid and prepare to shoot others down at the time of the raid and the retreat – (dusk - ?? ).
Break down part of the shipment quick – smaller trucks – cars – and go in different directions. Set more fires elsewhere ( or time them to go off at the estimated time) and return snipers to attacks on fire department and police. Litter the roadways with nails, caltrops or small car bombs (or smoky fires) for max chaos but minor deaths. – Get away – send those communiqués – and celebrate the precious arms that have been liberated !!
[b]A smaller and continuous harassment[/b] would be to rob police randomly at different areas – times – and ways -!! Get mony, cars, radios, weapons, uniforms and some priceless fun…
[b]
_________________________ ___
Send your links and comments to:
[url=]politicalsoldier@ly cos.com[/url]
Study guerrilla tactics and read about revolutionary groups while pondering the issue and what you would do in various scenarios.
_________________________ _____________
[b]Mao Tse-tung-- PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY
IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN [/b]
http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/PSGW38.html" title="http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/PSGW38.html" target="_blank"http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/P...
From the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung; Foreign Languages Press Peking 1967
First Edition 1965; Second Printing 1967, Vol. II,pp.79-112. Prepared for Internet by David J. Romagnolo, June 1997)
------------------------- ------------------------- ----------------
[b]Chapter I :: Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War[/b]?
[b]Chapter II :: The Basic Principle of War is to Preserve [/b]Oneself & Destroy the Enemy
[b]Chapter IV :: Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives[/b]
Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within
Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations
[b]Chapter VI :: The Establishment of Base Areas[/b]The Types of Base Areas Guerrilla Zones and Base Zones: Conditions for Establishing Base Areas
The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas
Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another
[b]Chapter IX :: The Relationship of Command[/b]
[b]NOTES[/b]
[7] Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. [p.95]
[9] Weichi is an old Chinese game, in which the two players try to encircle each other's pieces on the board. When a player's pieces are encirded, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then the latter are still "alive" (not captured). [p.102]
[10] In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present Hotse County in Shantung). The siege of Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei". [p.104]
_________________________ ___________
[b]Role-Playing Games: Theory and Practice[/b]
www.members.ozemail.com.au/~tarim/rpg/rpgpage.htm
The Dragon's Trove.
Enter to find those items for your adventure games
that you have been unable to find anywhere else.
www.dragontrove.com/
www.gamespot.com/pc/rpg.html
RPGGateway Role Playing Games Search Engine by Effie Rover
www.rpggateway.com/
Scifi-RPGS: For Science Fiction and Fantasy Role-Players
.
www.scifi-rpgs.com/
http://www.google.com/search?q=" title="http://www.google.com/search?q=" target="_blank"http://www.google.com/search?...%22role-playing+games%22& hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF -8&start=20&sa=N
________________
[u][b]APPENDIXES[/b][/u]
________________
[b]Bibliograghy[/b]
1. [b]Title: Commando Raids: 1946-1983[/b],
by Bruce Hoffman
Document No: N-2316-USDP Year: 1985 Pages: xiii, 64
http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=N-2316&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" title="http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=N-2316&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" target="_blank"http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/A...|warfare
Keywords:
Raids (Military science); Terrorism; Commando troops
This Note assesses the effectiveness of a sample of raids executed by small commando and commando-type forces in response to terrorist threats. One hundred raids by irregular forces (guerrilla groups, terrorist organizations, and private individuals) and elite units (organized military units belonging to a country's national armed forces) were examined in terms of: (1) previous training of the personnel involved in the mission; (2) the geographical position from which the raiding parties embarked; (3) the effectiveness of methods of transportation used; (4) the character of the mission (destruction, stand-off assault, rescue, kidnap, or assassination); (5) the size of the raiding party; and (6) the effect of disguise or deception on mission outcome. Seventy-seven percent of the raids accomplished their objective, indicating that obstacles such as geographic distances and well-defended enemy positions can be overcome by the stealth and mobility of small paramilitary and military units.
[b]2. Title: An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments,[/b] by Brian Michael Jenkins
Document No: P-4670/1 Year: 1972 Pages: 13
Keywords:
Asia; Counterinsurgency; Latin America; Revolutions
The author synthesizes a five-stage strategy by which urban guerrillas take over a city, and suggests government countermeasures. The guerrilla struggle appears to follow a sequence of (1) dramatizing their cause by terrorist bombings and assassinations, (2) expanding and reinforcing their organization; (3) launching an offensive to control the streets and isolate the police, (4) provoking repression to win mass support, and (5) coordinating mass support with guerrilla warfare to wage full-scale urban warfare.
3.
[b]Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad[/b]; RAND MR1738-1
[url=]http://www.rand.org/publicati...[/url]
The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. In fact, the crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may, at times, have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. … like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. In such circumstances the Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind “fingerprints” associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes.
Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can, in many circumstances, greatly increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged…
U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead. These features, coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laserhoming guidance.
“Finders”—intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets— will be of two broad types: those that provide wide-area coverage and those with a narrow field of view but higher resolution. The role of wide-area assets will be to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. Each of these types of assets has its strengths and limitations. A severe limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage—a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars, which have been under development for several years, could significantly enhance U.S. wide-area surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor.
Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors will make it possible to remotely examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. Because every material has a unique signature, data from such sensors can be processed and used to classify objects automatically and with greater fidelity than is possible with sensors that operate in only a single waveband. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination.1
Other promising technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical “sniffers.” Essentially miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. If it were possible to develop sniffers to detect particular types of explosives, then lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles could patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. In addition, certain types of illegal drugs or the chemicals used in their processing might be useful targets for sniffers, given the nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists in some areas (e.g., Colombia). Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysi s devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a “mother ship” or a ground station.
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1For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations
against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing
Airpower’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp.
Sensors employed for wide-area searches help analysts to gain a clearer picture of the nature of the enemy’s organization and operations and to identify places where other human and technical assets can be concentrated in hopes of gaining confirmation of the presence or absence of the enemy and, perhaps, the identity of individual terrorists. Such sensors, be they human sources or technical means, ideally should provide continuous monitoring of suspect areas and persons. They should also be covert; that is, able to function without tipping off targets that they are under
surveillance.
These requirements—high resolution, continuous and long-term coverage, and secrecy—suggest that sensors to support targeting should, in general, be small so that they can be easily concealed. Small imaging sensors, in turn, must be placed close to their targets, given the need for high resolution and restrictions on focal length.2 And sensors that need to “stare” at their targets for prolonged periods should generally not be on airborne platforms but rather placed on buildings or other fixed structures, or in trees.3
______________
2For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their
potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83–107.
3In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26–27.
Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts more efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors. Such tools are especially important in counterterrorist operations because the signatures associated with most terrorist groups are generally very small and the “noise” surrounding them is often considerable. For example, U.S. and Pakistani officials today are attempting to apprehend perhaps several hundred individuals in the city of Karachi, which has a population in excess of five million. Under such circumstances, a surveillance and identification system that boasted an error rate of only 1:1000 could still give off many false alarms for each correct identification.
Conventional cameras cannot see inside buildings if the occupants are cautious and if it is not possible to plant devices inside. One means of gaining information about activities inside a building is to listen to what is being said there. Occasionally, it may be possible to plant listening devices (“bugs”) in buildings or vehicles being used by terrorists. More often, antiterrorist forces will have to rely on remote means of monitoring. It has been demonstrated that one can sometimes listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building’s windows.
Experiments are also under way with radars that have the potential to “see” through walls. The resolution of such radars is, of course, modest, but it is possible to determine whether particular rooms in a structure are occupied or not—information that can be valuable when planning an attack. Another emerging technology that can be useful in identifying terrorists is facial-recognition software. If cameras can be placed in areas where terrorists might pass by, the images they collect could be rapidly screened against a database of facial images and perhaps other physical characteristics of known terrorists. Computer algorithms capable of comparing collected images against a large database and discriminating among key features of those images will be essential if this approach is to be effective. Even with these systems, additional efforts would be required to verify the identity of potential targets, given the large number of samples collected and likely false-alarm rates.
Tagging suspected vehicles could help in developing information about patterns of activity and assisting shooters in engaging elusive targets. For example, an operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. Once attached, the transmitter could permit authorities to monitor that vehicle’s movements, perhaps pointing them to other groups of terrorists. Signals from the transmitter could also make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle “in the crosshairs” should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy it.
One serious shortfall in U.S. special operations capabilities today is the lack of a means for inserting and extracting SOF teams stealthily. SOF helicopters and C-130 cargo planes are equipped for low-level
operations, but if they fly within line of sight of radars they can be readily detected and tracked. Because surprise and survivability are such important elements of successful SOF operations, the Air Force should explore concepts for a stealthy medium transport aircraft. To be of use to SOF in a wide range of scenarios, such an aircraft could be somewhat smaller than the C-130, which has a payload of around 40,000 pounds. But it would need to have a mission radius of 1000 miles or so to permit operations deep within the territory of hostile countries. Equally important, this SOF transport should be capable of landing at and taking off from short, unimproved airstrips or
Transport aircraft with these features might also prove to be well suited to serving as a successor to the AC-130 gunship. Developing a more-survivable gunship should be a priority because surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the AC-130 are proliferating and SOF and other light forces often require the type of sustained, precise fire support that the AC-130 provides.
______________
5The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is committed to procuring some 50 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. These vertical takeoff and landing machines will replace some of AFSOC’s helicopter fleet, offering greater speed and range, but they are not stealthy and cannot substitute for the C-130 in delivering large payloads over ranges greater than a few hundred miles.
1.2 Glossary of Terms:
AFSOF --Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS --Close Air Support
CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency
C3I --Command, Control, Communication & _____________ Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, _____________ Computation and Intelligence
COMINT --Communication Intelligence
DIA -- Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD -- US Department of Defense
FLIR --Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC --High Intensity Conflict
HUMIT -- Human Intelligence
LIC --Low Intensity Conflict
NSA -- National Security Agency
OOTW --Operations Other Than War
PGM --Precision Guided Munitions
SAM --Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR --Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
SOCOM -- Special Operations Command
UAV --Unmanned Airborne Vehicle
[u][b]Below are Links for STRATEGY [/b][/u]
_________________________ _____
globalsecurity
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" title="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" target="_blank"http://www.globalsecurity.org...
Military Analysis
[url=]http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi...[/url]
Links – Institute Terrorism
http://www.ict.org.il/" title="http://www.ict.org.il/" target="_blank"http://www.ict.org.il/
Defense Daily
www.defensedaily.com/reports/non_tradition al_threats.ppt+%22guerrillawar%22&hl =en&ie=UTF-8
Soldiers For The Truth
[url=]http://www.sftt.org/terrorops...[/url]
_______________________
[b]Contract Information:[/b]
Mr. Robert D. Steele, CEO OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Inc.
Post Office Box 369, Oakton, VA 22124-0369
Voice: (703) 242-1700Fax: (703) 242-1711;
Email: bear@oss.net
Web: http://www.oss.net/extra/tool...
[url=]www.defensedaily.com/reports/non_tradition al_threats.ppt+%22guerrillawar%22&hl =en&ie=UTF-8[/url]
http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=MR-243&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" title="http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ord i/getabbydoc.pl?doc=MR-243&hilite=1&qs =guerrilla" target="_blank"http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/A...|warfare
Document No: MR-243-SOCOM Year: 1994
Capt. Damien Schlussel, 31st Fighter Wing security forces and anti-terrorist trainer
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/k-guerri llawar/browse" title="http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/k-guerri llawar/browse" target="_blank"http://209.157.64.200/focus/f...
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| Guerrilla War Resources for Community Survival |
| 05.07.04 (5:43 pm) [edit] |
[b]Below are 2 links for STRAT _ NEW[/b]
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" title="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" target="_blank"http://www.globalsecurity.org...
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8 &oe=UTF-8&q=" title="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8 &oe=UTF-8&q=" target="_blank"http://www.google.com/search?...%22Chechnya+Photographs%2 2&spell=1
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" title="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" target="_blank"http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi...
[b]Glossary of Terms:[/b]
AFSOF --Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS --Close Air Support
C3I --Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, Computation and Intelligence
COMINT --Communication Intelligence
FLIR --Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC --High Intensity Conflict
LIC --Low Intensity Conflict
OOTW --Operations Other Than War
PGM --Precision Guided Munitions
SAM --Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR --Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
UAV --Unmanned Airborne Vehicle
Americans have no direct means of influencing their government. "Opinions" are occasionally sampled through polls. November 1995 CNN-Time poll, 55 percent of the people believe "the federal government has become so powerful that it poses a threat to the rights of ordinary citizens.
Links – Institute Terrorism
http://www.ict.org.il/" title="http://www.ict.org.il/" target="_blank"http://www.ict.org.il/
lots of links - above
http://www.sftt.org/terrorops.html" title="http://www.sftt.org/terrorops.html" target="_blank"http://www.sftt.org/terrorops...
above is like SOFortunes
II.
From Creative Stratego
A discussion group for war gamers on small unit strategies and applied tactical examples. Historical and hypothetical scenarios examined for application to various contexts. Costs, risks and shortcomings are considered. Its fun to imagine, its good for your chess playing potential and it might just save your life or your family or your country. Thanks!
2.1 U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business
By J. David Galland ( defensewatch02@yahoo.com )
After a hiatus of 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers will fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks. The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements. Collection skills have improved with time and experience. National-level intelligence agencies have shoehorned themselves into Special Forces intelligence operations that were initially designed for collection of tactical human intelligence. These ops gained strategic and global intelligence direction as they yielded bonanzas.
In the post-9/11 world, the intelligence community recognizes strength in the Special Forces that their own operatives lack. Establishing indigenous human intelligence operations in a rapidly developing or already fluid combat environment has not been a strong area for the ivy-league operatives. At least, not since the termination of the legendary Phoenix program in Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The Phoenix Phung Hoang (or Operation Phoenix) was a stroke of manifest brilliance by a former Saigon CIA station chief (and later CIA Director) William Colby. **** [ Actually a brutal war crimes campaign that killed or imprisoned thousands of innocent
Vietnamese ; see: http://www.members.authorsgui... ]
The CIA relied upon the Special Forces as key players in the Phoenix program. The soldiers were often dispatched into the "denied-areas" in the war zone to perform their dangerous missions. Phoenix was basically the shortest distance between two points during the Vietnam War – those points being (1) the decision to liquidate an adversary, normally a well placed Viet Cong official, or his minions, and (2) the end-game of the operation: the capture, disappearance, or publicized assassination of the target.
Why are Special Forces soldiers once again preparing to begin conducting their own intelligence collection, which will likely be fully sanctioned and supported by the CIA?
[b]Because they can. [/b]
What is clear is that the Department Of Defense is not going to be constrained and restricted, as in past decades, when it comes to aggressive intelligence collection efforts against our country's adversaries. In keeping with the veracity of the threat, Don Rumsfeld has also created the Pentagon's, first-ever, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.
The Army is stepping up intelligence training for Special Forces soldiers at SOCOM Headquarters in Florida, and at Ft. Lewis, Wash., the home of the 1st Special Forces Group. A source says that the Tacoma location is being run like a "Mini-Farm," referring to the highly classified CIA training facility at Camp Peary, Va. ( known to the CIA as "The Farm").
Rumsfeld has given SOCOM new powers to plan and execute, "kill-or-capture-missions " against terrorists. To accomplish this goal, the SOCOM troops must have mission-unique intelligence information that is absolutely current -- a CIA paramilitary force. CIA activities must be acquiescent to U.S. law. At the same time, the CIA largely engages in activities that are intended to, and do evade international law. Special Forces soldiers are bound by both sets of legal standards. While Special Forces soldiers have been "sheep-dipped" in the past, and lived by CIA standards, the Pentagon does not want its soldiers violating laws that pertain to soldier conduct. CIA personnel on the other hand are unrestricted by the laws of war that particularly deal with uniforms, equipment and identities. They exploit this freedom to create "cover" identities for their missions.
If Special Forces soldiers are captured they have protection under the Geneva Convention that governs the treatment of POWs, but if the soldiers are operating undercover with CIA paramilitary units, they risk losing that protection. Enemies are aligned against the US in an unconventional fashion that is now termed, "fourth-generation warfare"… characterized by our adversary’s adroit use of methods that differ greatly from our usual mode of military doctrine and operations. They undermine our strengths and exploit our weaknesses as the single global superpower and seek to portray the US as a global villain picking on the little guy.
If the US military doesn't "out-guerrilla the guerrilla," they lose the global war on terrorism.
[i]So it's imperative this new SF-CIA partnership continue.[/i]
[b]2.2 US Airforce Counter Guerrilla Task Force[/b]
Rand Study (and Related Information); Link is to an Israeli adaptation:[url=]
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html#Chapter" title="http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html#Chapter" target="_blank"http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa...%202[/url]
[ [b]Adversary Strategies[/b] ]
[b]Main Measures of Guerrilla Strength include:[/b] military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies (states and guerrilla movements) and weapon systems.
[b]Guerrilla as a Strategic Threat[/b]
The existential threat presented by guerrilla warfare derives from the guerrilla movement's goal of capturing a given territory and a given population controlled at the time by the regime, and sometimes also of destroying the existing regime. Guerrilla activities corrode social and political cohesion, and call into question the internal security of the state and its individual citizens. Even when a strategic threat is identified, the regime continues to counter it largely with military means, without recognizing the need to act against all the guerrilla's sources of power.
…………….Technology and Guerrilla Warfare
While the guerrilla's weapons remain the bomb and the rifle, more recently, advanced technology has also been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision system, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.
.................... Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the goal of the guerrilla movement. The characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses.
The goals of a war against guerrillas is the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes."29 Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting against guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces are improving by adapting new weapon systems, but they still do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).
Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of the conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon, who display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices.30 A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki 31.
Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force
Air power, in most cases, cannot win a counter-guerrilla war alone. However, unification of all functions of offensive operations (intelligence, planning, and execution) under the command of the air force, can bring about a revolution in the long term outcomes of campaigns against guerrilla forces. A model for the integration of advanced technology and quality manpower is the Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force, a specialized task force for well-defined goals and missions, whose principal role is counter-guerrilla warfare. Its headquarters - an air force unit - would enjoy responsibility and authority for training the units, the development of operational and tactical doctrines, command in combat, and the operational evaluation of operations weapon systems. The US Air Force has built a Special Operation Forces unit (AFSOF). This unit is organized and employed in small formations, capable of both independent and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling timely and tailored responses. 39
………………Structure of Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force 40
1. Intelligence Element : Collection Planning teams; UAVs unit; Ground observers; Target production; Analysis team; counter-intelligence
2. Command and Planning: C3 systems; C2 Teams; Professional experts
3. Operational Unit: Assault helicopters; Attack aircraft; Airborne commando; Electronic warfare
[b]............Conduct of Operations[/b]
[u][b]*** NOTE: [/b][/u]
[ [i]The following description of a large special forces operation is about to be launched into Colombia from Peru and Ecuador - to kill or capture guerrilla leaders - or the US may wait until it decides to assassinate Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, A possible cycle of activities in a single operation is described[/i]. ]
The intelligence element belonging to the task force would search and locate a guerrilla force moving far from the front-line. Forces would be scrambled to engage the guerrilla force and one force would be flown to the designated area in order to engage the guerrilla. A special force of the airborne unit, deployed by assault helicopters nearby the guerrilla unit, would use laser designation systems in order to mark it for attack by air. Simultaneously, attack aircraft loaded with precision anti-personnel munitions would take off towards the guerrillas for the completion of the mission. Assault helicopters manned with an airborne elite unit would be deployed in ambushes on the expected retreat routes of the guerrillas, in order to capture the survivors. Throughout the entire procedure of scramble and engagement, contact would be maintained with the guerrilla force by means of data collection (UAVs or sensors attached to guerrillas, spies or equipment) and would designate it by laser designators and other means for aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the first wave would be to destroy a part of the force and to 'freeze' the rest of it in place. At this point, after the guerrilla force has lost its maneuverability and mobility, since movement would expose it to additional volleys, attack aircraft and attack helicopters would continue to destroy the guerrilla force. Finally, the elite unit would close in and finish off the battle. The few guerrillas who succeeded in escaping would probably run into the ambushes and be hit by them.
[u][b]*** NOTE:[/b][/u]
[ How to counter this strategy and these operations? How to turn it into a trap ... or a defeat? ]
[b]............... Intelligence[/b]
Counter-guerrilla Air Warfare planning and execution is intelligence- intensive. Operations planners should use all-source intelligence from both organic and external intelligence sources. Harkabi, as a representative of the military viewpoint, emphasized the importance of tactical intelligence: "Development of tactical intelligence is important for counter-guerrilla warfare. Exploiting blind power against a 'stealthy' enemy as guerrilla is useless and dangerous."43 Air power requires 'real time intelligence,' since the swiftness of its operations demands knowledge on the enemy at the time of the execution of operations. Specific efforts should be invested to satisfy this requirement." 44
[u][b]NOTE:[/b][/u]
[ In Afghanistan these techniques of landing Rangers or other Special Forces near airforce targets worked extremely well. With the forward US forces identifying targets with laser devices, the accuracy of the JDAMS and other smart and not-so-smart bombs was precise and devastating against the Taliban bunkers. ]
A proper focus of intelligence on irregular forces should establish a database on various groups' identification and intentions, local political alignments and alliances, guerrilla goals and objectives. It should also monitor disaffected and radicalized individuals, and assess the influence and intentions of local religious leaders.
Air force intelligence gathering with special equipment and employing methods peculiar to aircraft is vital to counter-insurgency. By means of aerial reconnaissance, changes in insurgent deployment may be detected. . . .Intelligence material is needed for target allocation, for the preparation of 'hard cop' for air crews and as evidence to be used in public relations operations and any political campaign directed at the insurgents. In intelligence gathering, use is made of available means, such as remotely piloted vehicles, and SIGINT (mainly COMINT). It further involves the operation of the intelligence infrastructure as a whole, as it would in a conventional war, including for instance infra-red photography, fast dissemination and briefings.46
The intelligence community would provide intelligence infrastructure and equipment such as software, SIGINT systems and maps, and long-term intelligence, for example information on leaders, sources of recruitment, doctrines, weapon systems, and links with states and other organizations. The air force, which would supply air photos, expensive and rare systems and operations such as reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, SIGINT system, and new information warfare systems.47 The intelligence component would gather, collate, analyze and process tactical short-range, near-real-time information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual and potential guerrilla enemies by using visual, imagery and electronic reconnaissance.48 At the same time it must identify the threats which might interfere with the operations. Accurate information on target is the Achilles' heel of counter-guerrilla air warfare. Tracking human moving targets is more difficult than locating armor and fixed targets. Therefore, air power must shape unique requirements for sensors' research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement. An LIC American expert criticized the US military intelligence tendency to emphasize the technological side of intelligence, while LIC operations require effective political/human intelligence, which can be gathered and analyzed by well-educated people with operational experience....
[b]3. Guerrilla Manuals and Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy[/b]
3.1. http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.11 A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.12 PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.13 HOW THE URBAN GUERRILLA LIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.14 TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.15 THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S WEAPONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.16 THE SHOT; THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.17 THE FIRING GROUP
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.18 THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.19 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.20 THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Page last updated 11 Mar 2004
3.21 SURPRISE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.22 KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.23 MOBILITY AND SPEED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.24 INFORMATION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.25 DECISIVENESS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.26 OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.27 ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF MISSIONS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.28 ASSAULTS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.29 THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MISSION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.30 RAIDS AND PENETRATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.31 OCCUPATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.32 AMBUSH
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.33 STREET TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.34 STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.35 DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.36 LIBERATION OF PRISONERS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.37 EXECUTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.38 KIDNAPPING
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.39 SABOTAGE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.40 TERRORISM
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.41 ARMED PROPAGANDA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.42 THE WAR OF NERVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.43 HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.44 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.45 RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.46 GUERRILLA SECURITY
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.47 THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
3.48 POPULAR SUPPORT
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...
[b]3.5 Ireland's OWN: History (IRA & RIRA)[/b]
[url=]http://irelandsown.net/guerri...[/url]
[b]Table of Contents[/b]
Successful Implementations of Guerrilla Warfare : http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Ground Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare
The IRA
Understanding the Enemy
Guerrilla Commanders
Guerrilla Formations
Guerrilla Units
The Flying Column
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Defence and Attack Methods
Guerrilla Equipment:
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Arms and Explosives
The Barrack Buster
Semtex
Traitors
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare
Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrillas Should be Volunteers
Importance of Communication
Reaching out to the Masses
Inside Cadres
The Internet
Conclusion
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" title="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" target="_blank"http://groups.yahoo.com/group...
[b]3.6. For interesting Scenarios and information on tactics & strategy see:[/b]
[url=]www.guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/url]
[b]3.7. Future Strategy - Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights[/b]
Every political move – referendum- law – appointment is a military move – since war is in hearts and minds as much as on the filed – you have to respond to each political move – keep the enemy off balance
The elite are always way ahead of us street people – we are always reactive – slow – hesitant.
Just like in Colombia where they say that a massacre is always foretold – obvious
– if you look at US policies in Iraq or in Latin America you see the wars – the massacres – forming.
[b]Key overall guiding principles: [/b]
[b]3 Types of attacks:[/b]
1. Serious strategic attacks – Takeout key people – enemies – leaders – or major infrastructure ( Power Plant – Key Transformer, Chemical Plant – Oil Facility – Storage – Gas lines –Bridges – Dams – Aqueducts –Pumping Station, Railroads, terminals – docks – aircraft – or ports – many choppers or a production facility – government buildings
2. Tactical strikes – to acquire weapons, money, fame, or takeout limited equipment – a plane – a chopper – a communication facility
3. Symbolic Strikes – Sword of Bolivar – Statue of Liberty – Governors’ Mansion -
[b]
3.4 GW Commando Resistance[/b]
This news source occasionally provides analysis and recommendations for resistance groups:
A new low-tech national security strategy
– Venezuela and its emerging allies should adopt commando – citizen resistance strategies to defeat the US and to prepare the people for self and community defense. And Strategic Hamlets should be established on all border areas by the hundreds!
[b]3.8. Scenarios and Battle Examples
A Typical Urban Guerrilla Attack Plan[/b]
[b]TARGET – is a large gun shop or dealer – [/b]
1. Recon – Security at site, where supplies you want are located – the right powder – models etc –
2. Recon the nearest police stations and substations – and queuing areas – coffee shops – hangouts –
3. Observe shift changes and traffic changes – and shoppers at or near the place changes ..
4. Electric distribution of area - also supply transformers if near or big or right time of year – summer or winter extremes – where are key powerlines – gas lines – water system components?
5. Escape plan – route – stash places – breakdowns – re supply –
6. Fall back contingencies – injuries – heat –
7.
[b]Battle Plan :[/b]
1. Large fires or car bombs near a rich part of town away from gunshop – attacks on fire department and police in that part of town – then that group falls back to cover – keep out forces – say to the north – meanwhile gunshop is hit and powerlines/substations taken out all over – communication towers and – or jamming systems are used – and then the roads or police stations are taken out as we retreat with the stash – choppers – some hit ahead of time – some at the time – (dusk - ?? )
Break down part of the shipment quick – smaller trucks – cars – and go in different directions = more fires elsewhere and returned snipers – on fire department and police – nails – caltrops – car bombs for max chaos but minor deaths – Get away – communiqué – and lots of arms !! A smaller and continuous harassment would be to rob police randomly at different areas – times – and ways -!!
[b]
..................4.1 Reader Comments and Musings[/b]
Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia:
Interview militia people in the USA and get perspectives from US and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse.
Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries– McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly
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2. Adversary Strategy
2.1. SPECIAL FORCES AND THE USA Central Intelligence Agency
2.2. US Airforce Counter Guerrilla Task Force [Category: Adversary Strategy: Espionage ]
3. Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy
3.1.
3.2. Mao Tse-tung-- PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN
3.3. Marighella: THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
3.4. Future Strategy - Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights
4. Reader Comments and Suggestions
2.1 SPECIAL FORCES Enter The Intelligence World, Mar 05, 04
By J. David Galland (Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch; defensewatch02@yahoo.com )
U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business. They will be actively engaged in the pursuit of "actionable intelligence" in the Global War on Terrorism, in an effort to neutralize the asymmetric non-sovereign aligned threats to the U.S.A.
After a hiatus of nearly 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers are preparing to fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks.
The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements.
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A DISCUSSION GROUP FOR WAR GAMERS ON SMALL UNIT STRATEGIES AND APPLIED TACTICAL EXAMPLES. HISTORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS EXAMINED FOR APLLICATION TO VARIOUS CONTEXTS. COSTS, RISKS AND SHORTCOMINGS ARE CONSIDERED. ITS FUN TO IMAGINE, ITS GOOD FOR YOUR CHESS PLAYING POTENTIAAL AND IT MIGHT JUST SAVE YOUR LIFE OR YOUR FAMILY OR YOUR COUNTRY. THANKS!
Thursday, April 29, 2004
The Table of Contents - Small Unit Strategy & Creative Stratego
I. Introduction
I.1.
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The Few - The Brave -
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[ The Clandestine ]
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Soldiers of the world:
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Write us; help us; tell the world your dreams and hopes; open up and share -
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teach us how to fight!
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.....4.1 Reader Comments & Musings
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Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia:
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In our region many people are fed up with the federal government goons, the waste inherent in all the laws and regulations and the absolute threats to the Constitution – If it even exists… Abolishing this monstrosity that aims to bureaucratize the whole world is the preferred solution - States’ Rights? – how about State sovereignty and secession? You should interview militia people and their potential supporters in the USA and get perspectives from the many disgruntled US military personnel and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse.
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Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries (sans racist stupidity) – McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly…
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This game concept is a good way to plug people in and get them thinking clearly and with purpose.
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Bravo!
BRAVO !!!
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