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GUERRILLA WAR :: GAME TIME! ****************************** Send your links and comments to: politicalsoldier@lycos.com ___________________________ ******* ... Why Take Up Armed Struggle? ___________________________ ... or Why Play Guerrilla War ______________________ The art of Revolution: _________________ ------------------------------- ************ A (partially) ANARCHIST VIEW ------------------------------ -----------------******* ********** No SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE in recent world history has been effected through non-violent means. We live in a world of violent domination, where people are either compliant with corporate rule or done away with. As first-world consumers, we are all guilty of directly causing the subjugation of marginalized people the world over, the destruction of the global ecosphere and the deaths of those in political opposition to any government ours has relations with. Americans who claim to be believers in non-violence are fooling themselves. *********************** The legitimacy of armed uprising is an issue that each of us has to decide for ourselves. Pacifism is a sort of self-therapy to dismiss anything the pacifist doesn't wish to confront on a personal level. Don't argue the pacifist point of view with me, and don't censure me. Let the government do it's own dirty work. Now, on with the educational portion of this program... _______________________ _______________________ BUILD YOUR BASE OF SUPPORT... There are things that have to be done before taking up armed struggle. First, surround yourself with people you know well enough to trust with your life. The second is to prepare to leave everyone else you know behind and prepare for a lonely, painful existence of hardship and uncertainty. And drug, drink and sexual abstinence as well. Now you and a small band of friends are ready to begin. Before you pull off your first action, though there are a lot of preparations you will have to make. _________________________ Make sure you know as much as you can possibly find out about your base of operations: Who are your neighbors, do they suspect anything? Are they simpatico? Where are good hiding places? Good escape routes? Any fresh water springs or other sources of water in the area? Can you slip in and out of your basecamp ( or your various urban-rural safe-houses and barns) without being seen or looking suspicious? ______________________ _______ Do you know people outside your group who you can ask for help who will not ask questions and do anything (within reason) to help you? These people are going to be the ones who will let your wounded comrades hide out in their homes until they are better, who will help you acquire food and medicine, who will feed you and deliver messages to your above-ground supporters. You will not succeed in your efforts without at least a nominal base of support. Your supporters need not adhere to your political views. They will help you out because they like you as people and think that you are passionate, even heroic. Do not do anything to expose these people to violence from the police and military. They are not combatants. They have not joined your militia. Keep away from them during times of heightened activity from the police and military forces. ____________________ ___________ The guerrilla group - or preferably a higher level coordinating cadre (politico-military or intelligence) will also identify people or officials who can be coerced or intimidated into helping (money, protection, information on military plans) _____________________ ________ At this time, you should be propagandizing, letting the community know that there are people around who are willing to stop complying with the legal status quo. Through these efforts, you will better understand the community you are involved with. This is the time to confront attitudes - both yours and other's - and get a feel for who can be trusted and how far that trust can go. This is a time when you are vulnerable to arrest. ____________________ __________ Propaganda vehicles consist of flyers, graffiti, guerilla actions against billboards and any media at your disposal - print, radio, video -- anything that you can use to explain why you feel the way you do. _____________________ __________ It is not important to convert people to your side at this point - emphasis should be in setting the proper context for your consequent actions, so that when they begin, people will know what's happening and why. ___________________ ____________ When to begin your activities as a revolutionary fighting unit? Marxist strategy preaches that "the people" should be prepared before there can be a chance for a revolution to be successful. Yet history has shown that "the people" will start kicking ass long before any leadership has emerged. According to Che, the Cuban Revolution proved that an oppressed people sometimes only need a catalyst to prod them into action before they ignite into a mass movement -- to sweep aside the old regime. History has also shown that in the chaos between the fall of the old and the start of the new order, there is a danger of a cultish leader taking control of the revolutionary spirit in order to set himself up as the new dictator. ********************* ***** The times this has not happened, there has been international efforts made to crush the Revolution before it sets an example the rest of the world could follow. These are dangers that need to be considered during the development of the revolution. ******************* ********** Once your group is ready to begin activities, there are considerations: how do you keep the unit supplied with ammunition, what are your targets for attack, are you ready for a counter-strike by the enemy? There is a difference, psychologically, in pressing the attack and being attacked. In the former case, there is a feeling of control, you have met the enemy and are now going to kick his ass. When they come after you, however, there is a feeling of defeat from the outset. Coming under fire by your enemy is unnerving. Even when faced with far superior fire- and manpower, the guerrilla group can escape by stealth or directed assault and use their knowledge of the area to make their get-away. ---------------------------------- --------------------------- ------------------- Essential equipment Here are the things each guerrilla soldier must have: a weapon a sleeping bag or wool blanket a backpack good boots a hammock a tarp some heavy clothing an ammo belt _____________________ __________ A mosquito net would come in handy during the warm seasons, and the guerilla will do well to have some sort of dry food on him whenever possible. Other things that could help out would include a small flashlight, a cup and small pan, a knife of some sort, especially one similar to a Swiss army knife. Some extra cord, string or twine for repairing equipment and stringing up the hammock and tarp is always a good idea. ______________________ __________ The less stuff the soldier carries in the field, the more mobile the unit is. If your unit is operating in a safe, familiar area, you can stash things, like staple foods , medicines and extra ammunition and weapons in hidey-holes spread throughout your field of operations. ______________________ _______ There should be one or two people outside the unit who can act as go-betweens when the unit needs things like food and medicine. It is not important for the whole unit to know these people, nor for them to know much about the unit. You will hopefully have contact with organizations which support your actions. When the time comes to escalate your activities, these outside contacts will become sources for new recruits. ______________________ _________ Desirable Items of Gear and Weaponry ____________________________ 308 and 50 caliber sniper rifles with high powered scopes ________________________ Mortars ________________________ Incendiary and armor piercing ammo ________________________ Spotting scopes and telescopes _______________________ Range finders _______________________ blasting caps and det cord _______________________ familiarity with various timing devices and trip cord booby traps ------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ----------- The Anarchist Guerilla Group _____________________ ______ Decisions - including the choice of commanding officers - are often made by consensus, though this is not always possible. In battle, when unexpected complications arise (serious accidents occur or during severe weather) the officers take the initiative to remedy the situation - longer-term operations are consulted with by a larger group of soldiers. No Anarchist Guerrilla should put themselves in the position of sticking rigidly to non-hierarchal principles in battle situations. The Guerrilla should be able to trust her fellow militia members who have been chosen at large to act in the best interest of the unit. This is easier to do with people you've known a long time or have faced enemy fire with. ********************* ********* The typical Guerilla group is small, between five and a dozen people. Any more than that and the odds of being spotted by the enemy are greatly increased. Any less and there are extreme limits to what your group can attempt and expect to survive. There will usually emerge one or two people with organizational skills who will often serve as leaders due to their general competence. These people may not be the same people who are effective combat leaders. The differences should be respected, as well as acknowledged. These people should be deferred to during times of crisis or difficult decision making such as when chosen officers are missing or incapacitated. ********************* ******* When the conflict escalates, the group will hopefully grow and the experienced members will be thrust into leadership roles with the new arrivals, help them to make the adjustment to clandestine or camp life and teach them how to survive engagement with the enemy. It is worth noting that the successful small group leader will not always be as competent with a larger group. And the person unable to take the initiative with a small group of friends might find herself feeling responsible for the well-being of the new recruits. Let these naturally occurring roles manifest themselves, but always be wary of anyone who takes on too much responsibility. If that person were killed during an action, the group might find itself in deep shit. It is the responsibility of the entire militia to see that all the work is shared by everyone, so that there is always someone available to help out when someone else is lost due to injury or illness. ********************* ****** When the group has grown to ungainly size, it will need to split up. This then creates a new difficulty of keeping in contact and coordinating actions. Therefore, any activities must be planned well in advance - though not necessarily in great detail. This difficulty will be compounded greatly the more recruits there are. The time will come when the militia will have to expand its base of operations. This is like starting all over again, with new contacts to be made with the people in the area, new maps to be acquired, new terrain to be explored. This is a dangerous time for the group, and should be undertaken with a heightened sense of alertness. There should be time available to send men into new places without their field gear, just to pass through and scope things out. It is important for these people to stay out of difficulties with the police in the new places. ----------------------------- -------------------------- ------------------------- Insurrection! ________________________ ______ There are no hard-set rules for making your initial engagements with the enemy: ______________________ Never engage the enemy in an attack that you cannot win. Don't send your infantry to assault a well-fortified airfield or attack a barracks outside your territory - use suicidal bombers or standoff weapons (mortars or 50 caliber rifles). _________________________ Always strike fast, with every weapon at your disposal, inflict the maximum amount of damage that you can and withdraw just as quickly. ________________________ Have your escape planned beforehand. ___________________________ Select a rendezvous point where anyone separated during the fighting can catch up with the others. ___________________________ Make every round of ammunition count. You'll never suffer from an over-abundance of ammunition. ___________________________ Recover ammunition and weapons from fallen enemies. Indeed, many of your engagements will be solely for this purpose. _______________________ _________ Don't panic if things don't go well. Get out as quickly as possible and try to make the enemy regret any pursuit attempted. ______________________ _______ .......... ALWAYS fire from a well-concealed position. ___________________ _____ Not just behind a tree or rock, but laying on the ground behind a tree or rock. It is especially important to be on the ground behind a bush or in grass. If not, the enemy will likely see the discharge from your weapon and be able to aim at that. If you're on the ground, underneath some sort of foliage, the enemy may not even see your gun's blast. The smaller a target you present, the less likely you'll be hit. ____________________ _________ Make sure you're not trapped, in a place where any movement will expose you to enemy fire with no chance for cover. Though these may sound like obvious points, you will be surprised at what people will do in the heat of battle. Practice with paint guns before using real weapons. ______________________________ If you are being pursued by an enemy column, always kill the lead man (the Point man). This will unnerve the enemy and make the point position difficult to fill. This tactic will sometimes divide the enemy against one another, as some men may refuse to take a position that is going to result in their deaths. ___________________________ Your first actions will likely not put a great deal of fear into your enemies. You will have to do armed robberies in order to provision your group with enough food and supplies to get started. Keep some money in reserve in case the group is forced out of their base of operations. Do not rob the families of the people who are your supporters, or who should be your supporters. Rob the wealthy, the powerful and the local tyrants. You'll know who they are, the businesses they own and where they live, if you've made the proper preparations. ________________________________ When you've pulled off your first outright "military" action, this should be followed by a propaganda effort, or propaganda should be made during the action, so that all will know what's going on. From this point on, the Guerrilla is on enemy turf, until they have established complete control of some territory. Once this action is taken, the war is on and the guerrillas will be under constant harassment. _____________________________ -------------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------- Defensive positions ____________________________ You should have prepared several bunkers at different places throughout your base of operations. Here, you can store excess items rather than carry them around with you all the time. These should offer some shelter, not only from the cold and rain, but also from light artillery, such as grenades launched from guns and mortars. Thus, if the attackers are only a small unit you may have some time to evacuate and retrieve valuable equipment. __________________________ Anytime the unit is under fire and has to withdraw from an area, they should do so in an orderly manner. Several people should fall back and offer cover fire so that the others can pull out. These people will then take up firing positions so that the previously positioned guerrillas can then withdraw, too. The process is repeated until the enemy breaks off pursuit. During such a strategic retreat, an experienced fighting unit may sometimes find itself suddenly in the possession of an easily-defendable position. By regrouping there, they may be able to actually mount a counter-attack against the pursuing enemy. To do this, they must attack with great energy and only if they have enough ammunition to sustain the attack. If they can successfully force the enemy into retreat, there will be opportunities to gather ammunition left behind by fallen enemy soldiers. Of course, when faced with superior numbers and firepower, the best idea is to leave the area as quickly as possible. ___________________________ ------------------------------- --------------------------- ---------------------- ..........Taking Action : And Seeking Strategic Effect ___________________________ In Nicaragua (FSLN)-Sandinistas) & El Salvador (FMLN) rebels pulled off spectacular actions not only to display their capabilities, but also to humiliate their enemies. They would capture the banquet hall where a member of a ruling familiy was holding a wedding reception or loot and burn stores that belong to the rulers. The Tupac Amaru attempted such an action in Peru when they took over the Japanese Embassy. They had undertaken the effort as an act of desperation, without really expecting to win the encounter. They could have attempted to shoot their way out, thus giving their supporters and those in sympathy with them a chance to join in the fray. Had they engaged the army units surrounding them in a prolonged, running battle, they could have set the city aflame with revolutionary fever. _____________________________ By carrying out such outrageous actions, the guerrillas illustrate to the people that the powerful are vulnerable. This inspires admiration and respect, not only with the people in the barios, but often in the ranks of the military as well. There are incidents of high-ranking officers in the military, disgusted by the attitudes and behavior of the ruling elite, who would withdraw their troops into their barracks and withhold them from the fighting, then pledge themselves to the revolutionary government. Displays of bravery coupled with upright behavior can win over to the guerrilla's side those who have been apathetic or even opposed to their actions. Not all who serve the powerful enjoy their roles. ___________________________ The focus of the guerrilla groups initial activities will be to disrupt the lives of the enemy forces as much as possible and to cut off their supplies. With stealth and a few homemade weapons, the guerilla band can attack airfields, convoys and other means of supply the enemy will use. Mines that can be detonated by remote switches are effective. Shotguns can be converted into grenade launchers and explosive devices (black powder grenades, molotovs, etc.) can be fired with them. Improvised weapons are effective, not only due to their offensive capacities, but also as a psychological weapon against the opposing soldiers, who assume you have nothing in your arsenal other than a few rifles. ____________________________ Do not take prisoners unless they are valuable - wealthy or high ranking. If possible, escort surrendering troops to a border and tell them to get lost for the remainder of the war. Do not allow them to return to their bases. Since they will be fellow countryfolk, they may actually want to join your side! They must prove themselves under fire before you can trust them with weapons! Until then they can be treated as suspect new recruits. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .......... Urban Warfare Usually labeled as "terrorists", the urban guerilla differs from the traditional "fighting in the fields" guerrilla in their base of operations. The Urban guerrillas are under more intensive scrutiny than those in the woods and have to be careful not to arouse the suspicion of neighbors as well as the police. But, they can hide out just as easily, have more targets to choose from and can often stir up the locals to take part in their actions, even if they are only playing supporting roles. The Sendero Luminoso in Peru existed for years in the slums of Lima. ____________________________ The urban guerilla band will never have the security that the "outdoor" guerrillas have, nor will they usually have the number of people involved in their day-to-day activities, still they will be able to maintain social ties to the outside world. This is both good and bad. It's a security risk anytime someone outside the group becomes familiar with one or more of it's members. The good part is that the urban guerrillas can more accurately assess their situation and plan their actions accordingly. ************************ Urban guerrilla activity is probably the first step to take in a modern industrial state, though it is usually the last phase of the traditional revolution. Due to the amount of police informants, security forces and military available to combat the guerrillas, it is advisable not to stay in one area for very long. Once a few actions have taken place, the guerrilla group can split up and regroup later. This regrouping should be seen as a chance to gather together to plan the next operation and the group should have their combat supplies stored somewhere secure. When the group is dispersed for any amount of time, there is no certainty that all the members will rejoin the group. Some may be arrested, or injured or killed. There is always the danger of being followed or turned in by someone familiar with the guerrillas, maybe even one of its members. In any case, treat a re-grouping with extreme caution, assume the worst and do not wait around for very long for any stragglers. ************************* ------------------------------- --------------------------- ---------------------- .......Some final thoughts about ________________________ Insurrection ________________________ Once a person begins down this road, it is difficult to turn back. Even if one surrenders, there is no guarantee the government forces will accept the surrender, or that they won't have you killed in prison. __________________________ Self-discipline is key to security. Wandering away to have a fling with a babe, getting drunk at a tavern or trying to contact a missed person could result in getting oneself and the entire group killed. The ability to remain calm under duress is extraordinarily useful. If stopped by an agent of the state, try to determine what the matter is all about before whipping out a gun or grenade or taking cyanide. The agent in question could be asking around about something totally unrelated to your activities. __________________________ Try not to be fearful, but allow yourself to use your fear to your advantage. Fear brings about a heightened state of alertness which can be quite useful at certain times. __________________________ __________________________ Russia as Weird as the USA __________________________ The Russian authorities have so far ignored Basayev’s statements. They are most probably investigating the incident that occurred on 18 February in the Ramenskoye district near Moscow. ___________________________ On that day, in the vicinity of the village of Starnikovo, experts found a crater under a pipeline and 10-mm holes in a 200-mm gas pipe. On the day after the incident Alexander Alexeyev, a senior police official with the regional police directorate told Gazeta.Ru that judging by the size of the crater, either two explosive devices of about 200 grams of TNT or a bucket of petrol blew up under the pipeline. An explosive device planted by unknown saboteurs under another pipe in the same area was discovered and defused by sappers before it detonated. Local police suggested that local teenagers, who had watched too many action movies, could have been to blame.
Guerrilla War Resources for Community Survival
05.07.04 (5:43 pm)   [edit]
[b]Below are 2 links for STRAT _ NEW[/b]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" title="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm" target="_blank"http://www.globalsecurity.org...
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8 &oe=UTF-8&q=" title="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8 &oe=UTF-8&q=" target="_blank"http://www.google.com/search?...%22Chechnya+Photographs%2 2&spell=1

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" title="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4" target="_blank"http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi...


[b]Glossary of Terms:[/b]

AFSOF --Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS --Close Air Support
C3I --Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, Computation and Intelligence
COMINT --Communication Intelligence
FLIR --Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC --High Intensity Conflict
LIC --Low Intensity Conflict
OOTW --Operations Other Than War
PGM --Precision Guided Munitions
SAM --Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR --Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
UAV --Unmanned Airborne Vehicle


Americans have no direct means of influencing their government. "Opinions" are occasionally sampled through polls. November 1995 CNN-Time poll, 55 percent of the people believe "the federal government has become so powerful that it poses a threat to the rights of ordinary citizens.



Links – Institute Terrorism
http://www.ict.org.il/" title="http://www.ict.org.il/" target="_blank"http://www.ict.org.il/

lots of links - above

http://www.sftt.org/terrorops.html" title="http://www.sftt.org/terrorops.html" target="_blank"http://www.sftt.org/terrorops...
above is like SOFortunes



II.
From Creative Stratego


A discussion group for war gamers on small unit strategies and applied tactical examples. Historical and hypothetical scenarios examined for application to various contexts. Costs, risks and shortcomings are considered. Its fun to imagine, its good for your chess playing potential and it might just save your life or your family or your country. Thanks!


2.1 U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business
By J. David Galland ( defensewatch02@yahoo.com )
After a hiatus of 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers will fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks. The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements. Collection skills have improved with time and experience. National-level intelligence agencies have shoehorned themselves into Special Forces intelligence operations that were initially designed for collection of tactical human intelligence. These ops gained strategic and global intelligence direction as they yielded bonanzas.

In the post-9/11 world, the intelligence community recognizes strength in the Special Forces that their own operatives lack. Establishing indigenous human intelligence operations in a rapidly developing or already fluid combat environment has not been a strong area for the ivy-league operatives. At least, not since the termination of the legendary Phoenix program in Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The Phoenix Phung Hoang (or Operation Phoenix) was a stroke of manifest brilliance by a former Saigon CIA station chief (and later CIA Director) William Colby. **** [ Actually a brutal war crimes campaign that killed or imprisoned thousands of innocent
Vietnamese ; see: http://www.members.authorsgui... ]

The CIA relied upon the Special Forces as key players in the Phoenix program. The soldiers were often dispatched into the "denied-areas" in the war zone to perform their dangerous missions. Phoenix was basically the shortest distance between two points during the Vietnam War – those points being (1) the decision to liquidate an adversary, normally a well placed Viet Cong official, or his minions, and (2) the end-game of the operation: the capture, disappearance, or publicized assassination of the target.

Why are Special Forces soldiers once again preparing to begin conducting their own intelligence collection, which will likely be fully sanctioned and supported by the CIA?

[b]Because they can. [/b]

What is clear is that the Department Of Defense is not going to be constrained and restricted, as in past decades, when it comes to aggressive intelligence collection efforts against our country's adversaries. In keeping with the veracity of the threat, Don Rumsfeld has also created the Pentagon's, first-ever, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

The Army is stepping up intelligence training for Special Forces soldiers at SOCOM Headquarters in Florida, and at Ft. Lewis, Wash., the home of the 1st Special Forces Group. A source says that the Tacoma location is being run like a "Mini-Farm," referring to the highly classified CIA training facility at Camp Peary, Va. ( known to the CIA as "The Farm").

Rumsfeld has given SOCOM new powers to plan and execute, "kill-or-capture-missions " against terrorists. To accomplish this goal, the SOCOM troops must have mission-unique intelligence information that is absolutely current -- a CIA paramilitary force. CIA activities must be acquiescent to U.S. law. At the same time, the CIA largely engages in activities that are intended to, and do evade international law. Special Forces soldiers are bound by both sets of legal standards. While Special Forces soldiers have been "sheep-dipped" in the past, and lived by CIA standards, the Pentagon does not want its soldiers violating laws that pertain to soldier conduct. CIA personnel on the other hand are unrestricted by the laws of war that particularly deal with uniforms, equipment and identities. They exploit this freedom to create "cover" identities for their missions.

If Special Forces soldiers are captured they have protection under the Geneva Convention that governs the treatment of POWs, but if the soldiers are operating undercover with CIA paramilitary units, they risk losing that protection. Enemies are aligned against the US in an unconventional fashion that is now termed, "fourth-generation warfare"… characterized by our adversary’s adroit use of methods that differ greatly from our usual mode of military doctrine and operations. They undermine our strengths and exploit our weaknesses as the single global superpower and seek to portray the US as a global villain picking on the little guy.
If the US military doesn't "out-guerrilla the guerrilla," they lose the global war on terrorism.

[i]So it's imperative this new SF-CIA partnership continue.[/i]


[b]2.2 US Airforce Counter Guerrilla Task Force[/b]
Rand Study (and Related Information); Link is to an Israeli adaptation:[url=]
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html#Chapter" title="http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/39pub.html#Chapter" target="_blank"http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa...%202[/url]

[ [b]Adversary Strategies[/b] ]

[b]Main Measures of Guerrilla Strength include:[/b] military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies (states and guerrilla movements) and weapon systems.

[b]Guerrilla as a Strategic Threat[/b]

The existential threat presented by guerrilla warfare derives from the guerrilla movement's goal of capturing a given territory and a given population controlled at the time by the regime, and sometimes also of destroying the existing regime. Guerrilla activities corrode social and political cohesion, and call into question the internal security of the state and its individual citizens. Even when a strategic threat is identified, the regime continues to counter it largely with military means, without recognizing the need to act against all the guerrilla's sources of power.

…………….Technology and Guerrilla Warfare

While the guerrilla's weapons remain the bomb and the rifle, more recently, advanced technology has also been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision system, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

.................... Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the goal of the guerrilla movement. The characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses.

The goals of a war against guerrillas is the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes."29 Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting against guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces are improving by adapting new weapon systems, but they still do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).

Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of the conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon, who display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices.30 A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki 31.

Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force

Air power, in most cases, cannot win a counter-guerrilla war alone. However, unification of all functions of offensive operations (intelligence, planning, and execution) under the command of the air force, can bring about a revolution in the long term outcomes of campaigns against guerrilla forces. A model for the integration of advanced technology and quality manpower is the Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force, a specialized task force for well-defined goals and missions, whose principal role is counter-guerrilla warfare. Its headquarters - an air force unit - would enjoy responsibility and authority for training the units, the development of operational and tactical doctrines, command in combat, and the operational evaluation of operations weapon systems. The US Air Force has built a Special Operation Forces unit (AFSOF). This unit is organized and employed in small formations, capable of both independent and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling timely and tailored responses. 39

………………Structure of Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force 40

1. Intelligence Element : Collection Planning teams; UAVs unit; Ground observers; Target production; Analysis team; counter-intelligence

2. Command and Planning: C3 systems; C2 Teams; Professional experts

3. Operational Unit: Assault helicopters; Attack aircraft; Airborne commando; Electronic warfare

[b]............Conduct of Operations[/b]

[u][b]*** NOTE: [/b][/u]

[ [i]The following description of a large special forces operation is about to be launched into Colombia from Peru and Ecuador - to kill or capture guerrilla leaders - or the US may wait until it decides to assassinate Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, A possible cycle of activities in a single operation is described[/i]. ]

The intelligence element belonging to the task force would search and locate a guerrilla force moving far from the front-line. Forces would be scrambled to engage the guerrilla force and one force would be flown to the designated area in order to engage the guerrilla. A special force of the airborne unit, deployed by assault helicopters nearby the guerrilla unit, would use laser designation systems in order to mark it for attack by air. Simultaneously, attack aircraft loaded with precision anti-personnel munitions would take off towards the guerrillas for the completion of the mission. Assault helicopters manned with an airborne elite unit would be deployed in ambushes on the expected retreat routes of the guerrillas, in order to capture the survivors. Throughout the entire procedure of scramble and engagement, contact would be maintained with the guerrilla force by means of data collection (UAVs or sensors attached to guerrillas, spies or equipment) and would designate it by laser designators and other means for aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the first wave would be to destroy a part of the force and to 'freeze' the rest of it in place. At this point, after the guerrilla force has lost its maneuverability and mobility, since movement would expose it to additional volleys, attack aircraft and attack helicopters would continue to destroy the guerrilla force. Finally, the elite unit would close in and finish off the battle. The few guerrillas who succeeded in escaping would probably run into the ambushes and be hit by them.

[u][b]*** NOTE:[/b][/u]
[ How to counter this strategy and these operations? How to turn it into a trap ... or a defeat? ]

[b]............... Intelligence[/b]

Counter-guerrilla Air Warfare planning and execution is intelligence- intensive. Operations planners should use all-source intelligence from both organic and external intelligence sources. Harkabi, as a representative of the military viewpoint, emphasized the importance of tactical intelligence: "Development of tactical intelligence is important for counter-guerrilla warfare. Exploiting blind power against a 'stealthy' enemy as guerrilla is useless and dangerous."43 Air power requires 'real time intelligence,' since the swiftness of its operations demands knowledge on the enemy at the time of the execution of operations. Specific efforts should be invested to satisfy this requirement." 44

[u][b]NOTE:[/b][/u]
[ In Afghanistan these techniques of landing Rangers or other Special Forces near airforce targets worked extremely well. With the forward US forces identifying targets with laser devices, the accuracy of the JDAMS and other smart and not-so-smart bombs was precise and devastating against the Taliban bunkers. ]

A proper focus of intelligence on irregular forces should establish a database on various groups' identification and intentions, local political alignments and alliances, guerrilla goals and objectives. It should also monitor disaffected and radicalized individuals, and assess the influence and intentions of local religious leaders.

Air force intelligence gathering with special equipment and employing methods peculiar to aircraft is vital to counter-insurgency. By means of aerial reconnaissance, changes in insurgent deployment may be detected. . . .Intelligence material is needed for target allocation, for the preparation of 'hard cop' for air crews and as evidence to be used in public relations operations and any political campaign directed at the insurgents. In intelligence gathering, use is made of available means, such as remotely piloted vehicles, and SIGINT (mainly COMINT). It further involves the operation of the intelligence infrastructure as a whole, as it would in a conventional war, including for instance infra-red photography, fast dissemination and briefings.46

The intelligence community would provide intelligence infrastructure and equipment such as software, SIGINT systems and maps, and long-term intelligence, for example information on leaders, sources of recruitment, doctrines, weapon systems, and links with states and other organizations. The air force, which would supply air photos, expensive and rare systems and operations such as reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, SIGINT system, and new information warfare systems.47 The intelligence component would gather, collate, analyze and process tactical short-range, near-real-time information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual and potential guerrilla enemies by using visual, imagery and electronic reconnaissance.48 At the same time it must identify the threats which might interfere with the operations. Accurate information on target is the Achilles' heel of counter-guerrilla air warfare. Tracking human moving targets is more difficult than locating armor and fixed targets. Therefore, air power must shape unique requirements for sensors' research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement. An LIC American expert criticized the US military intelligence tendency to emphasize the technological side of intelligence, while LIC operations require effective political/human intelligence, which can be gathered and analyzed by well-educated people with operational experience....


[b]3. Guerrilla Manuals and Related Materials on Guerrilla War and Strategy[/b]

3.1. http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.11 A DEFINITION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch01.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.12 PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch02.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.13 HOW THE URBAN GUERRILLA LIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch03.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.14 TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch04.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.15 THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S WEAPONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch05.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.16 THE SHOT; THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S REASON FOR EXISTENCE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch06.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.17 THE FIRING GROUP
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch07.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.18 THE LOGISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch08.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.19 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA'S TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch09.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.20 THE INITIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Page last updated 11 Mar 2004

3.21 SURPRISE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch11.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.22 KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch12.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.23 MOBILITY AND SPEED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch13.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.24 INFORMATION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch14.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.25 DECISIVENESS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch15.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.26 OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA'S ACTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch16.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.27 ON THE TYPES AND NATURE OF MISSIONS FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch17.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.28 ASSAULTS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch18.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.29 THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MISSION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch19.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.30 RAIDS AND PENETRATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch20.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.31 OCCUPATIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch21.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.32 AMBUSH
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch22.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.33 STREET TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch23.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.34 STRIKES AND WORK INTERRUPTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch24.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.35 DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch25.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.36 LIBERATION OF PRISONERS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch26.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.37 EXECUTIONS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch27.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.38 KIDNAPPING
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch28.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.39 SABOTAGE
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch29.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.40 TERRORISM
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch30.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.41 ARMED PROPAGANDA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch31.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.42 THE WAR OF NERVES
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch32.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.43 HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch33.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.44 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TACTICS
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch34.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.45 RESCUE OF THE WOUNDED
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch35.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.46 GUERRILLA SECURITY
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch36.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.47 THE SEVEN SINS OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch37.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...

3.48 POPULAR SUPPORT
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" title="http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-ca rlos/1969/06/minimanual-u rban-guerrilla/ch38.htm" target="_blank"http://www.marxists.org/archi...


[b]3.5 Ireland's OWN: History (IRA & RIRA)[/b]
[url=]http://irelandsown.net/guerri...[/url]

[b]Table of Contents[/b]

Successful Implementations of Guerrilla Warfare : http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Ground Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare
The IRA
Understanding the Enemy
Guerrilla Commanders
Guerrilla Formations
Guerrilla Units
The Flying Column
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html#flycol" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Defence and Attack Methods
Guerrilla Equipment:
http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" title="http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla2.html" target="_blank"http://irelandsown.net/guerri...
Arms and Explosives
The Barrack Buster
Semtex
Traitors
Theories of Guerrilla Warfare
Psychological Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrillas Should be Volunteers
Importance of Communication
Reaching out to the Masses
Inside Cadres
The Internet
Conclusion

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" title="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bewareoftherise npeople/" target="_blank"http://groups.yahoo.com/group...


[b]3.6. For interesting Scenarios and information on tactics & strategy see:[/b]

[url=]www.guerrillawar.blogspot.com[/url]


[b]3.7. Future Strategy - Putting Together Lessons and A Methodology of Insights[/b]

Every political move – referendum- law – appointment is a military move – since war is in hearts and minds as much as on the filed – you have to respond to each political move – keep the enemy off balance

The elite are always way ahead of us street people – we are always reactive – slow – hesitant.

Just like in Colombia where they say that a massacre is always foretold – obvious
– if you look at US policies in Iraq or in Latin America you see the wars – the massacres – forming.

[b]Key overall guiding principles: [/b]

[b]3 Types of attacks:[/b]

1. Serious strategic attacks – Takeout key people – enemies – leaders – or major infrastructure ( Power Plant – Key Transformer, Chemical Plant – Oil Facility – Storage – Gas lines –Bridges – Dams – Aqueducts –Pumping Station, Railroads, terminals – docks – aircraft – or ports – many choppers or a production facility – government buildings

2. Tactical strikes – to acquire weapons, money, fame, or takeout limited equipment – a plane – a chopper – a communication facility

3. Symbolic Strikes – Sword of Bolivar – Statue of Liberty – Governors’ Mansion -

[b]
3.4 GW Commando Resistance[/b]

This news source occasionally provides analysis and recommendations for resistance groups:

A new low-tech national security strategy

– Venezuela and its emerging allies should adopt commando – citizen resistance strategies to defeat the US and to prepare the people for self and community defense. And Strategic Hamlets should be established on all border areas by the hundreds!



[b]3.8. Scenarios and Battle Examples

A Typical Urban Guerrilla Attack Plan[/b]

[b]TARGET – is a large gun shop or dealer – [/b]

1. Recon – Security at site, where supplies you want are located – the right powder – models etc –
2. Recon the nearest police stations and substations – and queuing areas – coffee shops – hangouts –
3. Observe shift changes and traffic changes – and shoppers at or near the place changes ..
4. Electric distribution of area - also supply transformers if near or big or right time of year – summer or winter extremes – where are key powerlines – gas lines – water system components?
5. Escape plan – route – stash places – breakdowns – re supply –
6. Fall back contingencies – injuries – heat –
7.

[b]Battle Plan :[/b]

1. Large fires or car bombs near a rich part of town away from gunshop – attacks on fire department and police in that part of town – then that group falls back to cover – keep out forces – say to the north – meanwhile gunshop is hit and powerlines/substations taken out all over – communication towers and – or jamming systems are used – and then the roads or police stations are taken out as we retreat with the stash – choppers – some hit ahead of time – some at the time – (dusk - ?? )

Break down part of the shipment quick – smaller trucks – cars – and go in different directions = more fires elsewhere and returned snipers – on fire department and police – nails – caltrops – car bombs for max chaos but minor deaths – Get away – communiquι – and lots of arms !! A smaller and continuous harassment would be to rob police randomly at different areas – times – and ways -!!
[b]
..................4.1 Reader Comments and Musings[/b]

Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia:

Interview militia people in the USA and get perspectives from US and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse.

Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries– McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly
 
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The Few - The Brave - ********************* [ The Clandestine ] -----------------------------******************** Soldiers of the world: +++++++++++++++++++++ Write us; help us; tell the world your dreams and hopes; open up and share - ********************** teach us how to fight! ___________________________ __________________________ .....4.1 Reader Comments & Musings _______________________ _______________________ Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia: _______________________ _____________________ In our region many people are fed up with the federal government goons, the waste inherent in all the laws and regulations and the absolute threats to the Constitution – If it even exists… Abolishing this monstrosity that aims to bureaucratize the whole world is the preferred solution - States’ Rights? – how about State sovereignty and secession? You should interview militia people and their potential supporters in the USA and get perspectives from the many disgruntled US military personnel and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse. *************************** ************************* Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books – Turner Diaries (sans racist stupidity) – McVie – current trends in philosophy – notable contacts – publications – webs – and also SOLDIER FORUMS – so as to channel – unite – give them (soldiers and militia) something new – get them motivated – reformed – improved – focused – revived ! -- or friendly… ______________________ _______________________ _______ _ This game concept is a good way to plug people in and get them thinking clearly and with purpose. - ++++++++++++++++ ++++++++ Bravo! BRAVO !!!