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GUERRILLA WAR :: GAME TIME! ****************************** Send your links and comments to: politicalsoldier@lycos.com ___________________________ ******* ... Why Take Up Armed Struggle? ___________________________ ... or Why Play Guerrilla War ______________________ The art of Revolution: _________________ ------------------------------- ************ A (partially) ANARCHIST VIEW ------------------------------ -----------------******* ********** No SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE in recent world history has been effected through non-violent means. We live in a world of violent domination, where people are either compliant with corporate rule or done away with. As first-world consumers, we are all guilty of directly causing the subjugation of marginalized people the world over, the destruction of the global ecosphere and the deaths of those in political opposition to any government ours has relations with. Americans who claim to be believers in non-violence are fooling themselves. *********************** The legitimacy of armed uprising is an issue that each of us has to decide for ourselves. Pacifism is a sort of self-therapy to dismiss anything the pacifist doesn't wish to confront on a personal level. Don't argue the pacifist point of view with me, and don't censure me. Let the government do it's own dirty work. Now, on with the educational portion of this program... _______________________ _______________________ BUILD YOUR BASE OF SUPPORT... There are things that have to be done before taking up armed struggle. First, surround yourself with people you know well enough to trust with your life. The second is to prepare to leave everyone else you know behind and prepare for a lonely, painful existence of hardship and uncertainty. And drug, drink and sexual abstinence as well. Now you and a small band of friends are ready to begin. Before you pull off your first action, though there are a lot of preparations you will have to make. _________________________ Make sure you know as much as you can possibly find out about your base of operations: Who are your neighbors, do they suspect anything? Are they simpatico? Where are good hiding places? Good escape routes? Any fresh water springs or other sources of water in the area? Can you slip in and out of your basecamp ( or your various urban-rural safe-houses and barns) without being seen or looking suspicious? ______________________ _______ Do you know people outside your group who you can ask for help who will not ask questions and do anything (within reason) to help you? These people are going to be the ones who will let your wounded comrades hide out in their homes until they are better, who will help you acquire food and medicine, who will feed you and deliver messages to your above-ground supporters. You will not succeed in your efforts without at least a nominal base of support. Your supporters need not adhere to your political views. They will help you out because they like you as people and think that you are passionate, even heroic. Do not do anything to expose these people to violence from the police and military. They are not combatants. They have not joined your militia. Keep away from them during times of heightened activity from the police and military forces. ____________________ ___________ The guerrilla group - or preferably a higher level coordinating cadre (politico-military or intelligence) will also identify people or officials who can be coerced or intimidated into helping (money, protection, information on military plans) _____________________ ________ At this time, you should be propagandizing, letting the community know that there are people around who are willing to stop complying with the legal status quo. Through these efforts, you will better understand the community you are involved with. This is the time to confront attitudes - both yours and other's - and get a feel for who can be trusted and how far that trust can go. This is a time when you are vulnerable to arrest. ____________________ __________ Propaganda vehicles consist of flyers, graffiti, guerilla actions against billboards and any media at your disposal - print, radio, video -- anything that you can use to explain why you feel the way you do. _____________________ __________ It is not important to convert people to your side at this point - emphasis should be in setting the proper context for your consequent actions, so that when they begin, people will know what's happening and why. ___________________ ____________ When to begin your activities as a revolutionary fighting unit? Marxist strategy preaches that "the people" should be prepared before there can be a chance for a revolution to be successful. Yet history has shown that "the people" will start kicking ass long before any leadership has emerged. According to Che, the Cuban Revolution proved that an oppressed people sometimes only need a catalyst to prod them into action before they ignite into a mass movement -- to sweep aside the old regime. History has also shown that in the chaos between the fall of the old and the start of the new order, there is a danger of a cultish leader taking control of the revolutionary spirit in order to set himself up as the new dictator. ********************* ***** The times this has not happened, there has been international efforts made to crush the Revolution before it sets an example the rest of the world could follow. These are dangers that need to be considered during the development of the revolution. ******************* ********** Once your group is ready to begin activities, there are considerations: how do you keep the unit supplied with ammunition, what are your targets for attack, are you ready for a counter-strike by the enemy? There is a difference, psychologically, in pressing the attack and being attacked. In the former case, there is a feeling of control, you have met the enemy and are now going to kick his ass. When they come after you, however, there is a feeling of defeat from the outset. Coming under fire by your enemy is unnerving. Even when faced with far superior fire- and manpower, the guerrilla group can escape by stealth or directed assault and use their knowledge of the area to make their get-away. ---------------------------------- --------------------------- ------------------- Essential equipment Here are the things each guerrilla soldier must have: a weapon a sleeping bag or wool blanket a backpack good boots a hammock a tarp some heavy clothing an ammo belt _____________________ __________ A mosquito net would come in handy during the warm seasons, and the guerilla will do well to have some sort of dry food on him whenever possible. Other things that could help out would include a small flashlight, a cup and small pan, a knife of some sort, especially one similar to a Swiss army knife. Some extra cord, string or twine for repairing equipment and stringing up the hammock and tarp is always a good idea. ______________________ __________ The less stuff the soldier carries in the field, the more mobile the unit is. If your unit is operating in a safe, familiar area, you can stash things, like staple foods , medicines and extra ammunition and weapons in hidey-holes spread throughout your field of operations. ______________________ _______ There should be one or two people outside the unit who can act as go-betweens when the unit needs things like food and medicine. It is not important for the whole unit to know these people, nor for them to know much about the unit. You will hopefully have contact with organizations which support your actions. When the time comes to escalate your activities, these outside contacts will become sources for new recruits. ______________________ _________ Desirable Items of Gear and Weaponry ____________________________ 308 and 50 caliber sniper rifles with high powered scopes ________________________ Mortars ________________________ Incendiary and armor piercing ammo ________________________ Spotting scopes and telescopes _______________________ Range finders _______________________ blasting caps and det cord _______________________ familiarity with various timing devices and trip cord booby traps ------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ----------- The Anarchist Guerilla Group _____________________ ______ Decisions - including the choice of commanding officers - are often made by consensus, though this is not always possible. In battle, when unexpected complications arise (serious accidents occur or during severe weather) the officers take the initiative to remedy the situation - longer-term operations are consulted with by a larger group of soldiers. No Anarchist Guerrilla should put themselves in the position of sticking rigidly to non-hierarchal principles in battle situations. The Guerrilla should be able to trust her fellow militia members who have been chosen at large to act in the best interest of the unit. This is easier to do with people you've known a long time or have faced enemy fire with. ********************* ********* The typical Guerilla group is small, between five and a dozen people. Any more than that and the odds of being spotted by the enemy are greatly increased. Any less and there are extreme limits to what your group can attempt and expect to survive. There will usually emerge one or two people with organizational skills who will often serve as leaders due to their general competence. These people may not be the same people who are effective combat leaders. The differences should be respected, as well as acknowledged. These people should be deferred to during times of crisis or difficult decision making such as when chosen officers are missing or incapacitated. ********************* ******* When the conflict escalates, the group will hopefully grow and the experienced members will be thrust into leadership roles with the new arrivals, help them to make the adjustment to clandestine or camp life and teach them how to survive engagement with the enemy. It is worth noting that the successful small group leader will not always be as competent with a larger group. And the person unable to take the initiative with a small group of friends might find herself feeling responsible for the well-being of the new recruits. Let these naturally occurring roles manifest themselves, but always be wary of anyone who takes on too much responsibility. If that person were killed during an action, the group might find itself in deep shit. It is the responsibility of the entire militia to see that all the work is shared by everyone, so that there is always someone available to help out when someone else is lost due to injury or illness. ********************* ****** When the group has grown to ungainly size, it will need to split up. This then creates a new difficulty of keeping in contact and coordinating actions. Therefore, any activities must be planned well in advance - though not necessarily in great detail. This difficulty will be compounded greatly the more recruits there are. The time will come when the militia will have to expand its base of operations. This is like starting all over again, with new contacts to be made with the people in the area, new maps to be acquired, new terrain to be explored. This is a dangerous time for the group, and should be undertaken with a heightened sense of alertness. There should be time available to send men into new places without their field gear, just to pass through and scope things out. It is important for these people to stay out of difficulties with the police in the new places. ----------------------------- -------------------------- ------------------------- Insurrection! ________________________ ______ There are no hard-set rules for making your initial engagements with the enemy: ______________________ Never engage the enemy in an attack that you cannot win. Don't send your infantry to assault a well-fortified airfield or attack a barracks outside your territory - use suicidal bombers or standoff weapons (mortars or 50 caliber rifles). _________________________ Always strike fast, with every weapon at your disposal, inflict the maximum amount of damage that you can and withdraw just as quickly. ________________________ Have your escape planned beforehand. ___________________________ Select a rendezvous point where anyone separated during the fighting can catch up with the others. ___________________________ Make every round of ammunition count. You'll never suffer from an over-abundance of ammunition. ___________________________ Recover ammunition and weapons from fallen enemies. Indeed, many of your engagements will be solely for this purpose. _______________________ _________ Don't panic if things don't go well. Get out as quickly as possible and try to make the enemy regret any pursuit attempted. ______________________ _______ .......... ALWAYS fire from a well-concealed position. ___________________ _____ Not just behind a tree or rock, but laying on the ground behind a tree or rock. It is especially important to be on the ground behind a bush or in grass. If not, the enemy will likely see the discharge from your weapon and be able to aim at that. If you're on the ground, underneath some sort of foliage, the enemy may not even see your gun's blast. The smaller a target you present, the less likely you'll be hit. ____________________ _________ Make sure you're not trapped, in a place where any movement will expose you to enemy fire with no chance for cover. Though these may sound like obvious points, you will be surprised at what people will do in the heat of battle. Practice with paint guns before using real weapons. ______________________________ If you are being pursued by an enemy column, always kill the lead man (the Point man). This will unnerve the enemy and make the point position difficult to fill. This tactic will sometimes divide the enemy against one another, as some men may refuse to take a position that is going to result in their deaths. ___________________________ Your first actions will likely not put a great deal of fear into your enemies. You will have to do armed robberies in order to provision your group with enough food and supplies to get started. Keep some money in reserve in case the group is forced out of their base of operations. Do not rob the families of the people who are your supporters, or who should be your supporters. Rob the wealthy, the powerful and the local tyrants. You'll know who they are, the businesses they own and where they live, if you've made the proper preparations. ________________________________ When you've pulled off your first outright "military" action, this should be followed by a propaganda effort, or propaganda should be made during the action, so that all will know what's going on. From this point on, the Guerrilla is on enemy turf, until they have established complete control of some territory. Once this action is taken, the war is on and the guerrillas will be under constant harassment. _____________________________ -------------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------- Defensive positions ____________________________ You should have prepared several bunkers at different places throughout your base of operations. Here, you can store excess items rather than carry them around with you all the time. These should offer some shelter, not only from the cold and rain, but also from light artillery, such as grenades launched from guns and mortars. Thus, if the attackers are only a small unit you may have some time to evacuate and retrieve valuable equipment. __________________________ Anytime the unit is under fire and has to withdraw from an area, they should do so in an orderly manner. Several people should fall back and offer cover fire so that the others can pull out. These people will then take up firing positions so that the previously positioned guerrillas can then withdraw, too. The process is repeated until the enemy breaks off pursuit. During such a strategic retreat, an experienced fighting unit may sometimes find itself suddenly in the possession of an easily-defendable position. By regrouping there, they may be able to actually mount a counter-attack against the pursuing enemy. To do this, they must attack with great energy and only if they have enough ammunition to sustain the attack. If they can successfully force the enemy into retreat, there will be opportunities to gather ammunition left behind by fallen enemy soldiers. Of course, when faced with superior numbers and firepower, the best idea is to leave the area as quickly as possible. ___________________________ ------------------------------- --------------------------- ---------------------- ..........Taking Action : And Seeking Strategic Effect ___________________________ In Nicaragua (FSLN)-Sandinistas) & El Salvador (FMLN) rebels pulled off spectacular actions not only to display their capabilities, but also to humiliate their enemies. They would capture the banquet hall where a member of a ruling familiy was holding a wedding reception or loot and burn stores that belong to the rulers. The Tupac Amaru attempted such an action in Peru when they took over the Japanese Embassy. They had undertaken the effort as an act of desperation, without really expecting to win the encounter. They could have attempted to shoot their way out, thus giving their supporters and those in sympathy with them a chance to join in the fray. Had they engaged the army units surrounding them in a prolonged, running battle, they could have set the city aflame with revolutionary fever. _____________________________ By carrying out such outrageous actions, the guerrillas illustrate to the people that the powerful are vulnerable. This inspires admiration and respect, not only with the people in the barios, but often in the ranks of the military as well. There are incidents of high-ranking officers in the military, disgusted by the attitudes and behavior of the ruling elite, who would withdraw their troops into their barracks and withhold them from the fighting, then pledge themselves to the revolutionary government. Displays of bravery coupled with upright behavior can win over to the guerrilla's side those who have been apathetic or even opposed to their actions. Not all who serve the powerful enjoy their roles. ___________________________ The focus of the guerrilla groups initial activities will be to disrupt the lives of the enemy forces as much as possible and to cut off their supplies. With stealth and a few homemade weapons, the guerilla band can attack airfields, convoys and other means of supply the enemy will use. Mines that can be detonated by remote switches are effective. Shotguns can be converted into grenade launchers and explosive devices (black powder grenades, molotovs, etc.) can be fired with them. Improvised weapons are effective, not only due to their offensive capacities, but also as a psychological weapon against the opposing soldiers, who assume you have nothing in your arsenal other than a few rifles. ____________________________ Do not take prisoners unless they are valuable - wealthy or high ranking. If possible, escort surrendering troops to a border and tell them to get lost for the remainder of the war. Do not allow them to return to their bases. Since they will be fellow countryfolk, they may actually want to join your side! They must prove themselves under fire before you can trust them with weapons! Until then they can be treated as suspect new recruits. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .......... Urban Warfare Usually labeled as "terrorists", the urban guerilla differs from the traditional "fighting in the fields" guerrilla in their base of operations. The Urban guerrillas are under more intensive scrutiny than those in the woods and have to be careful not to arouse the suspicion of neighbors as well as the police. But, they can hide out just as easily, have more targets to choose from and can often stir up the locals to take part in their actions, even if they are only playing supporting roles. The Sendero Luminoso in Peru existed for years in the slums of Lima. ____________________________ The urban guerilla band will never have the security that the "outdoor" guerrillas have, nor will they usually have the number of people involved in their day-to-day activities, still they will be able to maintain social ties to the outside world. This is both good and bad. It's a security risk anytime someone outside the group becomes familiar with one or more of it's members. The good part is that the urban guerrillas can more accurately assess their situation and plan their actions accordingly. ************************ Urban guerrilla activity is probably the first step to take in a modern industrial state, though it is usually the last phase of the traditional revolution. Due to the amount of police informants, security forces and military available to combat the guerrillas, it is advisable not to stay in one area for very long. Once a few actions have taken place, the guerrilla group can split up and regroup later. This regrouping should be seen as a chance to gather together to plan the next operation and the group should have their combat supplies stored somewhere secure. When the group is dispersed for any amount of time, there is no certainty that all the members will rejoin the group. Some may be arrested, or injured or killed. There is always the danger of being followed or turned in by someone familiar with the guerrillas, maybe even one of its members. In any case, treat a re-grouping with extreme caution, assume the worst and do not wait around for very long for any stragglers. ************************* ------------------------------- --------------------------- ---------------------- .......Some final thoughts about ________________________ Insurrection ________________________ Once a person begins down this road, it is difficult to turn back. Even if one surrenders, there is no guarantee the government forces will accept the surrender, or that they won't have you killed in prison. __________________________ Self-discipline is key to security. Wandering away to have a fling with a babe, getting drunk at a tavern or trying to contact a missed person could result in getting oneself and the entire group killed. The ability to remain calm under duress is extraordinarily useful. If stopped by an agent of the state, try to determine what the matter is all about before whipping out a gun or grenade or taking cyanide. The agent in question could be asking around about something totally unrelated to your activities. __________________________ Try not to be fearful, but allow yourself to use your fear to your advantage. Fear brings about a heightened state of alertness which can be quite useful at certain times. __________________________ __________________________ Russia as Weird as the USA __________________________ The Russian authorities have so far ignored Basayev�s statements. They are most probably investigating the incident that occurred on 18 February in the Ramenskoye district near Moscow. ___________________________ On that day, in the vicinity of the village of Starnikovo, experts found a crater under a pipeline and 10-mm holes in a 200-mm gas pipe. On the day after the incident Alexander Alexeyev, a senior police official with the regional police directorate told Gazeta.Ru that judging by the size of the crater, either two explosive devices of about 200 grams of TNT or a bucket of petrol blew up under the pipeline. An explosive device planted by unknown saboteurs under another pipe in the same area was discovered and defused by sappers before it detonated. Local police suggested that local teenagers, who had watched too many action movies, could have been to blame.

INSURGENCY LIFESTYLES TO Survive

07.12.04 (5:00 pm) [edit]

Key Words:

Fourth Generation Warfare - Insurgents - 4GW - Sun Tzu - John Boyd - Imperialism - War - Clash of Civilizations - Maneuver Warfare - Improvised Weapons - Guerrilla Warfare - US National Security Threats - Intelligence - Espionage - Sabotage - Assassination - Energy Vulnerability - Fifth Generation Warfare - Blackmail - Disrupting Alliances - al Qaeda - Iraqi Resistance - High-Tech Sensors and Surveillance - Neutron Bombs; Terrorism - Terror tactics - Counterinsurgency (COIN) - Special Operations - Military Commands – CIA - Suicide bombings - Car Bombs - Conspiracy Theories - Osprey V 22 - AC-130 Gunships - Osama bin Laden - George W. Bush - Rumsfeld - Fourth World War - Islam - Moslems - Crusades - Jihad - Shahid – Martyrs - Permanent war

http://istanbul.indymedia.org/news/2004/07/8532.php" title="http://istanbul.indymedia.org/news/2004/07/8532.php" target="_blank"http://istanbul.indymedia.org...

A WORLD OF 4GW - INSURGENCY LIFESTYLES TO
SURVIVE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

Dear citizens interested in turning the tide of USA-led fascism, I am a military strategist. I write to you because a great war is breaking out that will make or break this planet. Call it the 4th World War (4WW) - the War of Global Imperialism or the spread of fourth generation warfare -- 5th generation if the Imperialists don't win soon. (See Authors notes at bottom – or at www.soldierrebelion.squarespace.com)

[i]There will be war,
a fourth generation war, a war that the planet and the rich cannot win.[/i]
[b]A Good Defense Anticipates Enemy Offense: Rifleman Democracy[/b]

Traditional individual fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.

Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. So, to be successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box (or Box-cutter!), teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore. Falluja and Najaf/Karbala (in Iraq) support and yet also call into question this Rifleman analysis. Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. We are part way into a permanent war -- which is to say a long and complex war -- The Fourth World War. Groups opposed to the current power structure will have to master 4th and 5th generation mobile-chaos smart-targeting warfare. This kind of war relies on Secret revolutionary/battle/sabo tage cells, international media savvy, and connecting synergistically with each member and each group’s specialties: hackers, bombers, espionage, media, event-timing and logistics. The strength of Islamic fundamentalists lies in their cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) and their ability to combine cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timing to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader crusader (U.S.A.). The case of the FARC guerrillas in Colombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance! = political – territorial – military - financial POWER.

[u]Al Qaeda takes the long view[/u] that if Islam survives they win. Fundamentalist have cohesion and they have a weapon that embodies the most powerful elements of 4GW warfare: People, Ideas and Hardware. The weapon is suicide bombers and suicide car bombers. The West has no defense against such weapons except to declare martial law and watch the global economy crumble in their hands. A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland and starting World War II was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption. – A sinking ship brings out the rats…(UNO- Uno)

[u][b]A New Warfare to Fight the Permanent War of Totalitarianism: 4 GW[/b][/u]4 GW describes any way of dealing with U.S. military forces other than confronting them on the battlefield. It includes all forms of terrorism, guerilla warfare, intifada-type urban unrest -- sometimes financed by relationships with criminal or narcotics networks -- and others that will evolve. (IV.1)

(IV.2.), 4GW is not just guerilla warfare under another name: Perceiving war as a contest marked by the use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragically simplistic, and fundamentally flawed view ... a future war among industrialized states, even if effective and efficient, could be virtually invisible – or it could evolve into a war of insurgents versus States – a judo war of cultural attrition – which side can stand to lose what is important to their culture (civil rights, freedom, shrines, travel, vacations, airconditioning?) for the longest period of time. In 4GW distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-22 aircraft by poisoning the squadron's mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even attacking schools and PXs back at the base. 4GW, while highly "asymmetric," is not the same as "asymmetric warfare," since maneuver warfare is also "asymmetric" and calls for creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses, rather than engaging and trying to reduce his formations and fortified positions directly. Since 2001, more than 50 major active conflicts are brewing, any one of which could be the spark for commitment of US troops. (IV.3.)

We live in a world of "Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)" where the tactics of the weak confound the tactics of the strong. Nation-states confront criminal enterprises, fanatical opportunists, terrorists whose gang-like networks transcend national boundaries. This smorgasbord of actors often slips through the cracks of our own security, military, and legal bureaucracies. Sub-national insurgents use guerrilla tactics, insurrection, sabotage and terrorism to subvert nation-states and challenge the established international system. Governments, politicians, and state military-security apparatus of the West; desperately want to engage their 4GW foes in the tried and true conventional ways of the past.

America prefers combat where only the strongest wins. US fourth-generation foes prefer 4GW judo, avoiding a decisive fight, leveraging US addiction to technology and "throwing us" using the USA's bureaucratic weight to do so. The enemy's "weapons technology advantage" in the 9-11 attacks consisted of box cutters and ceramic knives, combined with a steely determination to die for a cause... it worked, and the modern world's vast military-security-enforce ment bureaucracy was helpless to stop it… and will be again and again…

We are witnessing the early stages of a major geo-political transition. This shift is characterized by a global landscape of conflict where the division between combatant, criminal opportunist and civilian is blurred. In this potential global insurgency, the urban guerilla (not to forget their rural counterparts) may be a religious zealot or a child for hire with an RPG. As technophiles, Westerners are enraptured by modern weapons of great precision, but have lost sight that people and ideas are the essence of why wars are fought and for how long. In the traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the "tactics of the weak." However, they have repeatedly been successful in circumventing our military's far stronger conventional strategy, tactics, and thinking.

Well before the 9-11 attacks al-Qaeda recognized the power of asymmetric warfare and adaptive tactics for their jihad struggle. An article entitled "Fourth Generation Wars," in an al-Qaeda affiliated Internet magazine Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War acknowledges that 4GW forms the foundation of al-Qaeda's combat doctrine. In doing so, the author, Abu 'Ubed Al-Qurashi, reputed to be closely linked with Osama bin Laden, cites the landmark 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" as key to understanding contemporary global conflict.

Only a few military analysts recognize the deadly nature of 4GW
If these factors are driving the evolution of conflict, then solutions must lie primarily in their arenas, that is, within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role, performing specific tasks to solve problems that are intractable through other means. The West is searching for a coherent grand strategy to ensure that military (destructive) actions harmonize with their overall objectives and do not undermine the public support needed to prosecute a fourth generation war to its successful conclusion. In grand strategy, the carrot is as important as the stick, and alliances are critical factors which could favor the US in 4GW against al-Qa'ida and those who support similar ideologies.

Technology is important, and may provide options, but the fact is that lack of suitable technology cannot explain America’s poor track record in fourth generation warfare. Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion.

Our Lives are War: Understanding Iraq/Saudi War Strategies - Insurgency as 4GW,
by Jacques Dessalines and

-- Comprehension of The Grand Strategies of the Key Players -- and the Forces They Represent –
is nowhere to be found...
-- There are many secrets... and plans that only a select few on each of the many sides have privy to.
-- Awareness is a battlefield…

The ruling class employs phases of escalation to control power and its uses:
Fake liberal democracy; sophisticated riot control and subversion of opposition groups; faked national crises leading to martial law and civil war. This final phase in the struggle against the ruling class will spread to most countries in a few years. At times all three phases overlap and so the government and the insurgents take advantage of tactics for influencing all three phases of popular resistance. Sorting out the grand or the priority strategies of either side -- amid this confusion of goals -- is no easy task.

The third and final phase of the struggle against the ruling class will see the development of sophisticated Guerrilla insurgencies employing Fourth generation Warfare (4GW) on the battlefield, the streets and the media: To build or disrupt alliances and to destroy the cohesion of the West and create doubt. (Uno)

The measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies and weapon systems. A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. (Dos.)

.....Between advance and retreat. Hidden dragon. Do not act.
--I Ching

]__________________Newsec tion- either on US strat or on Insurgent –

Both sides in the 4thWW will employ-- - harmony on the inside in order to create and exploit chaos outside. Such a strategy reduces the need for bloody battles. Employing time as his primary weapon, Sun Tzu strove to create ambiguity in the minds of enemy commanders as the milieu for weaving his web of surprise, deception, and rapid switching between orthodox and unorthodox tactics... to win without fighting. (tres)
John Boyd (1927-1997) used his -- observe-orient-decide-act -- (OODA) pattern (also called decision-loop) to operate inside his opponent's decision cycles, generating first confusion, then frustration, and finally panic in the enemy ranks. Once thus set up, the enemy could be finished off with a bewildering array of distracting and probing attacks, leading to multiple thrusts aimed at destroying his cohesion and collapsing his will to resist. A primary measure of merit was prisoner -- not body count. To sustain high operational tempos he codified an organizational climate derived from Sun Tzu, the German blitzkrieg, and the early Israeli Army. (cuatro.)

There are 3 fundamental points to the 4GW:
1. What is important is forces -- combinations of people, ideas, and hardware -- not individual weapons programs.
2. Neither Sun Tzu nor Boyd gave explicit guidance on selecting hardware, however, a hypothetical US strike force (with a hardware component) can be compared to the ancient and news ways of thinking about conflict and maneuver warfare
3. First attack your enemy’s strategy then his alliances and cohesion. (cinco)

Summary of the US 3-4 GW Evolutionary Strike Force:
A. Personnel system that fosters trust, cohesion, and leadership.
[And- for insurgents - to sow suspicion, division and dead leadership among the enemy -- especially among the leaders of US strike forces]

B. Doctrine built around third and fourth generation warfare ideas.
[Insurgents and other anti-American forces will grasp this change and react by acquiring weapons and tactics best suited to fourth and 5th generation warfare (seis.)]

C. Land forces, a U.S. Strike Force, built around:
U.S. Marine Corps, Army 82nd Airborne Division, Special Forces, Rangers, Delta Force, SEALs and other unconventional forces, carrier and land-based tactical air, and Intra-theater lift of heavy armor & mechanized infantry. These would be enhanced through: Robust research, development, prototyping, and experimentation; and increased emphasis on intelligence, including revamping the personnel system to make it co-equal in stature with operations. (siete)
__________(( ADD IN MORE ON US STRIKE FORCE AND its strat -- )))

The core of force effectiveness lies in understanding fully -- why people fight, why they polish their fighting skills, why they refuse to quit until they have won. (( EXorm,ore forfootnotes--))

Insurgents are asking themselves and their spies the same questions as the ruling class. Both sides are predicting the grasp and style of 4th Generation Warfare that the other has and which each will deploy. So far, Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents have out-guessed the US -- though the examples of the US "surrender" at Falluja and Najaf show that the US is catching on fast! (II.7.- ocho)

Evolving Military Strategy for Socio-Cultural Warfare
The strategy devised by Sun Tzu fit the circumstances perfectly. It rested on two major and complementary elements, one internal and one external. Harmony on the inside is The Way (Tao) of war. All else flows from this basic idea, and without it, there is little reason to press forward into the stress of military operations. Externally, Sun's goal was to create confusion in the opposing side and then exploit it. The focus was not on winning through superior tactics or individual fighting technique (although these are important), the enemy commanders must become confused and if possible, driven insane. The tool for accomplishing this was quickness, which helps create ambiguity and also increases the effectiveness of deception, security, and intelligence.

Foreknowledge enables an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others even when the opponent is stronger or wealthier. Foreknowledge must be obtained from reliable people, people who know the conditions of the enemy. (III.2.) Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem conducted before and during combat operations can unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. If one fails to spot mismatches between what one believes to be going on and what really is, (i.e., between Orientation and the real world), one has become "mentally isolated." If adversaries can keep us in this state -- operating inside our OODA loops -- then as setback after inexplicable frustration befall us, we will become disoriented, confused, indecisive, fearful, etc. (III.3.) A competent enemy will create, locate, and exploit vulnerabilities leading, in the case of maneuver warfare, to envelopments, ambushes, high prisoner counts: phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change. Ill-treatment of POWs cannot be tolerated: A battlefield commander wants them to surrender, and needs to make it as easy as possible. (III.4.)

The Utility of Military Force
For Sun Tzu the best way to defeat an enemy is by "attacking his strategy." Attack early, while the enemy's plans are being laid or employ unusual methods to "seize victory without even battling." Should this prove impossible, Sun Tzu then recommends disrupting his alliances. Some say that this means to attack early (pre-emptive strikes), before the enemy can solidify his alliances. Others suggest it means isolating potential enemies from sources of support, or intimidating them through strong alliances of your own. (V.1.)

The use of armed force by the US government must be carefully thought out so that it does not cause more problems than it solves. (V.2.) For this Boyd expands on Sun Tzu's first two courses of action through his concept of "grand strategy," which serves to:
1. Support national goals and pump up one's own resolve, drain away the adversary's resolve, and attract the uncommitted to one's cause
2. End the conflict on favorable terms in the shortest possible time and with the least possible loss of life
3. Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict – don’t kill too many of the enemy or mistreat prisoners (V.3.)

Insurgents will try to block each of these imperialist actions.

U.S. leaders will commit enormous forces to protect such things as access to crude oil, and given the dependence of the U.S. economy on imported resources, practically any part of the world could become a "vital national interest" in the future (Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia). (V.5.)

Military Force vis-a-vis Other Options and Considerations
The Balkans, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq have shown the limited capacity of the major powers to deploy forces relevant to keeping the peace and rebuilding states shattered by civil war. Civil affairs capabilities have proven to be almost non existent. Keeping the peace requires soldiers to act like policemen, a job for which they are ill prepared and ill equipped. Many Third World countries resent the U.S. ready resort to military power. (VI.1.)

Since the Bush invasion of Iraq, large majorities around the world have grown to fear the threat of an Imperial-Crusader US foreign policy and the US proclaimed right to pre-emptive strikes, lies and bullying that it uses to get its way with the people of the Middle East, US allies and the UN. The U.S. is rushing to court unpopularity across the world, contrary to expectations that the Bush national security establishment would conduct itself with sophistication. U.S. foreign policy under President Bush suggests a lack of coherence and a hegemonic arrogance. The Bush administration has set a record for alienating so many nations in such a short period. And then there was Iraq... (VI.2.)

Forgotten are the lesson of the Tao Te Ching, that any use of "power," even (especially) if it is successful, breeds resentment and may plant the seeds of future conflict. (VI.3.) Boyd, Chester and most liberals miss the point of Bush's actions. Having grasped the seriousness of Boyd's predictions about 4GW, the US has been forced to accelerate its program of global domination. Though some mistakes were made -- as in all conflicts -- Bush seeks to draw out potential large nation enemies so that the US can destroy their conventional forces and reduce their support to insurgents. Then the US will only face 4GW and strategic threats of a diminished nature. (VI.4.)

What Makes a Military Force "Effective"? -- Sun Tzu's and Boyd's Perspective
Sun Tzu focused on the problem of how to get groups of people to work together harmoniously under conditions of hardship, danger, and the inevitable confusion of conflict (and it applies to all forms of conflict, including business, politics, and sport). Before envisioning conflict with another state, the ruler and his immediate advisors must survey and compare many factors to guide their plans:

1. Which leadership has the Way? The "Way" (Tao) means harmony among people, so that the people and the leadership are united in purpose to overcome fear of danger. The Way, in this sense, includes unity of purpose between the ruler and the population and other factors, such as the ability to clearly perceive the true situation (which includes the ability to make these comparisons
2. Is the terrain favorable? Is the weather likely to be favorable? Which army can better exploit the advantages of climate and terrain?
3. Which side's generals are the more capable? The political leadership must make objective comparisons of such factors as humaneness, intelligence, trustworthiness, courage, and sternness.
4. Which army's doctrine and discipline is superior? Here the leadership must consider organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and provisions. Whose troops are the stronger, including morally and intellectually?
5. Whose military discipline is more effective? In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out?
6. Whose officers and soldiers are better trained? Whose system of rewards and punishments is clearer? (VII.2.)

Sun Tzu believed that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if wise military practices were applied, war could be waged with certain success. (VII.3.)

Later he restates some of these practices with a more tactical (i.e., who will win the next engagement) flavor:
1. Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious.
2. Those who know when to use many or few troops are victorious.
3. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
4. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious.
5. Those whose generals are able and not constrained by their governments are victorious.

Leaders should improve weaknesses wherever they exist, and the final calculation rests heavily on the experience, intelligence, and intuitive understanding of the commander and the ruler. Success in conflict depends on one's ability to perform these calculations and, in particular, not to deceive oneself. (VII.4.)

Boyd's scheme is:
1. Mutual trust; unity: Similar to The Way in Sun Tzu's list of factors.
2. Intuitive competence, at all levels from private to general. In addition to proficiency with weapons at the individual level, "intuitive competence" also applies at the command levels, where it refers to the "feel" that great commanders have for the progress of the battle, and in particular to their seemingly uncanny abilities to detect and exploit openings while they still present opportunities. This comes from years of practice at ever increasing levels of complexity. The Germans called it fingerspitzengefhl, literally "finger tip feeling" and it implies such a high level of competence that complex decisions can be made without hesitation, similar to the Zen notion of action without a "sticking mind."
3. Mission orientation. The Germans called this auftragstaktik. The basic idea is that commanders and subordinates enter into a type of contract where the subordinate agrees to fulfill the commander's intent, while the commander agrees to give the subordinate wide latitude on how this is done.
4. Focus and direction. Related to the concept of "commander's intent." It often refers to a specific unit and its mission. All other units must make their activities support the fulfillment of this unit's mission. Depending on the progress of the operation, the commander may shift this role to another unit and another mission. (VII.6.)

Boyd's insight was that organizations that operated along these lines would naturally generate higher OODA loop speeds and more irregular ways to employ them. Boyd concluded that such units could:
1. Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistru st with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novel ty as a basis to sever the adversary's moral ties and disorient him.
2. Select the initiative (or response) that is least expected [note: not necessarily the one that has the highest predicted effectiveness, since the enemy can perform these calculations, also].
3. Establish the focus of the main effort (together with other efforts) and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.
4. Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
5. Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for later mop-up.
6. Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic and chaos in order to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse. (VII.7.)

We find echoes in Sun Tzu: 1. Take them by confusion. 2. Throw them into disarray. 3. Cause division among them. 4. Victory is gained by surprise. 5. Take away the heart of their general. (VII.8.)

Cheng and Ch'i: Forcing or Deceiving
The interplay of Cheng (Pinning -- Orthodox) and Ch'i (Distracting -- unorthodox) strategies is a tool of available to those who operate inside their opponents' OODA loops. It applies to the force (people-ideas-hardware) rather than to any particular component alone. Making armies able to take on opponents without being defeated is a matter of unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng) methods ... The unorthodox and the orthodox give rise to each other like a beginning-less circle -- who could exhaust them? (VII.9.) The utility (resiliency, cohesion and cleverness training) of a force can be assessed without predicting how effective it will be. This seeming contradiction hinges on the idea that the actual performance of the force in the field depends on the enemy's actions, which cannot be predicted.

True war-winning effectiveness comes from the force's ability to play the cheng / ch'i game, that is, to set up the opponent, then quickly shift to something he does not anticipate, and then to exploit to the fullest the resulting confusion. A key element of strategy is to "drive the opponent crazy" before actually committing military forces. Isolation in all forms -- particularly diplomatic and economic -- is an effective tool for accomplishing this. (VII.10.) Morally-mentally-physical ly isolate our adversaries from their allies and outside support as well as isolate them from one another in order to magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis, bring about their collapse and/or bring about a change in their political / economic / social philosophy so that they can no longer inhibit our vitality and growth. – Boyd (VII.11.)

Drawn out campaigns tend to strain both alliances and domestic support, and what is seen as gratuitous destruction alienates support in the US, among allied countries, and within those groups in the target society that would support the U.S. The insurgents will seek to exploit the weaknesses in this strategy and make it backfire. They can take advantage of election cycles and mistakes to add to strains in alliances and catch shifting public opinion with symbolic or terror-inducing strikes (assassinations, bombings and kidnappings). (VII.13.)

Creating Forces: Designs for Multiple Next-Generation Strike Forces
In creating forces and assessing them, one needs to ask:
1. Do they offer the requisite variety? Do they present a range of options to the people actually conducting the conflict? Do they facilitate the creation of cheng / ch'i situations? Do they create options that would be least expected by the enemy, not necessarily the one that is predicted to be the most effective?
2. Can commanders rapidly shift the focus if required? When a decision is made, are forces structured and trained so that it can be rapidly carried out? Is this capability being tested and exercised under a variety of circumstances? When selecting between quickness and predicted effectiveness, is there a strong bias towards quickness?
3. Are people and forces being trained to act in harmony? Are organizations formed to foster harmony? Is this quality exercised in a variety of circumstances and are those who prove adept in its employment promoted?
4. What is being done to ensure that people at all levels will take the initiative in harmony with others in the force to achieve objectives? In particular, are all commanders trained to issue mission orders? (VIII.2.)

Instead of detailed tactics, followers of Sun Tzu evolved a way of thinking about conflict. That guerillas should be using Sun Tzu is not surprising, given his emphasis on deception and formlessness, since guerillas that become predictable are quickly eliminated. As the world moves into the 21st Century, such forms of highly irregular and unpredictable conflict are becoming the only way for many opponents to confront U.S. military forces. 4GW (asymmetric" conflict pushed to its limits) is what the U.S. military will have to face in the future. (VIII.4.)

The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others' failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard. (IX.3.) Future wars will be fluid with no defined fronts or formations; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops ask permission and wait for orders; war designed to place the enemy in a dilemma, to suck him in to traps of his own creation, taking advantage of his stupidities and weaknesses and avoiding his strengths; war where soldiers act on judgment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common culture and common outlook; a willingness to fight close, not just applying firepower from a long standoff, but infiltrating when the opportunity arises. (IX.4.)

According to Sun Tzu, The Way of military operations winds through unit cohesion:
Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
Good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of momentum, not from individual people. (X.1.))

Cohesion works because it creates and in turn depends on trust. Harmony is an essential element of any successful organism, and "mutual trust," (translation of the Germaneinheit -- literally, "oneness") is at the top of Boyd's "organizational climate for operational effectiveness.” He concluded that: Harmony in operations is created by the bonds of implicit communications and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar mental images or impressions each individual creates and commits to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of experience in the same ways. (X.2.)

Military hardware and organizations must possess the inherent variety of action to facilitate cheng / ch'i (orthodox/unorthodox) maneuvers. The range of options that a force offers and the rapidity with which it can switch between them is crucial. A clever and motivated enemy can develop counters to any particular capability. One force will win because -- through training, cohesion, and leadership -- it can create options for itself and dilemmas for the enemy, and switch between them more rapidly, more inconspicuously, and with more irregularity than the enemy can cope. When a vulnerability ("gap") has been created or discovered, it can be exploited. Since the enemy is a clever and determined human being, one must assume he will find and close gaps as rapidly as possible, or, even more insidiously, change them into traps, or convert some of them into chengs of his own by attempting to create and exploit gaps in one's own forces. If he can do this more rapidly than friendly forces can cope, he can create Boyd-type effects: panic, confusion, and chaos, leading to collapse. This suggests that forces with mission cycles measured in days, or in some cases even hours, will find it difficult to function as the ch'i component of maneuver warfare, thus limiting the options for commanders. (XI.2.)

Logistics and support requirements play a role in sustaining high operational tempos (ammo, fuel, spare parts). These can interfere with the ability to maneuver and create and exploit gaps. Systems that require extensive logistical support also tend to focus commanders' attention inward. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, it was the rare commander who could envision how to break free of the railroads that were providing his sustenance. Part of the genius of both Grant and Sherman is that they were able to convert this obvious dependency into a cheng, that is, fool Confederate commanders into attacking "lines of supply" while they launched out cross country: Grant towards Jackson and Vicksburg, and Sherman towards the sea. (XI.3.)

Complex hardware and systems focus organizations inward, which can accelerate the trend towards confusion, disintegration, and collapse. However, technical complexity per se is generally not the most severe issue, since it generally "just" degrades how often the system is available for combat. Organizational complexity is much more debilitating and is the key component in Clausewitz's famous friction. It represents organizational entropy that dissipates energy and converts it into chaos, without having to wait for the enemy to do it. In particular, the OODA loops of complex organizations can degrade quickly in such an environment, making them vulnerable to cheng / ch'i maneuvers by the other side.

The real problem with very complex equipment is that it spawns complex organizations to operate, support, and maintain it. In other words, technical complexity tends to generate organizational complexity and thus predictability and slowness. (XI.5.) However, the US defense establishment is so vast that within its shadows there exist focused operational systems (even whole divisions) who are learning from Iraq and adapting technology to aid the new tactics they have adopted. This will force insurgents to become more creative, more cunning and more destructive.

Complexity (technical, organizational, operational) causes commanders and subordinates to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interaction -- hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or even internal) circumstances. The effects of this internal focus were noted above: confusion, disruption, disintegration -- the very effects one should be trying to create in the enemy.

Guerrilla Insurgents and New Technology
Advanced technology has been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision systems, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.

To counter enhanced guerrilla technologies "Finders" -- intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets are being deployed. The role of wide-area assets is to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. A limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage -- a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars will enhance U.S. surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor. (XII.5.)

Advanced Sensor and Surveillance Technologies
Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors make it possible to examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination. Other technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical "sniffers." Miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. Lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles may soon patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysi s devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a "mothership" or a ground station. Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors.

One can listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building's windows. Experiments are under way with radars that have the potential to "see" through walls. Tagging suspected vehicles helps develop information about patterns of activity and assists shooters in engaging elusive targets. An operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. The transmitter permits authorities to monitor that vehicle's movement. Signals from the transmitter make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle "in the crosshairs" should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy the vehicle. (XII.6.)

Most researchers ignore that technology promotion by the US is primarily to re-assure its people of US superiority, second to prop up the profits of the Congressional-Military-In dustrial Complex and by creating so many and diverse technological gadgets and systems some of them turn out to actually be useful. Effectiveness concerns have also overcome institutional momentum in a few notable cases. The Commanche helicopter program was scrapped after costs and concerns that insurgents will posses advanced surface to air missiles rendering the aircraft obsolete. (XII.7.)

Force Structure Options
Summary of the guidelines for a Sun Tzu / Boyd force:
1. Military force is a key component of furthering national interests, but it is not the only component or in many cases even the primary one. It should always be used sparingly.
2. Military forces, when they are used, should obey Sun Tzu's dictum: end the conflict in the quickest possible time with the least possible damage to either side.
3. Military operations against conventional forces, for example, to assist an ally under conventional attack, must be conducted as maneuver warfare. That implies a substantial capacity to play the cheng / chi game against any potential opponent.
4. Military operations in 4GW must be carefully measured so that, by their very success, they do not strengthen the hands of opponents. It truly is not necessary to destroy the village in order to save it. (XIII.1.)

The changing nature of conflict has led the US to focus on littorals (regions within 100 miles of the sea), where most of the world's people, wealth, commerce, instabilities, and U.S. interests are concentrated. The need for intervention and extraction capabilities to protect lives, property, commerce, and other interests demands an emphasis on high-speed lighter forces configured for autonomous operations in hostile regions. The rise of 4 GW results in a need for irregular war-fighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small-unit operations among state/non-state actors. Characteristic of this are the following:
a. Decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground warfare.
b. Decreased reliance on deep-strike/interdiction/ strategic bombardment of "infrastructure" in air warfare.
c. Increased reliance on fast-transient littoral penetration operations, info-war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/ antiterrorist/ antinuclear operations, and increased occurrences of urban/suburban combat.
d. Increased resource constraints resulting in internal competition for resources. (XIII.3)

Evolving US Strike Forces and Rapid Deployment Options
The U.S. Marine Corps provides all the conventional ground warfare capability needed to engage the land forces of any Third World country. The three active duty U.S.M.C. divisions provide a range of capabilities, including heavy armor, light armored vehicles, organic artillery, air support and infantry. The Marine Corps, beginning with its 1989 edition of Warfighting, is the farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Using them, the Marines liberated Kuwait in two days and probably could have done it sooner. Once the rout began, there was nothing to stop a Patton-esque penetration -- properly supported from the air (as Patton's was) and logistically (as Patton's was not) -- from continuing straight on to Baghdad. The big hook around the left flank was at best cheng, perhaps unnecessary, and in any case, failed to accomplish its stated objective, since the bulk of the capable Iraqi forces escaped over the Euphrates. (XIV.1.)

Fire Support and Weapons Requirements
Before World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Then the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment was developed where the objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy's war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War was the first time that precision guided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force (Bosnia and Kosovo). Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. (XV.2.)The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead and coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laser homing guidance.

Similar capabilities have been demonstrated in Iraq (2003-2004). However, the shock-and-awe initial attacks were not particularly effective and the US has failed to kill a single Iraqi leader with bombs as of June 2004. Weapons or technology without solid intelligence to guide them are dangerous and of marginal tactical or strategic value. (XV.3.)

LOCATING & ATTACKING TERRORISTS & RELATED TARGETS
Improvements are being developed so that U.S. air forces can identify and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist to define new and more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets. Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. They may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments, or they may choose urban environments (again occupying unexceptional buildings). Within these environments, terrorists may be stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatant (family members or unrelated strangers). New concepts for engaging such a demanding target set will seek to incorporate innovations among "finders, controllers, and shooters." (XV.4.)

U.S. forces can apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 Specter gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions. It combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. The crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy's ability to observe preparations for an attack. (XV.5.)

One can also envisage situations in which U.S. involvement in counterterrorist operations is desired but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. The Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind "fingerprints" associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes. Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged. (XV.7.)

To cause larger enemy formations to stop moving and to engage land forces ashore, a US strike force needs an effective close air support and air interdiction capability. This would facilitate maneuver warfare in littoral areas outside the battleship range, and it could also provide fire support and interdiction in conjunction with unconventional forces operating much deeper -- perhaps in a thrust / feint towards the capital or ruling juntas residences, weapons of mass destruction storage / launch facilities, etc. In order to support high operational tempos and interfere with the enemy's, an aircraft must be developed capable of operating from carriers, as well as far forward from austere bases (and generating high sortie rates). Such considerations suggest a short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft with system redundancy, a low vulnerable area, low visible signatures, and high loiter capability. Particular attention should be paid to allowing it to operate successfully in an environment infested with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS -- shoulder-fired infra-red missiles), of which there are upwards of 500,000 in the world today (accounting for 2/3 of all aircraft destroyed by ground fire in the last 15 years). This implies a low infra-red signature (less than one-tenth that of an F-16, which is itself some 35 times that of an AH-64 Apache helicopter). It should be designed to rain enough chaos from the sky to cause Third World troops to rapidly leave their vehicles and not return for an appreciable time. (XV.8.)

The Marines have the AV-8B Harrier, but it is expensive, complex, and vulnerable to ground fire. U.S.A.F. studies in the1980s demonstrated the feasibility of developing a simpler and more rugged aircraft.

OspreyCV-22
With a range of 515 miles and capable of transporting 24 troops plus the two man crew (at 275 knots), the V22 is set to play an important role in transporting Special Forces. The vertical takeoff plane can carry a 10,000-pound payload 50 nautical miles at 3,000 feet. During the previous OPEVAL (operations evaluation tests), 24 combat loaded Marines were flown in the MV-22. Ingress and egress were demonstrated without difficulty. The Air Force requires the CV-22 to provide a long-range VTOL insertion and extraction capability and to supplement the Special Operations Forces (SOF) MC-130 aircraft in precision engagement. The V-22 design, incorporating advanced mature technology and b survivability and crashworthiness. A tiltrotor combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft represents a technological breakthrough in aviation that meets long standing military needs. The US has the capability to quickly move more than 10,000 troops into any nation’s capital or key cities and back them up with sustained firepower.

FFOOTTHNNOTE SSS

Uno

Dos : See full article and introduction with a comment on the Massive US base
at Diego Garcia: Section I. INTRODUCTION: The Stages of Ruling Class Control Mechanisms
http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/0 58642.html" title="http://www.mblog.com/imperialiststrategy/0 58642.html" target="_blank"http://www.mblog.com/imperial...
Rifleman Democracy (plus INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION; long w/footnotes plus ); http://communitydefense.blogs...

Tres.:

Cuatro
Cinco
seis
siete
ocho:- See complete article at: Section II. National Defense Review --
http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us -national-defense-review.html" title="http://communitydefense.blogspot.com/2004/06/section-ii-us -national-defense-review.html" target="_blank"http://communitydefense.blogs...
With Photo Gallery at: Section II. National Defense Review
http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000380294 &zorpiasid=6c3126873f1df1 f1af3dfc56134f5cde" title="http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal.cgi?journal_id=0000380294 &zorpiasid=6c3126873f1df1 f1af3dfc56134f5cde" target="_blank"http://zorpia.com/cgi/journal...

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I have worked in British intelligence services and for American security firms that directed the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. I have worked for the Iraqi resistance. I am a strategist and not much of a philosopher by training, but I can tell you of my experiences. I cannot tell you which political, social or religious systems work the best -- because what is the best or even what is good for the short or the longterm has been degraded and mystified in this existence that we call the modern world. People cannot talk about the definitions of important things or about why communications/understand ing are so difficult.
I can tell you what I have seen. These are stories from behind the curtain of the rich and powerful. Wherever US-UK money goes it breeds the most vile corruption. From the sex-slavery of Dyncorp in Bosnia to the same group and many other security contractors committing torture, murder and atrocities in Iraq; from the jokes about the Colombian and Peruvian airlines/airforce drug smuggling to the hilarious naivete of US activists and eco-tourists. There are 100 stories of the tragedies tolerated or promoted by the USA government and its elite classes around the world. To know the details of these evil errors (evil -- but are they errors or intentional? Ah...) is to understand why for billions of people in the world -- and millions of insurgents everywhere - there is no turning back toward (false) ideas of peace or cooperation with the West or its ruling class imperialists.

The Few - The Brave - ********************* [ The Clandestine ] -----------------------------******************** Soldiers of the world: +++++++++++++++++++++ Write us; help us; tell the world your dreams and hopes; open up and share - ********************** teach us how to fight! ___________________________ __________________________ .....4.1 Reader Comments & Musings _______________________ _______________________ Suggestions from the South Cascade Militia: _______________________ _____________________ In our region many people are fed up with the federal government goons, the waste inherent in all the laws and regulations and the absolute threats to the Constitution � If it even exists� Abolishing this monstrosity that aims to bureaucratize the whole world is the preferred solution - States� Rights? � how about State sovereignty and secession? You should interview militia people and their potential supporters in the USA and get perspectives from the many disgruntled US military personnel and soldiers around the world. Sponsor open discussions of the Meaning of Life in these times; strategies for defending homelands; and tactics and the psychology of social collapse. *************************** ************************* Review and summarize the philosophy and "resistance knowledge" from militia people and related books � Turner Diaries (sans racist stupidity) � McVie � current trends in philosophy � notable contacts � publications � webs � and also SOLDIER FORUMS � so as to channel � unite � give them (soldiers and militia) something new � get them motivated � reformed � improved � focused � revived ! -- or friendly� ______________________ _______________________ _______ _ This game concept is a good way to plug people in and get them thinking clearly and with purpose. - ++++++++++++++++ ++++++++ Bravo! BRAVO !!!